BOTH collectively and individually, we Pakistanis have a truly amazing capacity for self-delusion.

A case in point is the recent report published by this newspaper containing recommendations for reforms in the foreign office made by a number of senior army generals. One of them has written: "Today Pakistan is most isolated. China is lukewarm, Iran is not as close (as it used to be), Muslim world [sic] lacks desired warmth, USA/West [sic] misses no opportunity to show us in bad international light, a lot more is to be done in South Asia, Afghanistan, Central Asian Republics and Africa. We definitely need a breakthrough with Russia."

This analysis displays a disquieting degree of innocence in a senior army officer. If, as the author of this report suggests, Pakistan is "most isolated", who is to blame? Are not our blind support of the Taliban and our aggressive Kashmir posture the main causes for our isolation? And who is the architect of these policies? Certainly not our politicians or our foreign office mandarins. Both may be guilty of much else, but I'm afraid GHQ has to accept much of the blame for this isolation. When Benazir Bhutto was offered the position of prime minister in 1988, one of the conditions imposed by the establishment was that she would not tinker with Zia's Afghan policy. She was happy to go along, and this has been true of her successor, Nawaz Sharif.

Similarly, the foreign office has very little input in our moral and material support of the jihadi groups fighting in Kashmir. While officially we deny supplying and training these guerillas, it is difficult to believe that they could have carried out the Kargil operation alone and unaided. To then expect the foreign office to defend this action in capitals abroad, and to blame it for not doing so effectively, is both churlish and cynical.

Another general writes: "What is the system of dealing with negative news in international news or electronic media? They need to have a pre-emptive and, in fact, offensive strategy. Why did we not react to the Indian campaign of calling Pakistan a rogue army?"

Having served as the information minister in our embassy in Washington ten years ago, I can assure the general that the international media does not accept orders as readily as an army battalion does. Just getting a denial or a rebuttal printed in the letters column can become a major task. Forget about "offensive" or "pre-emptive" strategies, it is very difficult for a Third World diplomat from a country with a serious image problem to influence a newspaper's policies or perceptions. There are 600 press officers from countries and organizations around the world based in Washington to monitor and influence US media. To expect the Pakistani representative to adopt a "pre-emptive" or "offensive" strategy in such an environment is to display total ignorance about the working of the western media.

And when he asked why our missions abroad did not react to "the Indian campaign of calling Pakistan a rogue army", the general would do well to remember that the same Pakistan army has staged four coups in our 53-year old history, and has interfered incessantly in politics even when it was ostensibly in the barracks. We have before us the admissions of an army chief and the ex-ISI head about the financing of anti-PPP candidates in national elections. Against this background, it becomes difficult to defend such an institution abroad, especially when the fighting in Kargil had reached battlefield proportions, and the prime minister of the day had denied giving the orders to launch the attack.

When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait ten years ago, many people wondered why he took that insane step, when we could all foresee the consequences. I am convinced he took the gamble because he is too unsophisticated to know the dynamics and compulsions of western power centers, chiefly the US. Having hardly traveled abroad, he sees the world through his narrow vision; and as a dictator, he takes all major decisions himself without having to convince his colleagues and his country. Thus, his moves are largely divorced from global political realities.

Sadly, one is forced to conclude that despite the many differences between Pakistan and Iraq, our decision-making process also seems to function in isolation. While deciding to first set up and then give open-ended support to an obscurantist group like the Taliban, the government of the day (led by Benazir Bhutto, incidentally) imagined there would be no collateral damage in terms of negative publicity abroad and a spillover effect at home.

Similarly, when foreigners and innocent civilians are killed at random in Kashmir, Pakistan is held at least partly responsible because of the succor we provide to the many militant groups operating there. Nobody abroad (and many at home) accepts the distinction currently being made between jihad and terrorism: random violence targeting innocent civilians is abhorred the world over, irrespective of the righteousness of a cause.

The author of one of the recommendations asks: "Does our foreign policy have desired linkage [sic] with our national interests and aspiration?" Clearly not: any sane foreign policy is directed towards enhancing security through improving ties with neighbors and favorably influencing major powers where possible. In our case, we have antagonized neighbors like Iran by blindly supporting the anti-Shia Taliban, while simultaneously allowing local Sunni militias free rein to terrorize Shias. Relations with India are at their lowest ebb. China is annoyed with the activities of Pakistani fundamentalist groups on its soil, and is in any case too busy trying to establish itself as a world power to continue supporting our activist Kashmir policy.

As to our "national interests", we have yet to define them: do they lie exclusively in gaining all of Kashmir and getting control over Afghanistan through the Taliban? Or do they consist of aiming for a prosperous, peaceful and progressive Pakistan? The latter was Jinnah's vision, and the former is the ambition of the establishment. Unfortunately, there has been no public debate on these vital matters as a small but powerful and articulate section of our society has virtually hijacked the national agenda.

A major problem is that while this same lobby would like to see Pakistan improve its economy and interact effectively on the world stage as an equal, it insists on following narrow, retrogressive policies in the region and at home. This has the natural effect of isolating Pakistan. Unfortunately, the establishment remains blind to this contradiction. Until this contradiction is recognized and resolved, it is pointless blaming the foreign office or anybody else.