LIKE other Nadras I have known, NADRA (National Database and Registration Authority) is not famous for either accuracy or punctuality.

With much fanfare, it produced electoral rolls for several districts which were so riddled with mistakes that the Election Commission had to withdraw them. Now NADRA has promised us error-free lists by November 28 so that local bodies elections can be completed in 18 districts by December 31. Good luck, is all I can say; however, I am taking no bets on NADRA's ability to deliver.

I have been unable to comprehend the military mind's insistence on reinventing the wheel each time the army takes over. Since this happens with monotonous regularity in Pakistan, my failure to understand the psychology of successive juntas is a matter of some concern to me. In this particular case, we have an Election Commission and a Census Bureau, both of which have been performing as well as can be expected of government agencies. If our present rulers were unhappy with their performance, surely the answer lay in improving the existing departments instead of creating yet another bureaucracy. It seems odd that when all the talk in the corridors of power is about downsizing, a new Authority is created without closing down the existing agencies responsible for registering voters and issuing ID cards.

When General Naqvi's National Reconstruction Bureau unveiled its grandiose devolution plan, it produced all the excitement of Hanif Mohammad grinding out a century in two days of defensive batting. The complicated set-up proposed in the plan, far from gripping the imagination, is virtually incomprehensible to the very people who are supposed to work the new system. Why a new local bodies system was necessary when a perfectly good one existed already is again beyond me. I suppose when you establish such a pompous-sounding agency like the NRB those put in charge feel they have to produce something grand. While I respect its head, General Naqvi, I'm afraid I simply don't see how his plan will lay the foundation for a brave new Pakistan.

One big problem with the concept is that it attempts to administratively detach the district from the provincial government. By involving the central government in district administration, the plan strikes at the very heart of provincial autonomy. Ultimately, the blueprint produced by the NRB ensures that there will be constant tension between the federal and the provincial governments.

Then, by declaring that these elections will be on a non-party basis this government has effectively reduced the participation level. Traditionally, political parties have brought out voters in Pakistan. In the currently planned exercise, candidates will be vetted, and those with declared party affiliations will be disbarred. Thus, an entire layer of political workers will be prevented from contesting the elections. Unknown faces with no party ties will find it difficult to motivate voters, and I can foresee a very low turnout.

Then there is the whole business of ensuring that candidates are 'morally sound'. What does this mean, and who will pronounce on such a tricky issue? To me it smacks of an attempt to keep independent minded people out of the fray. In the last few months, General Naqvi has been touring the country to sell his devolution plan, and at a breakfast meeting, I pointed out to him that in recent elections, the ISI and the army have admitted to indulging in fairly blatant rigging. What assurance did we have that they would not similarly try to fix the results to suit themselves? The good general solemnly assured me that this would not happen. With the same solemnity, I am passing on his assurance to readers.

Perhaps the biggest problem inherent in the scheme is that it has been rejected and roundly condemned by all the major political parties. Although the army can ram the plan through while it is in power, it is difficult to see how these local bodies will continue functioning after national and provincial elections are held by October 2002, as mandated by the Supreme Court. Why should popularly elected political governments finance and support local bodies created under a military government? When General Pervez Musharraf was asked this question a few months ago, he said in effect that the army would make sure that this system stayed intact even after the army had gone back to the barracks. I am not wholly convinced that having this permanent bone of contention between the defence forces and the civilian government is a good idea. A scheme without support from any significant political party is doomed to failure in the long run.

None of this should be taken to mean that I oppose the growth of democratic institutions at the grassroots level. Far from it. I think our politicians have bypassed and generally ignored local councils because they found them inconvenient with the result that they have failed to take root. But I am far from convinced that the answer lies in discarding the previous system and replacing it with a complicated, cumbersome scheme that has not found acceptance in any quarter.The army high command has to realize that just because they (and most of us as well) are dissatisfied with the performance of our politicians, the remedy does not lie in trying to pervert the political process in order to eliminate them and render the entire class irrelevant. Like it or not, politics is an integral part of the life of any progressive, vibrant society. By artificially trying to suppress it, bypass it or marginalize it by any method, the army destroys viable institutions without replacing them with any sustainable ones. This is the problem we have been facing under various military governments, and is one reason why we are where we are today. Each time a new junta is in power, it seeks to neutralize politicians and replace them with a pliable crew of the army's choosing. Unfortunately, these people are unacceptable to voters.

Instead of tinkering with political matters of which the generals have little experience, the junta would do far better to try and fix things like electricity and water supplies. Alas, its performance in these fields is also far from satisfactory. So perhaps the army should stay in the barracks, and when needed, at the border. If it is absolutely forced to intervene, it should play a purely caretaker role with a clear timeframe and an exit strategy. Above all, it should not try and reinvent the wheel each time it is in power.