BEING human, we all like to think we are more important than we really are. But while individuals can afford to nurse delusions of grandeur, nation-states do so at their own peril.

I think it is Margaret Thatcher, the erstwhile Iron Lady of Britain, who first propounded the thesis that her small country "punched above its weight" - that is, it played a bigger role on the world stage than warranted by its size, population and military and economic strength. Although this notion was never seriously tested in recent times, it made good headlines and probably kept the British voters happy.

Tony Blair, nothing if not adept at cashing in on the "feel good" sentiment (considerably dented of late by herds of British cattle, sheep and pigs who refuse to cooperate with the Labour Party), has seized upon this boxing metaphor for his Cool Britannia. But we need to remember that Britain's global clout, such as it is, depends on hanging on to American coattails. It no longer has an independent foreign policy and is reduced to being Washington's surrogate in Europe.

If this is true for Britain today, it was certainly true of Pakistan until a decade ago. Years of being the United States' regional chowkidar in its cold war with communism gave successive Pakistan governments the illusion that we were stronger than we actually were. Basking in our role of America's anointed ally, we continued posturing long after the cold war was over and the Soviet Union imploded under the weight of its many inefficiencies. More than a decade later, we continue to think we are the tough kid on the block although we have long since been left to our own feeble devices by our ex-patron. Unfortunately, our leadership still has to wake up to the new realities, and continues to follow external policies we can no longer sustain.

These ideas were very succinctly and lucidly developed by Dr Charles Amjad Ali during a discussion on his recent visit to Karachi. A Pakistani scholar in the United States, he holds the Martin Luther King Jr chair at the Hubert Humphrey Institute in Minnesota. According to him, Pakistan jumped on the American bandwagon soon after its creation, and reaped many advantages as a result. From the western point of view, it occupied a very strategic position by virtue of its location at the cusp of several important regions like China, the Soviet Union, the Middle East and South-East Asia. As a result, it received substantial aid as well as sophisticated arms, apart from diplomatic support from the West. India, because of its pro-Soviet stance and its tightly controlled economy, did not get the importance it deserved.

Now the picture has changed completely as the end of the cold war has coincided with the opening of the Indian market and the liberalization of its economy. Now, there is a convergence of American government and corporate interest in redressing the earlier imbalance in their approach towards India, and Washington has no hesitation in recognizing its pre-eminent role in the region.

Pakistan, on the other hand, because of its short-sighted policy in Kashmir and Afghanistan, its inability to make democracy work and its support of terrorist organizations, is now beyond the pale, at least as far as American policy-makers are concerned.

Unfortunately, our own military and civilian leaders have not grasped the fact of Pakistan's irrelevance to the rest of the world and continue posturing as though we still counted for much. (Incidentally, I took no notes during our discussion, so I might have put words in Charles' mouth that he did not utter; if so, my apologies to him).

It is a fact that had we not allied ourselves with the United States in our early years, our leadership would have had to come to terms with our financial and military limitations, and presumably settled the Kashmir issue long ago. It is entirely possible that the shape of such a settlement might not have been entirely to our liking, but at least we would not have carried this millstone around our neck for fifty years. An appearance of strength that is devoid of real substance can be a dangerous thing for it inspires a false feeling of confidence verging on bravado.

In our case, our policies have been warped by the knowledge that we had the support of the United States and China. The former has bluntly told us to get lost; the latter is too polite to openly say so, but by telling us to settle the Kashmir issue directly with India, it has changed its stance substantially, and sent us a signal that it will not get involved in sub-continental problems. Hopefully, this dose of reality will concentrate minds in the Foreign Office and GHQ, but one is not taking any bets.

Another fact we must keep in mind is that a man who has been rich finds it hard to come to terms with recent poverty, while a man who is born poor copes much better since this is the only condition he knows. Similarly, having once thrived on a superpower's support, we find it difficult to adjust psychologically to our present reduced status of a cold war orphan.

Accustomed as we are to the presumption of regional parity with our neighbour, we are sulking at the attention the whole world is showering on India, while simultaneously smarting from our neglect.Major geo-strategic changes call for wrenching changes in outlook and policies. Unfortunately, we continue to behave like the proverbial impoverished minor nawab who migrated from India, leaving everything behind, but continues to act as though he were master of all he surveyed. The one thing that is certain in human history is that nothing is certain.

Civilizations have risen and fallen, and are now no more than a distant memory. Seen from this perspective, Pakistan's creation and brief existence counts for but an instant on the scale of human history. If we are to play a positive role, we need to think about our role and our situation.

The fact is that in the long run, financial and intellectual capital now count for far more than military might. In our context, we can no longer sustain our aggressive posture: near bankruptcy and with a rotten credit rating, we are now at the end of our tether. If we are to survive and develop, we have to reduce our non-development expenditure. In short, we have to adopt policies that are realistic and we can afford and that are in our interest, and remember that Washington is a long way away, both in terms of distance and time.

The enfeebled boxer who tries to punch above his weight gets knocked out.