As war drums beat louder than ever in South Asia and the Middle East, the faint promise that some good might come out of the September 11 attacks in the United States is quickly evaporating.

In both regions, the vague prospects of peace have been effectively derailed by a combination of suicide bombings and cynical leaders. Ironically, the compulsions of forging a makeshift coalition in the 'war against terrorism' had raised hopes that some of the underlying causes of the September 11 attacks - like the occupation of Palestinian territory by Israel - would at last be addressed. Indeed, President Bush's statement that he accepted the idea of a Palestinian state encouraged many into thinking that a sea change had occurred in American policy.

Similarly, repeated western pledges 'not to walk out of Afghanistan' this time were widely believed. Many saw an era of continued engagement in the region as Afgahanistan was rebuilt after two decades of warfare, and its institutions restored. In this rose-tinted scenario, a reformed Pakistan would re-enter the fold of respectable nations, and a combination of American pressure and persuasion would be brought to bear on New Delhi and Islamabad to resolve the festering Kashmir problem.

In brief, a better world would emerge from the rubble of the World Trade Centre, and those thousands of lives would not have been lost in vain. Now welcome to the post-Taliban world of realpolitik: the rhetoric from Delhi gets shriller and more bellicose, and is matched by the violent words and actions emananting from Tel Aviv. Mercifully, as I write this, the shelling in the subcontinent is limited to that unfortunate punching bag, Kashmir. But unless cooler heads and common sense prevail, things can spiral quickly out of control. If this happens, the terrorists who attacked the Indian parliament last week would have won.

The common strand that runs from the subcontinent to the Middle East is the harsh reality that when the push comes to a shove, long-term self-interests are more important than the temporary expedients that briefly hold wartime coalitions together. Thus, the cold war succeeded the alliance between the Soviet Union and the western powers immediately after the Nazis had been defeated. And following the recent defeat of the Taliban and Al-Quaeda, signs of strain in the American-led coalition are already evident. Indeed, the earlier clarion calls for rebuilding a devastated Afghanistan are very muted now, and the billions of dollars being bandied about seems more and more like the election pledges of politicians rather than the basis for a real plan of action.

In the Middle East, Sharon has cleverly used the recent Palestinian suicide attacks against the Israeli occupation to draw parallels between his country's situation and the September attacks against America, thus gaining Bush's support for the bloody reprisals and state terrorism against the Palestinians. Now the Israelis want to send Arafat packing just as Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden were evicted from their positions of power. Bush, seeking to secure more Jewish votes in the next election than he managed in his controversial victory last year, is more than willing to support Sharon.

In the subcontinent, the Americans are equally ready to press Musharraf to crack down on terrorist organizations like the Lashkar-i-Taiba and the Jaish-i-Mohammad, accused by New Delhi of being behind the attack on the Indian parliament. I have long been of the view that these extremist outfits are a danger to Pakistani civil society and need to be crushed. However, by making a hysterical demand for action, Vajpayee has placed the Pakistani president in a very awkward position: if he cracks down on them, he will be accused of caving in to Indian pressure.

If he does nothing, he will be seen as being soft on terrorism by Washington. Musharraf has tried to find some wriggle space by condemning the attack and offering a joint inquiry, but this has been predictably rejected by New Delhi. Had Vajpayee resorted to quiet diplomacy, Musharraf could have found a face-saving way out, taking action against those behind the attack while being seen by his domstic critics as independently moving against a domestic threat.

Another myth to have been exploded in the aftermath of the 'victory' over the Taliban and Al-Quaeda is that Bush had moved towards multilaterlism after his intitial unilateral approach following his first few days in the presidency. It was widely assumed that his earlier rejection of the Kyoto accord and the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty would be tempered with a more internationalist attitude towards world affairs because of the American need to forge an alliance against terror.

This view, too, has had to be changed in the light of events: when the Americans realized that most of the world that counted was more or less obliged to follow where they led, they have again returned to unilateralism. Against every expectation and prediction, the Muslim world did not explode into flames as the Americans bombed Afghanistan for weeks; the Russians have jumped on board with great enthusiasm; and the Europeans (most notably Britain) have served as cheer-leaders and hand-maidens.

So the question now probably being asked in Washington is: why do we have to modify our policies and priorities when the rest of the world is willing to play ball according to our rules? Why indeed? The hard reality is that as the sole superpower, the United States is able and willing to enforce its diktat around the world. And if somebody doesn't like it, tough. There is much unease among America's current allies about the possibilty of an attack on Iraq despite the lack of any evidence linking it with the events of September 11. But Bush and his right-wing coterie are fully aware that if they do decide to go after Saddam Hussein, there won't be much anybody will be able to do about it.

But this kind of 'America first' approach is likely to prove self-defeating as it will further push desperate men into taking desperate action. While Al-Qaeda may have been destroyed, the motivation of its cadres and its many admirers and supporters remains undiminished.