When in France, I am often asked where I come from, and when I say "Pakistan", more often than not the response is "Ah, Pakistan! Beaucoup de problemes la!"

In part, the perception that Pakistan is, first and foremost, a country with many problems is due to the recent terrorist attack in Karachi that left a dozen French engineers dead. But more than any single incident, the last quarter century has been a period of mounting crises in Pakistan, most of them self- created. A combination of political ineptitude and short-sighted and self-serving military rule has generated new contradictions and made the old ones more difficult to resolve.

The recent series of attacks against Christian and western targets provides us with a glimpse of the hellish black hole we have reached. While many Pakistanis resent the increasingly negative image we have abroad, the fact is that for much of the world, nothing good is associated with our country which is, more than ever before, seen as a centre of religious intolerance and violent extremism. The two murderous attacks against Christian establishments in Murree and Taxila recently have only reinforced this view.

In the aftermath of 9/11, many of us supported Musharraf's forced conversion to the American anti-Taliban cause in Afghanistan because we felt that finally we would see a much- needed cleansing of extremist, jihadi elements from our society. As violent events over this last year have reminded us, fanaticism is not easily managed and directed: jihadi groups have their own agenda and play along with intelligence agencies only to the extent it suits them. To imagine that they would support Gen Musharraf's pro-American stance and lower their profile in Kashmir at the same time displays an alarming naivete.

Ever since they regrouped after the hammering they took in Afghanistan, they have been driven by a burning desire for vengeance. Since the Americans are too powerful and too far from the region, Musharraf and his government are the obvious target. By attacking soft western and local Christian targets, they have sought to destabilize a government they see as their foe. Their calculation seems to be if they can topple the Musharraf government, the ensuing chaos would give them the opportunity to regroup and carve out a base in Pakistan, much as they had in Afghanistan.

In order to counter the jihadis and their politics of violence, one would have thought the obvious move for the army would be to seek a united front with all the mainstream political groups and leaders. Unfortunately, with elections around the corner, Musharraf and his minions are still playing power games by hobnobbing with minor parties in a bid to keep the two major political groupings out in the cold. This fixation with individuals at the cost of national interests could cost us very heavily indeed.

The political vacuum that might result if the government succeeds in its aim of denying power to Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif despite their demonstrable popularity will give the religious parties an opportunity to do far better at the polls than they have ever done in the past. Such a showing will provide them with the legitimacy and credibility they have always lacked in previous elections where they have rarely managed to get over five per cent of the popular vote.

In the West, there is a genuine fear today that Pakistan might go the way of Algeria where a major civil war has been raging for over a decade between the army and religious elements. But these analysts miss a serious difference: in Algeria, the religious right had won the elections but was denied power by the military. Mercifully, in Pakistan, these elements have never been even close to electoral victory. On the other hand, the Algerian army and the ruling party, the revolutionary FLN, are both secular in outlook whereas the Pakistan army now contains many officers in Ziaul Haq's mould who would be happy to see Pakistan following the Taliban route.

Had Gen Musharraf used the momentum of the Taliban defeat to roll back extremist groups in Pakistan, he would have had a far better chance of success. Elements of Al Qaeda who have filtered down to Pakistan have had the time to establish links with local groups and plan elaborate and vicious attacks. Suicide bombers, unheard of in Pakistan until recently, now ply their deadly trade at regular intervals.

Ever since the events of 9/11, Gen Musharraf has been sending out mixed signals: after jailing hundreds of extremists earlier this year, his government released most of them within weeks. Time and again, he has backed off after making sane, secular pronouncements. This has emboldened the zealots who see his equivocation as a sign of weakness. It seems that all his tough talk and action are reserved for those he sees as his principal enemies, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. He needs to understand that he has far more in common with them than he does with the religious fanatics who are a much greater danger to him and the entire country.

As his three-year tenure draws to a close, Gen Musharraf should remember that all the great generals were flexible enough to change their plans during the course of a battle if the situation so demanded. A blind adherence to Plan A is often a recipe for disaster. Just because he began his stint with a strong (and understandable) aversion to Pakistan's two major politicians does not mean that he should not now recognize that the bigger threat comes from elsewhere.

In Pakistan, as anywhere in the world, we are so caught up in our day-to-day problems that we don't bother how the rest of the world sees us. We also forget how important this international perception is. But it counts for a great deal, specially if we are an economically fragile country that requires not only foreign assistance but a great deal of foreign investment.

Currently, few outsiders would visit our shores for love or money. How many would invest a single dollar in a country where church-goers are regular targets?