By the time you read this, the elections will be over and the results will have been largely tabulated, at least unofficially. But irrespective of which party or coalition commands a majority in parliament, we do know the army will continue to wield power.

General Musharraf has stated ad nauseam that he will restore 'the essence of democracy'. Obviously, he has been consulting a different dictionary from the rest of us because in its most widely accepted sense, democracy means a system of government established by the will of the people as expressed through free and fair elections.

But these elections have been anything but 'free and fair'. Indeed, the regime's contempt for politicians has never been concealed, even though the general has been behaving like one for some time now. However, the political problems that now beset Pakistan - and which are likely to sharpen as a result of these engineered elections - will require considerable tact and wisdom to resolve. Neither quality has been on display of late.

During Zia's dictatorship, my son once interrupted me in the middle of an anti-Zia harangue to ask: "But why shouldn't the army be in power? After all, it has all the guns and the planes and the tanks." In a nutshell, this represents the current state of the military rulers' political views. Conveniently forgetting their own and their predecessors' disastrous role in Pakistan's turbulent history and placing all the blame on the politicians, our generals have convinced themselves of their right to rule, and the first point on their messianic agenda has been to 'sort out the bloody politicians'.

I have been accused by several readers of overlooking the corruption our major politicians have been guilty of in my criticism of the army's role in politics. In truth, I have merely attempted to put things in perspective: while the crimes of mere politicians have been much publicized and even exaggerated by the media, the actions of our generals have been usually concealed through press censorship. Also, since the army has ruled directly for over half of Pakistan's 55 years of independent existence, it must accept at least half the responsibility for our many problems.

As a matter of fact, it has controlled key areas of foreign policy for far longer, and as a result, we find ourselves in our present bind. GHQ has called the shots on both Afghanistan and Kashmir for decades, even when civilian governments were in power. Thus, if the Indian army has been sitting on our borders for 10 months and jihadi groups are active Pakistan, together with elements of Al Qaeda who have infiltrated into the country, who should we hold accountable?

Isabelle Hilton, in a recent long article for The New Yorker entitled 'The general in his labyrinth', made the useful observation that during their training and their subsequent years in the barracks, Pakistani army officers absorb three constants: all politicians are useless; Kashmir is essential for Pakistan's survival; and Islam is the glue that holds the country together'.

A corollary to the first point is that the army is the only organization that can be relied on to tackle the country's problems.

When I joined the civil services in the late 1960s, it was a requirement for newly inducted officers to do a two-month stint with an army unit. So a few months before the outbreak of the 1971 war with India, I found myself with an infantry regiment in Quetta. As tension with India was building up, I naturally discussed the current scenario with the army officers I was with, wanting to know how they thought they would be able to offset the Indian army's large numerical advantage. In all seriousness, many of them assured me that one Muslim soldier could take on ten Hindus.

I mention this not to mock but to remind ourselves that these attitudes are still prevalent, and those I served with briefly over 30 years ago must now be senior generals if they haven't retired. Here in London, I was recently invited to dinner by a general who had just retired. As an institution, our army has either been ignoring recent history or re-writing it. Thus, a myth has grown that had it not been for political interference, we would have won the 1965 war with India despite the fact that we were running out of ammunition and spares. According to prevailing notions in the barracks, in 1971 it was Bhutto who talked General Yahya into cracking down in East Pakistan so he could take power in West Pakistan after the country broke up. Thus, the army was manoeuvred into a no-win position and had to suffer a humiliating defeat.

One of the charges laid at Benazir Bhutto's door when she was thrown out in 1990 after less than two years in power was that she was 'betraying national interests' by trying to improve relations with India. It is no secret that Nawaz Sharif became anathema to the army when he first invited his Indian counterpart to Lahore, and then had Clinton broker a ceasefire after the Kargil misadventure in which our army lost considerable face.

A recent editorial in The Guardian, 'Playing with fire', says: "...By most 'war on terror' measures in fact, Pakistan, with its ruptured economy, unstable politics and military government, is a state both failed and rogue that is over-ripe for regime change... Last spring's referendum, which made General Musharraf president for five years with sweeping powers, was an undemocratic embarrassment. His exclusion from public life of many of Pakistan's established politicians, is another... Far better all around, therefore, that General Musharraf honour his personal promise to return to barracks and leave politics to the politicians after this week's general election.

"Only a strong, popular, democratic government, working with but not for the military, has any long-term chance of rehabilitating Pakistan economically, defanging the terrorists, and persuading India to end its threats and start a meaningful dialogue... If General Musharraf reneges and the election is stolen, the Pakistani people will know who to blame."

Unfortunately, knowing who to blame is not enough; being unable to do something about it is the problem.