Judging by the column inches of news reports and editorial comments in the subcontinent and abroad, the prospects of Indo-Pakistan talks have generated more excitement than a World Cup cricket final between the two countries.

It is therefore just as important for Messrs Vajpayee and Jamali (with General Musharraf playing the role of coach and manager in the background) to put as much into these negotiations as would the skippers of their respective cricket squads. The big difference is that at a summit of this nature, a tie would be an eminently acceptable result.

Whatever the final outcome of these talks, Mr Vajpayee's commitment to peace in South Asia must be applauded: this is the third Pakistani government he will be negotiating with during his stewardship, and each time, he has taken the initiative. But the important thing for him is to take up the talks from the point they stalled earlier in Lahore and Agra. Similarly, Mr Jamali needs to be his own man and not allow invisible forces to derail the talks.

It is stating the obvious, but in complex negotiations like these, neither side gets everything it wants. Inevitably, there has to be a measure of give and take if the two parties want a successful outcome. Thus, when Pakistan says Kashmiris must have the right of self-determination - implicitly demanding the accession of the valley - leaders in Islamabad must understand that this runs counter to the Indian stand.

Similarly, when Indians declare that Kashmir is a closed chapter, they are repeating a fifty-year old mantra that is a deal-breaker before the talks even begin. Clearly, both sides will have to show a degree of flexibility while approaching the delicate matter of Kashmir.

However, given the intractable nature of the dispute, the blood and the billions invested in it, and the decades of propaganda that has warped thinking on both sides, it may be advisable to put Kashmir on the backburner and get on with other issues. But this formula, earlier pushed by India and resisted by Pakistan which put Kashmir first, has acquired a new dimension in recent years: since India accuses Pakistan of infiltrating terrorists into Indian Kashmir, it wants this problem on top of the agenda. In an ironic reversal, many people in New Delhi now view the solution of the Kashmir dispute as a precondition to sorting out other issues. But as we have seen time and again, it may be best to start with the easier problems first.

Trade, sports and travel are all areas over which there is not much acrimony. There is a school of thought in Pakistan that is averse to running up a trade deficit with India, just as there are Indians like members of the Shiv Sena who recoil at the thought of Pakistani sportsmen competing on Indian soil. Then there are intelligence agencies on both sides whose jobs and budgets would be on the line if travel restrictions are lifted. But you can't please everybody. The benefits of opening up trade and travel far outweigh any disadvantages.

Once normalization begins, both sides can involve Kashmiri leaders in working towards a compromise that all three can live with. But given the history and the bad blood involved, talks will need to take place over an extended timeframe just as Sino-Indian border talks have been going on for the last four decades without either side resorting to violence to impose its will.

There are a number of forces that would like to ambush these tentative steps towards peace and harmony. In India, the obscurantist elements in the ruling BJP find any compromise with Pakistan just as hateful as Pakistani fundamentalists and ultra-nationalists do any softening of our Kashmir policy. The intelligence agencies and military establishments on both sides are happy with the status quo and see any improvement of relations as a threat to their bloated budgets and perks.

In Pakistan, particularly, the army and the ISI are so accustomed to calling the shots on Kashmir and Indo-Pakistan ties that it will take a major effort of will for them to let the 'bloody civvies' carry the ball. But General Musharraf is a pragmatist above all, and he is aware of the limits of power: Kargil taught him that the world is not going to sit aside and allow a possible nuclear standoff to develop in the subcontinent.

The leverage the Americans currently enjoy in Pakistan makes it possible for them to lean very hard on GHQ to stop dragging its feet. As a sweetener, Washington might well offer some military hardware. For example, some F-16s and other assorted goodies would make it easier for Jamali and Musharraf to sell a deal with India to the hardliners in the army as well as in the fundamentalist parties.

Difficult as the coming weeks will be for those involved in the talks and their preparation, they should be sustained and strengthened in their resolve by the knowledge that if successful, their efforts will benefit hundreds of millions of the dispossessed of South Asia. If the staggering cost of maintaining the present military posture can be reduced, the resources thus released can be used for the purpose they ought to have been in the first place: education, health, roads and housing. Indeed, a decade of peaceful coexistence can transform the subcontinent.

An added bonus is that we would be able to see each other's cricket and hockey teams in action in Lahore, Karachi, New Delhi and Mumbai. Our musicians and film stars will be able to perform in both nations and friends and relatives could visit each other without going through the humiliating hassles associated with 'police-reporting visas'. If it all seems too good to be possible, we should remember that this is how most neighbours live side by side.

We in Pakistan have been conditioned to believe that the 'evil Indian empire' wants nothing else but to dominate us while Indians have been brought up to think that the 'mad mullahs and military' across the border want Muslim rule to return to the subcontinent. For both sides, here are some sobering and salutary words from a recent editorial in The Hindu, possibly the sanest newspaper in India:

"...there is a need for New Delhi to give up its rigidity which in a large measure led to the collapse of the Agra summit, hardliners in the government working overnight to sabotage the talks which had looked promising till the last hour. Not surprisingly, the only discordant note now emanates from the BJP's obscurantist allies. If compromise is at the heart of good neighbourliness, India as the larger nation must be willing and ready to give more for the common good of the South Asian region."