President Musharraf said the other day that he had not come across a single new idea on Kashmir in the Pakistani press. The fact remains that there has been no shortage of suggestions on how to resolve this unending problem.

However, his recent proposal to discuss arrangements for the seven components of Kashmir as geographical and not religious units could well be the way forward. This approach would neatly outflank the standing Indian refusal to discuss Kashmir as a religious issue. Given their secular constitution, they have a point.

But if Azad Kashmir, with its entirely Muslim population, retains its present status, and the units with a majority of Hindus stay with India, we are left with the contentious Valley.

If this area is placed under some kind of UN or joint Indo-Pakistani control pending a final resolution of its status, we could break the 55-year old deadlock once and for all.

There has been much talk on the need to obtain a consensus in Kashmir itself. But given the bickering among the many groups and parties claiming to speak for Kashmiris, how is this to be achieved? In the current atmosphere of mistrust and violence, how do we determine what Kashmiris want?

Only after peace returns to the troubled region can there be rational dialogue and debate. Currently, the tendency is to gun down anybody who does not agree with you. If we wait for a consensus to miraculously emerge in that war-torn land, we will still be where we are in the next millennium.

Another impediment to peace-making has been the rigid mindset of the foreign offices of the two countries. Brought up on a steady diet of reasons why we cannot step back from the respective maximalist positions on both sides, our diplomats tend to fight to the last full-stop and comma, while losing sight of the bigger picture.

We have been exposed to this kind of thinking in a spate of articles written by retired ambassadors. Apart from the turgid prose and the recycled thinking, we are left wondering why these stalwarts have waited until their retirement to inflict their opinions on foreign affairs on the rest of us.

Predictably, the day after President Musharraf voiced his thoughts on Kashmir to a group of journalists and diplomats, he was subjected to a cannonade by the massed artillery of the MMA and the ARD.

These alliances pass for the opposition in Pakistan, and they have accused the president of moving away from our long-held position on Kashmir. So much for imagination.

Nisar Ali Khan, an opposition MNA, hit the nail on the head. According to him, had an elected leader made the proposals Musharraf has made, he would have been charged with treason. Precisely.

The political reality in Pakistan is that only the army can undertake meaningful talks with India and sign an agreement. As both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif have learned to their cost, the army considers Kashmir its exclusive preserve, and would never allow 'those bloody civvies' to make any concessions.

In theory, one cannot fault the stance taken by the opposition. An army ruler should not be able to make a major departure from a long-held position, bypassing parliament and public opinion, on a major issue like Kashmir. But we cannot afford to stick to theoretical positions if they are not in our national interest.

In the long run, the only realistic way civil society can reassert its authority over the all-powerful defence establishment is by reducing the army's role in our national life.

This will only happen once there is a permanent end to the state of confrontation between India and Pakistan. And to achieve this, we must solve the Kashmir problem.

We are fortunate that a number of factors have combined to change the army high command's previously rigid mindset. A realization that our economy can no longer support this state of no-war, no-peace has helped focus minds in GHQ. 9/11 and its aftermath has been another major factor, as has been the steady pressure applied by the international community, most notably the United States.

Talking to a major player who has been closely involved behind the scenes in the peace process, one had a clear sense of the commitment of the high command to the idea of peace.

None of the initiatives emanating from Islamabad have been for public consumption, or to appease the international community. There has been a growing realization in both GHQ and the presidency - not that there is any longer a difference between the two - that the Kashmir problem has to be put behind us.

The Indian foreign office's initial response to President Musharraf's proposals has been predictably cautious, and their spokesman has been mildly critical of the tendency to conduct diplomacy on Kashmir through the media. Actually, our president often shoots from the hip.

One can understand his impatience with the glacial speed of the process. However, he must understand that a premature revelation of various options being discussed away from the limelight generates unnecessary controversy in both capitals.

Until the leadership in both India and Pakistan have agreed on a formulation, there is little point in giving diehards a stick to beat the government with on this most ticklish of issues. Let backdoor diplomacy proceed until it produces a mutually acceptable solution before preparing public opinion for the necessary compromises.

Indeed, this might well be the hardest part of the entire process. Hardline nationalists on both sides will fight tooth and nail to cling to the tired old formulas: 'a plebiscite as per UN resolutions' for Pakistan; and 'Kashmir is an integral part of our secular state' for India.

But 55 years of confrontation and sterile debate around these positions show that they offer nothing to India, Pakistan or Kashmir. Mercifully, the army leadership has finally understood the need for peace. We must all support President Musharraf in his quest.