BOTH the standard textbooks on grand strategy and military history warn generals not to open too many fronts. They also urge them to woo allies rather than make enemies. Far from heeding these lessons, General Musharraf seems bent on starting new fights and spurning potential friends. Politically, he has never been more isolated. Militarily, his troops are heavily engaged in Waziristan, and are on alert in Balochistan while the militia fights Baloch insurgents. His reliance on the religious parties of the MMA, the natural support base of military rulers in Pakistan, has backfired.

The current protest movement, ostensibly against the offensive Danish cartoons, threatens to spiral out of control. This is an issue that has united the opposition, and has the potential to draw the crowds into the streets in a way local issues have not. Suddenly, the opposition seems galvanised while Musharraf is looking shakier than he has done since he seized power.

As President Bush’s visit to Pakistan approaches, President Musharraf needs to put his own house in order, rather than appear a beleaguered leader at bay on his own turf. But obviously, the opposition is itching for this occasion to embarrass Gen. Musharraf, so we can expect demonstrations and possibly violence on the streets of Islamabad to greet the American president. One suspects the insurgents in Wana as well as in and around Dera Bugti will use this visit to turn the heat up.

And yet, much of this could have been avoided had President Musharraf been prepared to negotiate a graceful exit. His record of broken promises has ensured that his many opponents now feel that the only way to get rid of him is through violent protest. As his acolytes send out signals that the president is unwilling to leave the scene even after the elections in 2007, they have raised the stakes in Pakistan’s ruthless game of power politics.

Currently, his only supporters, apart from the army and the Americans, are the carpetbaggers of the Muslim League. But as other military rulers have learned, this ragtag collection of opportunists back a leader only as long as he is seen to be in charge. As soon as they sense his power ebbing away, they look around desperately for the next rising star to hitch their wagons to.

Some of Gen. Musharraf’s woes have been imposed on him; but the rest have been own goals. For instance, the explosive situation in the tribal belt dividing Pakistan and Afghanistan is part of the package of being America’s staunch ally. While prior to 9/11, Islamabad would not have raised an eyebrow over the Taliban raids into our neighbouring country, today there is huge pressure from Washington on GHQ to prevent these cross-border attacks. And from time to time in a conflict with well-armed and highly motivated men, there are bound to be civilian casualties, an issue that provides the MMA with more ammunition against Gen Musharraf.

In Balochistan, we have been hearing about the insurgents using large numbers of rockets, mortars and mines against government personnel and assets. This kind of ordnance costs a lot, and one can only speculate where the money is coming from. Musharraf has more than hinted at an Indian hand in organizing and financing the shadowy Baloch Liberation Army. While there is no way of knowing if this charge is true, it would seem logical retaliation for Pakistan’s support for the Kashmiris. Had our government lived up to its repeated promises to halt cross-border terrorism, perhaps we would not be facing the Baloch insurgency today.

Politically, President Musharraf’s isolation is entirely of his own making. From the day he took over, he has acted to eradicate the influence of the country’s two major politicians — Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto. While the former was treated leniently and sent into a luxurious exile, the PPP leader and her husband have been hounded mercilessly. Every effort has been made to bribe and bully their party members to switch allegiance. Now, when Musharraf needs their support to neutralize the mullahs, he finds them in the opposite camp.

Recently, President Musharraf was asked by a foreign publication why his government had pressed Interpol to issue its much-publicised ‘red warrants’ against Benazir Bhutto and Asif Zardari at this time. Coolly, the president replied that he had nothing to with the matter as the National Accountability Bureau had initiated the case, and it was an entirely autonomous body. I suppose he will next claim that the Chief Election Commissioner is independent too.

As for the many charges against corrupt politicians, the fact is that many of them are members of his cabinet, as previous NAB enquiries have established. And if honesty were ever to become the sole criterion for people to take part in politics and wield power, I’m afraid there wouldn’t be too many politicians in Pakistan or elsewhere. So clearly, the whole exercise in house-cleaning is motivated solely by a desire to keep certain undesirable politicians away.

When cornered, politicians will even compromise with the devil. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, when he faced the combined might of the opposition in 1977, tried to take the religious high ground and ban alcohol, gambling and night clubs. The move backfired, as we know to our cost. What deals might President Musharraf want to cut, and with whom? His options are clearly limited: he cannot appease the mullahs without drastically reducing his close cooperation with the Americans. It follows from this that the uprising in the tribal areas will continue.

In Balochistan, he is probably exercising all his self-control not to follow his first instinct and go in with guns blazing. He lacks the temperament to negotiate patiently and arrive at a formula that gives the Baloch a greater share of revenues from their resources. After over six years of constant harassment and defamation, it is unlikely that a deal with the PPP is now possible. But politics make for strange bedfellows. Who knows, given the right inducements, how power-hungry politicians react to the prospect of high office?

Even now, there is still time for President Musharraf to end his isolation. But all too often, people who have been in power for a long time convince themselves of their own invincibility. One problem is that his army deputies and corps commanders are now far junior to him, and in the military, this counts for a lot. While in his early years as president, his colleagues could have spoken to him as near-equals, their successors are probably far more deferential. This usually makes for bad advice.

Ultimately, dictators become isolated because they have no contact with the real world, and are convinced of their own infallibility.