SPYING is said to be the world’s second oldest profession. The oldest, of course, is prostitution. Every country spies on others as well as on its own citizens, and has done so ever since the human race organised itself into first tribes, and then into nation states.

But by the nature of their secretive work, spooks prefer to remain in the shadows, inhabiting the grey area of plausible deniability. When, once in a while, they are exposed as they go about their clandestine (and often illegal) tasks, they squirm in the limelight, like worms when a rock is lifted under the sunlight. Usually, such exposure is the result of a botched operation or through the painstaking work of an investigative reporter. So imagine how painful it must be when their own boss turns the spotlight on them.

This is what has happened to the ISI when Musharraf’s book In The Line of Fire made its appearance in New York with so much fanfare. Although I have not yet read the book, I understand reviewers are having a hard time in deciding whether to classify it as an autobiography, or a work of fiction.

One of the bizarre incidents the general recounts is that Pakistan was threatened by the United States with a bombardment that would take it back to the Stone Age.

In reality, there are some areas and attitudes in our homeland that would not need much bombing to take them back to pre-history. But I digress: it seems this threat was relayed to Musharraf by none other than the director of the ISI, Lt. General Mahmood Ahmed, who happened to be in Washington during the 9/11 attacks.

According to Arnaud de Borchgrave, editor of the Washington Times, the ISI knew about the Al Qaeda plans, and its director contrived to be in the US capital at the time in order to assess the reaction of the Bush administration. Frankly, I find this a bit hard to believe.

Anybody who knew that a bunch of amateur pilots were planning to fly a plane into the Pentagon would stay as far away from the building as possible. But it is a fact that within days of the attack, General Ahmed did meet Richard Armitage, the ex-marine deputy secretary of the State Department, and conveyed his tough message to his boss, General Musharraf. Apparently, his words (in Urdu) were: “Wo eent say eent baja daingay.” This translates roughly into: “They (the US) will turn the country into rubble.”

But one charge de Borchgrave makes in his article has a ring of truth: as the US made preparations to attack Afghanistan, they gave the Taliban a last chance to hand over Osama bin Laden. General Ahmed was dispatched to Kandahar, together with a team of ISI officers and senior Pakistani clerics, to convince Mullah Omar to comply with the American demand in order to save his country.

The mission apparently failed, and within a few days, the devastating American attack was launched. But even at the time, rumours circulated that instead of using his clout with the Taliban to convince them to hand over Bin Laden, General Ahmed advised them to hang tough.

This charge has been repeated now by de Borchgrave.

Although these charges and rumours have been triggered by General Musharraf’s book, the ISI often manages to get into the limelight on its own as well. A couple of months ago, a bunch of goons in plain clothes broke into a house in Islamabad, beat up an 80-year old man, manhandled his daughter-in-law, kidnapped her young son, beat him up, and dumped him by the road outside the city.

Unfortunately for them, they picked the wrong people to terrorise. It later transpired that the boy had got into a fight with the son of a serving general in the ISI, and the thugs were sent to teach him a lesson. The boy’s grandfather was a retired brigadier who had received some of the highest military decorations for gallantry, and his mother was the wife of an air force officer.

Understandably, the media had a field day. And while the ISI did not openly admit its involvement, it is public knowledge that General Musharraf himself telephoned the illustrious brigadier. But at least this incident was highlighted: over the years, scores of civilians have suffered a similar (or worse) fate without any public outcry.

Recently, a journalist in Karachi was picked up, threatened, roughed up, and dumped far from his home. This is standard operating procedure, and many colleagues have suffered this treatment. Although it is possible the ISI is not involved in each such incident, the fact is that many clandestine agencies are operating without any check or balance.

Here in London, a terrorism trial ground to a halt because of alleged ISI involvement. Omar Khayyam, a UK citizen, had admitted obtaining training in a Pakistani camp run by the ISI. However, the day after this sensational courtroom confession, he refused to continue his testimony, claiming he had been informed by family members in Pakistan that they had been threatened by the ISI.

A recent defence ministry report in the UK has made many damaging accusations against the ISI’s performance in Afghanistan. When asked to comment on the recommendation that the agency be disbanded, General Musharraf replied that he had “200 per cent confidence” in the ISI. Unfortunately, the rest of the world — and indeed, many Pakistanis — do not share his confidence. They see an agency that has become a state within a state, accountable to only one man. Pakistanis are well aware of the crude methods it has used to destabilise democratically elected governments. General Asad Durrani, ex-director of the ISI, testified before the Supreme Court that he doled out a hundred million rupees in cash to prevent Benazir Bhutto getting an outright majority in the 1988 elections. He also cobbled together an anti-PPP alliance.

All these rumours, allegations and facts represent only the tip of the iceberg. Maybe General Musharraf will write a sequel to his autobiography, and call it Behind The Scenes With The ISI.