DO international interventions in local conflicts help or hinder in the long run? Is it better to let wars continue to their logical (if bloody) conclusion, or should the comity of nations put a stop to them as soon as possible?

These are some of the questions raised by Edward Luttwark in a recent article in 'Foreign Affairs', the authoritative American publication. A maverick scholar and consultant, Luttwark is the author of the classic "Coup D'Etat: A Practical Handbook" in which he postulated that in view of the concentration of power in developing states, a relatively small force could stage a successful coup.

All the leader had to do was to seize control of the state TV and radio, the telephone exchange in the capital, the airport and the chief executive's residence and office. He could then broadcast a statement to the nation, justifying what he had done, and the people and state institutions would soon fall in line.

Luttwark's current thesis is no less provocative. He argues persuasively that by intervening in armed conflicts, the UN and other international organizations merely defer the day of reckoning; in the meantime, the states concerned devote all their energies and resources preparing for the next showdown. Weaker countries are shielded from the consequences of their recklessness, and more powerful states are denied the rights their strength would normally entitle them to.

Obviously, this argument flies in the face of the internationalist movement that has sought to govern international relations during this century. First came the League of Nations that was created in the aftermath of the First World War to ensure that such a conflict did not recur, but its inherent weakness and irrelevance were exposed when it failed to halt Italy's shameless and brutal invasion of Ethiopia.

The end of the Second World War saw the emergence of a more determined effort to halt armed conflict. This time, the United States threw its full weight behind the United Nations, and the organization has completed over a half century of peacekeeping. The results have been mixed at best. Small states complain that through the Security Council, the great powers have used the UN to their own ends, while the latter allege that countries with a population of a few thousand carry the same weight as they do in the General Assembly. While there is considerable truth in both arguments, the fact is that it is in the Security Council where the real decisions are taken, and all too often, these decisions are in line with the interests of the permanent members of the Council.

But despite its inherent weaknesses, it is true that the UN has prevented many conflicts by giving the protagonists a forum to vent their grievances. However, it is equally true that by intervening, the organization has simply postponed the solution of problems rather than solving them.

A case in point is Kashmir: while halting hostilities in 1948, it failed to have its own resolutions implemented, and this failure has resulted in half a century of bloodshed, tension and bitterness between India and Pakistan, as well as untold suffering for the Kashmiris. Had there been no intervention in 1948, the problem would have been solved one way or another, and we would have got on with life. This way, we are in a situation of no-war and no-peace that has debilitated both nations.

The Middle East is another powder keg that has exploded from time to time as a direct result of the UN's actions and inaction. By first sanctioning the initial injustice of the creation of the Zionist state of Israel in the midst of a Palestinian population, and then failing to implement the Security Council resolutions to prevent Israeli expansionist tendencies, the UN has fuelled the flames of war. Here, the western powers who control the Council have ensured that Israel is protected from international censure and sanctions.

The conflict thus keeps smouldering, and even if the Oslo accords are implemented, the Palestinian refugees and their descendants who languish in refugee camps in the neighbouring states will still not have the right to return to Gaza or the West Bank, and their hatred and sense of alienation will continue to be a source of tension for years to come.

In Bosnia and Kosovo, it was NATO, pressed by the United States, that provided the framework for intervention. Here, too, Luttwark argues against intervention, contending that in the real world, the Serbs would have asserted their power. It is precisely because small powers are aware that they will be protected by the world community that they defy more powerful states.

But intervention does not resolve the cause of conflict which in this case is the pathological hatred Serbs have for Muslims. In Luttwark's worldview, the Bosnians and Kosovars would have been crushed and marginalized. These rabid Serb tendencies were first kept in check by the Hapsburg Empire, then the Yugoslav Socialist Republic, and now by NATO. But Luttwark argues that nobody will play policeman for ever, and as soon as political will flags, Serbia's historical sense of being wronged will surface, and it will pounce on its Muslim neighbours.

Clearly, Luttwark's provocative article is aimed at making us rethink our automatic response to halt conflict everywhere through collective action. The images of war and bloodshed that invade our living rooms through television have increased our abhorrence towards organized bloodshed, and it has become difficult to argue that the powerful should be allowed to ride roughshod over the weak. But in terms of history, this is precisely what has been happening.

The Darwinian principle of the survival of the fittest holds as true for nations as it does for animal species. There has never been any place for morality in international relations, and Luttwark argues that the current trend towards collective action to prevent warfare is simply a fig-leaf to cover the underlying realpolitik that governs relations between states. He suggests that it is time we removed this flimsy covering, and allow a natural balance to emerge based on relative force.

Although a seductive argument, it is a dangerous one in its blind reliance on the linear logic or cause and effect. The fact that human beings have evolved to at least aspire to a civilized world makes it incumbent on the comity of nations to turn its back on the long and gory history of mankind. But small countries need to understand the realities of power and talk softly if they do not carry a big stick.