THE current issue of 'The Economist' quotes a Western diplomat as saying there is a "whiff of uncertainty in Islamabad" over what the present government is doing - or rather, not doing.

There is similar concern being increasingly voiced in columns in national dailies. Apparently, there is growing unease over the glacial pace at which the military regime is moving. Many Pakistanis who expected a blitzkrieg to be launched on October 12 are understandably disappointed. Those who gleefully talked about building new cells in our jails to accommodate Pakistan's army of defaulters are now very despondent, as are those who saw the new dispensation ushering in a brave new world.

Surely these people should have known better. If General Zia could not get taxi drivers to fix their meters in his seemingly unending tenure, it seems a bit much to expect his successor to put the whole country right in two months. An old friend, now a senior member of the Army XI, said recently: "Yar, give us some time!" Since I had no expectations at all, I am not in the least bit disappointed. But there is no doubt that many people with short memories of the past performance of the military on and off the battlefield are quite dejected. They forget that the world over military is a defender of the status quo.

Expecting the army to put our house in order is a bit like expecting a guard who has evicted the landlord to pay attention to the condition of the garden and the poor state of repair of the property. Granted that the landlord was too crooked and shortsighted to put things right; the fact remains that the guard has neither the means nor the competence to undertake the task of refurbishing the house.

As it is, the country is at a virtual standstill. Since the Chief Executive has still not given us any kind of timeframe or blueprint, we are unclear as to what he proposes to do. The problem is that so is he. True, he did give us a wish list in the form of his seven-point agenda, but that was more a noble declaration of intent than a clear plan of action. Nationalized banks may have got back a few billions of their outstanding loans and a score or so of defaulters are languishing in jail. And that, apart from its avowals of good intentions, is about the sum total of what this government has achieved in two months.

Another friend pointed out that some of the ministerial appointments made by the junta would never have been made by a political government. This is true. Outstanding people like Omar Asghar Khan are very rarely offered ministerial positions. But unfortunately, the problems Pakistan faces are of such a magnitude that a change of personnel at the top is not enough: steel in the spine and a fire in the belly are required to make a difference, and so far, we have seen no evidence of either.

In management theory, there is something called 'administration by earthquake' in which a newly appointed chief executive takes drastic action and makes radical personnel changes at every level. The idea is to shake up the organization and get everybody on his toes. This kind of managerial terrorism is also designed to send a clear message that there is a new man at the top, and that old loyalties and previous performance no longer count for anything. To do well under the new dispensation, everybody has to prove himself anew.

None of this has happened since October 12. Apart from the dismissal of Nawaz Sharif's cabinet and the shuffling of a few secretaries, it is pretty much business as usual. Most of the ex-PM's handpicked ambassadors and corporate heads are still in place and doing very well, thank you very much. The federal and provincial governments are frozen into inaction, not that they were breaking any records for speed and efficiency before.

General Musharraf has often voiced his support for the notion of devolution of power. Contrary to this laudable sentiment, provincial governments have been told that ordinances issued by ex-governors now have to be sent to Islamabad for the Chief Executive's approval before they can be renewed. Some public sector organizations like the Export Promotion Bureau are coasting along without anybody being named to replace the sacked chairman.

Sooner or later it will sink in that getting the country moving again takes more than rhetoric and hot air. Had it been this simple, we would now have been at the top of the economic league instead of languishing at the very bottom. No amount of good intentions or reform packages will get the economy moving again until investor confidence has been restored. The thousands of factories that are shut will not reopen until their owners have working capital. But with interest rates at around 20 per cent, very few businessmen are willing to take loans in such a depressed market.

One problem is that the very people who are capable of reviving the economy are currently under great pressure as a result of the accountability drive. Sadly, the industrialists whose names grace the list of defaulters and who are today on the exit control list are some of our biggest employers and who have in the past been at the forefront of industrialization. Whether we like it or not, entrepreneurship is a rare commodity that needs to be nurtured in backward countries like ours. Although many of our top businessmen are robber barons, we need to acknowledge that without them, we would not even have been where we are in terms of industry and finance. It may go against the grain, but the fact remains that we need to put things in perspective in our zeal to clean up the Augean stables of our credit system.

However, the army mind tends to see things in black and white, ignoring the shades of gray in between. Over the years, the Pakistani military has developed an unhealthy contempt for politicians in particular and civilian institutions in general, comparing them both with the discipline and relative efficiency prevailing within its insulated confines. They forget that politicians and planners cope with far more complex problems than army commanders are asked to deal with, and that a country like Pakistan is much harder to govern than the army. No doubt General Musharraf is now in the process of absorbing this lesson.

In his recent address to the nation, he asked for more time. Sorry, general, that is the one commodity we are very short of.