America's image problem

It was bound to happen sooner or later, and in some ways it seems to be an apt metaphor for the strange times we live in. Something old, something new. Nations are still warring for the oldest of motives - mainly greed - but not with swords and shields or cavalries; nowadays crusades are waged with "smart" bombs and "intelligent" missiles. They still leave you dead, of course.

It's just that today's killing machines are so much more.... well, to use a free-market catchword, efficient. In mediaeval times, warriors had to make up tales about slaying 30 foes with a single stroke. Today exaggeration is no longer required: 30 at a blow is no longer newsworthy; even 300 does not raise too many eyebrows. And 3,000 isn't out of the question.

We're talking conventional warfare here. And measuring the price of progress. Scientific advances are not, thankfully, restricted to weaponry. The internet and digital photography have been among the most popular hi-tech developments of the past decade.

It is somehow apt that they have, in combination, shone an unforgiving light on one of the sorriest aspects of the 21st century's first major conflict.

US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld appears to believe that the pictures pose a more profound problem than the behaviour they illustrate. From the Pentagon's point of view, he isn't wrong. The rest of the world, fortunately, doesn't see it quite that way. Significantly, nor does much of the US.

Even Rumsfeld, with characteristic bluntness, admitted at a Senate armed services committee hearing last Friday that although he was aware of the allegations, the extent and precise nature of the abuse hadn't become obvious to him until he saw the pictures for himself. And he said there was worse to come: photographs of an even more despicable nature, and videos as well.

Sure enough, two days later The New Yorker published an image of a naked Iraqi prisoner cowering in fear, cornered by a posse of American military guards with a couple of vicious hounds straining at the leash.

Photographs not yet made public at the time of writing reportedly include depictions of rape, and of US soldiers posing triumphantly with Iraqis. They are being called mementos. The sort of snapshots tourists collect for their scrapbooks, to prove they've "been there, done that".

Something to show the kids, perhaps, when they ask: What did you do in the war, Pop? Or Mom. The US government, not surprisingly, has been on the back foot over the torture revelations, and several lines of defence have rapidly been deployed.

Once Washington realized that the scandal had sprouted legs and would run for a while, the commander-in-chief was called upon to make a sorry appearance on two Arabic-language satellite television channels.

He did, saying just what the spin doctor ordered: We're all appalled by the pictures; it's just a bunch of bad eggs causing the trouble and they'll be brought to justice; the rest of us Americans are doing a great job, so on and so forth.

He didn't make much of an impression, and he refused to say the s-word. How could the supremo of the free world be expected to apologize to the great unwashed on the unfree world? But the pressure kept, so his spokesman said sorry to the press corp.

The following day, George W. Bush was persuaded to say it himself. Not to the people. mind you, but to a potentate - King Abdullah, who has kept up his father's tradition of generally putting American wishes before Jordanian interests.

Still, it shows the White House is taking the affair seriously. That's why, soon after the story broke, Rumsfeld was summoned to the Oval Office for a reprimand. Or at least that's the story that was put out.

He apparently got a dressing-down not for the maltreatment of Iraqi detainees, but for not informing his commander-in-chief that a volcano was about to erupt. Bush says he first saw the pictures on CBS.

The network had delayed its broadcast at the request of General Richard Myers, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, who said refusal by the CBS to heed his advice could endanger American lives in Iraq.

The excuse doesn't make a lot of sense: if the photographs were so dangerous, how would delaying their appearance by a week or so make much of a difference? Perhaps the Pentagon needed the time to cobble together a face-saving strategy.

The Rumsfeld reprimand may have been part of that plan: an elaborate charade enacted for publicity purposes, and in order to keep the defence secretary in the cabinet. Calls for his departure have been growing; at the weekend, even a military newspaper chimed in - just as vice-president Dick Cheney described him as the best defence secretary the US has ever had.

Rummy and Cheney go back a long way, having served together in the Nixon-Ford administrations. But it wasn't out of fear of Cheney that Bush agreed to visit the Pentagon on Monday.

In effect, the charade goes on. If the heat gets too high, Rumsfeld will probably be sacrificed. But the president is loath to let him go, because such a key change in the administration less than six months from November would hurt his chances of re-election.

Serious abuse of prisoners isn't a recent phenomenon, nor is it restricted to Abu Ghraib. Most of the photographs that have come to light date back to October-November last year.

But even before that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Amnesty International had conveyed their concern to the US government. An ICRC report late last year contained evidence of such blatant and widespread abuse that Red Cross president Jakob Kellenberger deemed it necessary to convey it personally to Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice and Paul Wolfowitz.

By mid-January, army investigators were also paying attention to whistleblowers' allegations of torture. Hundreds of photographs, compact discs and videotapes were seized from military police at Abu Ghraib, and Major-General Antonio Taguba was assigned to investigate the matter.

His shocking findings - revealed recently by Seymour Hersh in The New Yorker - were presented to his superiors on March 3. Two months later, neither Myers nor Rumsfeld had read the whole report.

In the light of the evidence available so far, the argument that only a small number of untrained reservists, out of their depth, were responsible for the humiliations and depredations heaped on Iraqi detainees (many of whom had been arrested simply for being in the wrong place at the wrong time) is untenable.

Some of the torturers have said they were encouraged and sometimes even ordered to "soften up" prisoners ahead of interrogations - which were carried out by the CIA or by the ubiquitous "civilian contractors" (even key security functions in wartime are now being outsourced, and the mercenaries are apparently not answerable to the army for their actions).

As far as lack of training and unfamiliarity with the Geneva Conventions is concerned, someone fairly senior in the military hierarchy must take the blame. It's certainly not the fault of the Iraqis. Besides, how much training does anyone need to function as a semi-decent human being?

Did Saddam Hussein's torturers do worse things at Abu Ghraib? Most probably. But should Saddam be the moral compass for Iraq's Anglo-American "liberators"? Saddam emptied Abu Ghraib in October 2002, although his portrait remained on the gates until the following June. When the site was adopted as a US-run concentration camp, the portrait was replaced by a slogan: "America is a friend of all the Iraqi people." Yeah, right.

A comparable scandal has reared its head on the other side of the Atlantic, with Tony Blair apologizing to the French, for some reason, for excesses by British troops. But then, there is no obvious reason why the Brits should be any less racist and sadistic than the Yanks.

In both cases, there are historical precedents. In Vietnam, American soldiers used to walk around with body parts cut off from their victims. Britain spread itself more thinly, but its tactics in suppressing the Mau-Mau uprising in Kenya in the 1950s could serve as a valid reference point.

But that was then, this is now. Well, here's a quick example of what happens now. Javaid Iqbal and Ehab Elmaghraby were taken into custody without any charges. According to a recent report in The New York Times, the men claim they "were repeatedly slammed into walls and dragged across the floor while shackled and manacled, kicked and punched until they bled, cursed as 'terrorists' and as 'Muslim.' and subjected to multiple unnecessary body-cavity searches, including one during which correction officers inserted a flashlight in Mr Elmaghraby's rectum, making him bleed."

This didn't take place at Abu Ghraib, but in Brooklyn in the aftermath of September 11. So please don't tell me that America has "lost its innocence" with the Abu Ghraib pictures. And don't tell me it has lost the moral right to be in Iraq. Because it never had that right.

Can it redeem itself? That's hard to say. But it could have a go. For starters, don't just send Rumsfeld packing, but also Wolfowitz. And Doug Feith. Powell and Richard Armitage? On their way! And, above all, Bush and Cheney. But don't forget Condi. Regime change. Let them spend a night at Abu Ghraib, just to experience the aura.

Beyond that, the US must pull out of Iraq. Completely. Yes, it can be done. Once all that has been achieved, ask me again about redemption.

Email: mahirali2@netscape.net.

Sheltering the urban poor

The latest protest demonstrations by katchi abadi dwellers in Islamabad last week, including one which took place in front of the National Assembly, are reflective of the continuing problems which urban squatters face, despite the National Katchi Abadi Policy 2001 and the Settlement Policy for Katchi Abadis In Islamabad 1985.

As is apparent from the protests, which were prompted by the Capital Development Authority's latest squatter eviction drive in G-8 sector, insecurity is still the major problem confronting the katchi abadis. A single katchi abadi can actually have been bulldozed many times and built up again on the same spot as many times.

The Katchi Abadi Policy 2001, which is based on the earlier policy formulated under the 1985 Ghulam Haider Wyne report on katchi abadis, is supposed to give urban squatters security through regularization and re-settlement.

Regularization means that the dwellers would get ownership/lease rights and their settlements would be upgraded with development works like electricity, water and gas supply, and sewerage.

According to the director, Katchi Abadi Cell, CDA, under the 2001 policy, katchi abadis, which were established before 23 March 1985 and which consist of more than 40 huts, are to be regularized. Others are to be relocated elsewhere in authorized settlements.

In the Capital, according to the director, there are 11 katchi abadis, of which six are being regularized, four are being re-located in a new authorized settlement at Alipur Farash, and one is an Afghan abadi, which is also being re-located.

But it is one thing to formulate and announce a policy, and quite another thing to implement it, and successively too at that. Judging from the occasional demonstrations staged by the katchi abadi dwellers in the twin cities - in March 2004, and in November, August and May 2003 - the process of regularization of recognized katchi abadis and the resettlement of others is definitely not proceeding as well as planned.

Mismanagement and corruption by some officials and departments concerned are partly responsible for this. But inherent flaws in the policies themselves could well also be responsible for the continuing plight of many katchi abadi residents.

Instead of containing the mushrooming of katchi abadis, the policy of regularization, which originated in 1978, had the effect of actually encouraging the sprouting of ever more katchi abadis in urban centres throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

The first katchi abadi policy formulated in late 1978 by Gen Zia's regime had set January 1, 1978 as the cut-off date for regularization. This cut-off date was later extended to January 23, 1985 by the then government.

The 2001 katchi abadi policy of the then chief executive, Gen Pervez Musharraf, had apparently retained January 23, 1985 cut-off date, much to the disappointment of many katchi abadis.

Moreover, evictions of katchi abadis in urban centres, including Islamabad, continued thereafter, prompting protests and demonstrations by the All Pakistan Katchi Abadi Alliance, who claimed that the authorities were acting in contradiction to the 2001 policy.

The confusion surrounding the official katchi abadi policy was compounded by Prime Minister Jamali's statement made in September 2003 in Hyderabad (reported in an English daily) that the government had decided to regularize "all" kutchi abadis, rather than only those established prior to 1985.

The regularization policy had willy nilly presented governments with the fait accompli of regularizing every new katchi abadi that sprouted, or at least re-settling the inhabitants. If they do not, and instead simply evict and bulldoze any new settlement, the governments face accusations of adopting anti-poor policies.

Not only has the katchi abadi growth been inadvertently encouraged, the policy of regularizing katchi abadis on encroached state land has also effectively absolved governments from making systematic allocations in the sectors concerned for planned, low-cost housing estates.

Real pro-poor policies on the other hand require that governments formulate sustained and planned low cost housing projects in urban centres, especially under financial schemes that would allow the people to make instalment payments for these homes over an extended period of time.

The governments have been adopting regularization more as a measure to win political constituency than to actually solve the problems of the urban poor. The real solution to the katchi abadi issue should involve measures like mass low-cost housing which will help contain the emergence of new katchi abadis.

Continual growth of the katchi abadi phenomenon merely reflects the failure of past and present governments to fulfil the increasing demand for low cost urban housing and thus provide shelter to the urban poor. This failure is in turn helping to nurture political activists in the katchi abadis, some of whom may even rise to become full-fledged political leaders later.

Durand Line an 'ambiguous' border?

Instead of a straight, unqualified apology for unwarranted military intrusion into Pakistan's sovereign territory (May 5), a US defence official called into question the very status of the Durand Line as the internationally recognized Pakistan-Afghan border.

To quote the official, "the border is a very ambiguous line. It is not physically well-marked". Afghan and Pakistani officials, the spokesman from Washington went on to add, had "discussed problems with the ill-defined border in the past".

Unless misreported, the above statement may well be seen as double-edged. First, it faults the very delineation of the line and, secondly, it tends to support the Afghan version of the line as an 'ill-defined' border.

In other words, it throws the status of something as settled as the Durand Line open to re-interpretation and re-definition, with far-reaching consequences - intended or unintended.

US troops deployed on the Afghan side of the Durand Line, have reportedly crossed into Pakistani territory several times, (certainly more than once) in recent days in blatant disregard of Pakistan "expressly prohibiting such action".

The Americans were said to have intruded deeply enough to reach the bazaar area of Alwara Mandi and search a number of shops and any other place suspected of harbouring Al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists.

The Pentagon dismissed the episode as 'inadvertent', supported by the 'bottom line' that "we respect the territorial integrity of Pakistan". This too came with the proviso that there must be some 'way out' for ensuring demarcation (rather re-demarcation) of 'this porous border' between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Surprisingly enough, our foreign office all but ignored the substantive part of the US version questioning the historical status of the Durand Line drawn in 1893 by the British and approved, accepted and recognized by generations of Afghan rulers.

A foreign office spokesman actually gave the benefit of the doubt to the intruders for blundering into the wrong side of the border, being unaware of its exact location.

Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri in his Senate address all but shifted the focus from border violation to a reiteration of the government resolve to go ahead with its nuclear missile programme rather than roll it back under 'alleged' American pressure.

His emphasis on Pakistan's 'national sovereignty' and resolve 'not to tolerate infringement of its territory' might have been little more than a routine exercise in, yet again, re-stating the obvious.

The fact remains that instead of hedging around the issue, the US should have severely reprimanded the intruders and warned them strongly against committing such violations in the future.

It might have been easier to understand a body of civilians intruding for want of exact drawings and maps, but hardly so in the case of a trained military force equipped with operational maps and real time intelligence. It would be either a deliberate trespass or a serious blunder hardly expected of a professional fighting outfit.

Read with the statements periodically made by responsible US spokesman at various state and diplomatic levels voicing lack of satisfaction with the role of Pakistan's security forces in dealing effectively with Al Qaeda and Taliban remnants on our side of the border, the latest episode acquires an aspect more sombre than what meets the eye.

Can it be viewed as deliberate trespass threatening to develop into some kind of hot pursuit? With the degree of desperation US forces would appear to be acquiring after failing to hit their high-value target, coupled with patience on our part, such an eventuality cannot be dismissed altogether.

At what point of time such a tactic may actually be deployed would be hard to say. However, considering the mounting demands and pressures of the US election year, it might well be sooner than later.

While President George Bush, his Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice have tempered their critique of Pakistan with a kind word or two, US ambassador to Kabul, Mr Zalmay Khalilzad, has been aggressively blunt.

In one incredibly rudely-worded statement amounting to a virtual ultimatum, he told the Pakistani leadership "to solve this (Al Qaeda/Taliban) problem or we will have to do it ourselves...." In response to Pakistan protesting, Mr Khalilzad said he was not 'hostile' to Pakistan but as long as 'terrorist sanctuaries' existed on the Pakistan side it would not only make his job harder but will not be good for Pakistan also...' It would be naive to assume that whatever Mr Khalilzad said (and keeps on saying) was without an assenting nod from Washington.

Statements for and against Pakistan's role in the global war against terrorism apart, Washington's remarks about the 'complex' nature of the Durand Line amount to indirect support of the Afghan stand for rectification (re-demarcation) of the line. Its implications must be viewed with all seriousness as it is an issue impinging on the territorial integrity of Pakistan.

Criticising Pakistan's role on its side of the border is one thing but pushing the status of the Durand Line into the debate is quite another.

- The writer is a retired brigadier of the Pakistan Army.

Hasrat Mohani - forsaken and forgotten

Tomorrow (May 13), 53 years ago, Hasrat Mohani breathed his last in Lucknow in 1951. He appears to have been forgotten by us. Fazlul Hasan Hasrat Mohani was a freedom fighter, a legendary parliamentarian, and the first activist to demand complete freedom from the British in 1921 from an All-India Congress forum.

He was a practising sufi, an "Ishtiraki Muslim," famous for his austere way of life, and yet daring and outspoken, one who would love to swim against the tide where principles were involved.

But Hasrat Mohani was a poet also, an exponent of 'jadeed' ghazal who rejuvenated the genre with fresh and simple images. Soon after his graduation from Aligarh University, he launched the monthly Urdu-i-Moalla, a literary-cum-political organ.

Lack of finances forced him to do the job of editing, printing and publishing himself. But he had the unflinching support of his wife, Nishatunnisa Begum. The paper was banned, Hasrat was jailed, his books and precious documents were confiscated, and sold out. But he remained unbending, and that was how he lived his life.

Hai mashq-i-sukhan jaari, chakki ki mashaqqat bhi
Ek turfa tamasha hai Hasrat ki tabiyat bhi

Hasrat was a Muslim Leaguer, as he would claim, who kept to left of the party. He was the first politician to welcome the October Revolution of 1917 in Russia. Also, it was through his single-handed efforts that the first All-India Communist Conference of 1925 was held at Kanpur.

In 1936, when the first All-India Progressive Writers Association meeting was held in Lucknow, attended by such luminaries as Munshi Prem Chand, Maulvi Abdul Haq and Mulkraj Anand (hopefully still living), Hasrat was also there.

And as Sajjad Zaheer, secretary of the association, would later narrate in his book Roshnai, Hasrat "created a scene." A resolution opposing "the use of obscenity" in literature (of which the Progressives were often accused in those days) was put before the house and was opposed by none other than Maulana Hasrat.

He said (the words are mine) that 'obscenity' could not be defined in clear terms so it should be left to the good sense of the writer himself to decide. He also referred to the classical literature of Urdu and Persian in this regard. He further argued that once the resolution was accepted, retrogressive and obscurantist elements would keep on harassing writers, branding every bit of progressive writing as obscene.

Maulana Hasrat's arguments changed the opinion of the house and the resolution was dropped. Today, exactly 53 years after his death, no literary organization feels the need to recall the great idealist, poet and politician. If I am not wrong, there is a Hasrat Mohani Trust or a Hasrat Mohani Society to keep his name alive. Can't they even hold a meeting in the great man's memory?

* * * * *

The bomb blast at the Hyderi mosque last Friday saddened people all over the country and brought cultural life in Karachi to a near standstill. The first casualty probably was a meeting with Iftikhar Arif at the Arts Council.

The event was cancelled. Later, an international mushaira scheduled for the next evening was also postponed, the decision to do so taken by the aalmi mushaira committee at an emergency meeting. The Arts Council also postponed its film festival and music conference scheduled for Tuesday and Wednesday. The mushaira may not be held in the near future.

Meanwhile, around a dozen poets from India and other countries who came for the aalmi mushaira took part in various private gatherings and localized poetic soirees.

Earlier, two important events were held, both at the Arts Council. A 'mehfil-i-naqd-o-nazar' was held on May 3, devoted to the recital of naats. Sarshar Siddiqui was the main speaker, who dilated on the merits of devotional poetry.

Another speaker was Ghaus Mathravi, who also read out his naat. Raashid Noor, Irfan Abedi, Ms Rehana Roohi, Inam Nadir, Shaukat Ali Unqa were among others who recited their devotional offerings.

A mushaira held by young poets at the Arts Council on May 5 was successfully conducted by the Sakenan-i-Sheher-i-Sukhan (the B-team of the council's Adabi committee, as someone remarked). Apart from many young poets, senior poets also recited their ghazals.

Peerzada Qasim was in the chair, since he thought it was his "moral duty" to provide guidance to young talent. He admired the budding poets and advised them to seek guidance from the writings of classical writers. Shaukat Ali Unqa conducted the mushaira, which was much against tradition concluded fairly early in the evening - at 10.30pm.

* * * * *

The populous Orangi Town never lags behind when it comes to promoting mushaira culture. The Sindh Adabi Singhar held a mushaira last Saturday to remember Mobarak Mungeri on his 15th anniversary.

Born in 1914 in Mungair (in Bihar), Mungeri spent most of his life in the former East Pakistan and later came to Karachi. He was a popular poet who wrote satirical verses for a daily till he breathed his last in October 1988. He had five poetry collections to his credit, the last one published by his son, Iqbal Majeedi, also a poet.

Among those who presented verses recalling Mobarak Mungeri were Manzer Ayyubi, Gulnar Afreen, Zakia Ghazal and Rafiuddin Raaz. Kavish Omer was in the chair.