Delhi nuclear dialogue

Although democratic opinion in both India and Pakistan has regarded nuclear weapons with horror, New Delhi and Islamabad have taken six years, after the Pokhran and Chagai explosions in mid-1998, to hold the first official meeting between their experts to discuss nuclear confidence-building measures (CBMs).

The success of the nuclear talks held recently in New Delhi augurs well for the talks between the foreign secretaries of the two countries on June 27-28; they will discuss "peace and security" as well as Jammu and Kashmir. They are also expected to discuss the agreement reached between the experts of the two countries on confidence-building measures.

The nuclear experts will hold further exchanges on the draft nuclear CBMs to formalize an agreement on a draft missile treaty handed over in New Delhi by the Indian team to its Pakistani counterpart. This will be further discussed by the foreign secretaries of the two countries and later by the foreign ministers when they meet in the coming weeks. Happily, nuclear diplomacy has at last picked up steam after six long years.

Before discussing the salient features of the newly evolved nuclear entente, it will be instructive, even amusing, to look closely at the background to the Delhi talks. It may be recalled that the common minimum programme of the Congress-led coalition government in New Delhi promises that while "maintaining a credible nuclear weapons programme", the government will evolve "demonstrable and verifiable confidence-building measures with its nuclear neighbours".

It may be observed that, happily, there has been a noticeable change in the tone, tenor and substance of external affairs minister Natwar Singh's statements in regard to relations with Pakistan, since his eyebrow-raising interviews with the Outlook and India Today soon after assuming office. As the Times of India has aptly put it, his assertions now communicate nothing but "bonhomie and good cheer towards Pakistan."

Pakistan's stance at the Delhi talks was no less reasonable, pragmatic and accommodative. It appears that after the disclosures about some of its scientists being involved in N-proliferation, Islamabad wisely decided to demonstrate its sense of responsibility at the Delhi talks.

In order to reduce the risk of nuclear confrontation between them, the two neighbours have agreed to implement seven CBMs, the most important of these being a well-groomed, upgraded and secured hotline between the directors-general of military operations (DGMOs) and the setting up of a similar channel between their foreign secretaries to prevent misunderstandings and reduce risks relevant to the use of nuclear weapons.

Besides recognizing that their nuclear capabilities, based on 'their national security imperatives', constitute a factor for stability, the two sides committed themselves to 'national measures' in order to reduce the risks of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under their respective control. Also, they would adopt bilateral notification measures and mechanisms to prevent misunderstandings and misinterpretations by either side.

India and Pakistan have also reaffirmed their commitment, made in Lahore in 1999, to refrain from carrying out any further nuclear tests after the 1998 test blasts. Significantly, the two have invited the world's nuclear powers to join them in a global quest for peace, proposing regular working-level meetings to discuss issues of common concern.

If accepted by other nuclear powers, it would imply recognition of India and Pakistan as legitimate nuclear powers. The suggestion seems to have found favour with the IAEA whose director-general wants India, Pakistan and Israel, unofficial nuclear powers, to be included in the NPT talks.

Being the first official meeting between India and Pakistan to reduce the risk of nuclear confrontation between them, the Delhi talks succeeded in achieving substantial progress. However, a lot still remains to be done to boost nuclear-related CBMs. Being a key issue, the control and command systems of India and Pakistan must have come up for discussion during the talks.

It is, however, not yet clear whether a full understanding of each other's control and command system has been achieved as a result of these talks. Also, no explanation is available as to why working groups were not set up for further discussions to explore mechanisms for risk reduction

There are two important confidence-building measures, in the specific South Asian context, which deserve to be considered by the experts of the two countries at their next meeting. In a thought-provoking article by two eminent physicists of India on the editorial page of The Hindu (June 4, 2004) two sensible recommendations have been made.

If adopted, these will go a long way towards building confidence between the two nuclear-armed neighbours. The first is that the Indian government should offer not to deploy nuclear weapons. The government of Pakistan should also reciprocate by making a similar offer.

The second suggestion is that New Delhi should stop installing early warning systems which, in the specific South Asian context where the response time is dangerously short, will increase, instead of decreasing, the risk of accidental or unauthorized nuclear war. According to the Indian scientists, as these two sensible recommendations do not compromise "national security in any real sense", they could constitute the basis of a common nuclear doctrine with Pakistan.

It appears the winds of change are blowing across South Asia. A very sensible suggestion has been made by two well-known Indian strategic analysts, Bharat Karnad and G. Parthasarthi. They have suggested that India should unilaterally declare that no nuclear weapons will be deployed within 250 km of the India-Pakistan border, the range of the Prithvi missile.. The usually hawkish, and influential, strategic expert, Mr. K. Subrahmanyam has supported the suggestion. These are encouraging developments and should be taken note of by Pakistani experts.

It will, however, be a mistake to be complacent about the difficulties involved. The history of CBMs in the case of India and Pakistan has not been very happy. Because of mutual distrust and suspicion, obligations were undertaken in the past, initially honoured and then forgotten.

Proper implementation of agreed measures can build trust and confidence and therefore every possible care should be taken by the two sides to implement faithfully whatever has been agreed upon. As they progress in nuclear entente, they may have to agree on a set of verification and monitoring measures in order to ensure that the other side is not cheating on its obligations.

Unlike the United States and Russia - with their thousands of warheads and hundreds of aircraft and missiles - Pakistan and India have very limited nuclear arsenals. Therefore, many of the risks of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, raised in the western literature on the subject, are missing in the South Asian context. But the danger of nuclear disaster in South Asia from accidents or miscalculations cannot be entirely ruled out.

Therefore, every possible precaution should be taken by the two sides to lessen the danger of a nuclear holocaust. The establishment of a fool-proof and high-speed communication link between the DGMOs and foreign secretaries of the two countries is a step in the right direction.

The success of the Delhi nuclear dialogue is a positive development in the bilateral relations of the two countries. The logic of nuclear weaponization has at last impelled Islamabad and New Delhi to initiate a serious and result-oriented discussion on the management of their nuclear arsenals.

The dialectic of nuclear weaponry has obliged the two neighbours to realize that an agreement on nuclear stability cannot be made hostage to their unresolved disputes and differences. Having acquired the awesome capability, Pakistan and India owe it to their people and the world at large to take concrete steps for nuclear risk reduction.

The writer is a former ambassador.

Gunning for talks

The army on the Indian side of Kashmir says that infiltration from Pakistan has increased. The home ministry reports in a 30-page document that training camps have been reopened on the Pakistani side of Kashmir and some 500 militants are undergoing training. This is nothing unusual. Militants' camps have never been completely wound up and infiltration takes place after the melting of snow at the passes straddling over the mountains.

Yet, it was expected that in view of the ongoing talks between New Delhi and Islamabad, Pakistan would stall infiltration. This impression got strengthened after President General Pervez Musharraf gave such an indication after meeting former Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee last year at Islamabad.

The quantum of infiltration is still small. One cannot say for certain whether it would reach the proportion which it had in the past decade. Nor can one be sure about how far Pakistan was behind it. There are some jihadis who, even Musharraf admits, cannot be checked since they are like a loose gun beyond anybody's control. But if infiltration is beginning in the same old way, it is an unfortunate development.

It will be a clear message from Islamabad that it is not happy over the content of talks. The Pakistan spokesman in his last week's briefing dropped a hint: "There are some differences. Pakistan has its own position and India its own. We have been talking about it for quite some time without reaching any conclusion."

Was the hush-hush meeting between Security Adviser J N Dixit and Musharraf's adviser Tariq Aziz at Amritsar meant to break the deadlock?

Surely, the resumption of infiltration was too rapid a reaction even if the two had failed to find a way out. One should not, however, underestimate the interest, which Washington was taking. Secretary of State Colin Powell's statement at Washington was significant. He said: "We continue to monitor the rate of infiltration and that we continue to express our concern about the structure that remains behind." That he made the remark in the presence of Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh assumed greater significance.

Powell's observation was on infiltration and it should have been left at that. There was nothing to suggest that America was exerting pressure on Islamabad for accepting the Line of Control (LoC) as the international border. Still that was the general impression in Pakistan. An angry reaction from the least expected quarters, the Lahore Bar Association, told all. The association said that "a well contemplated plan by American on Kashmir" was in the offing.

Such a sharp observation by an organization like the Bar Association meant two things: either it did not know what it was talking about or it was speaking somebody's voice. Whatever the truth, it served no purpose. If Washington had made up its mind to advocate a particular solution, Islamabad could do little because it was too dependent on America.

But the Bar Association's other observation in the same resolution it passed was more serious. It indicated that it did not understand even the ABC of the problem. The Association said that Pakistan would not be 'complete' without Kashmir. Once in a while such statements emanated from the other side.

But, by this time it should have been clear that India would not be a party to any solution which recommends the state's division on the basis of religion. Pakistan's claim over the valley does not become weightier just because this part has Muslims in a majority. New Delhi cannot afford to reopen partition and pose a threat to its ethos of secularism. Had the state acceded to Pakistan when the British rule lapsed in August 1947, India would have taken the development in its stride.

But now, after 57 years, how can it accept a solution on the basis of the two-nation theory which even its exponent, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, had discarded after the creation of Pakistan? He said that the Hindus and Muslims in Pakistan were Pakistanis and the Hindus and Muslims in India were Indians, free to pursue their religion but not to mix it with the state.

Even today's Islamic state of Pakistan, although preponderantly Muslim, does not follow the two-nation theory. The Pakistan nation comprises Muslims, Hindus and Christians. The minorities are not a separate nation, nor do they have a separate electorate. The solution of Kashmir, whenever found, will be on the basis of Kashmiriyat, which is pluralistic in content and secular in character.

Whatever be the rhetoric on both sides, my impression is that the talks on Kashmir are taking place behind the scenes. That may be the reason why Musharraf too is silent after having said that he would wait for a solution until August before ending the confidence-building measures. The two foreign ministers after meeting at Beijing have said that the "chemistry" was good. They obviously talked about Kashmir.

However, my conviction is that if ever the two countries find a solution to the Kashmir problem, it would not be at the negotiating table. The settlement would be reached somewhere away from the public gaze and media glare. And it would be anvilled by non-officials. This almost happened three years ago when two non-officials, former Pakistan foreign secretary Niaz Naik and former MP R K Mishra met secretly a few times to achieve something "close" to the solution during the regimes of Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif. Such efforts take time.

What does one do in the meanwhile to lessen the sufferings of the Kashmiris? Many books have come out to describe their agony. The recent one, "Kashmir: The Untold Story", is by Humra Qureshi, a sensitive journalist. She has poignantly etched the life of ordinary people, sandwiched between militants and security forces. So has nuclear physicist Dr Parvez Hoodbhoy in his documentary, "Kashmir, Pakistan and India - Crossing the Lines."

According to the Economist, "a 15-year war has claimed 40,000-110,000 lives." The two countries should ponder how to stop the killings. One way is to silence the guns of the militants as well as those of security forces. New Delhi may be willing for a complete ceasefire but Islamabad is not likely to do so because even after ordering a ceasefire on the LoC it has looked the other way when the militants from Pakistan have operated in India. Such an approach is unproductive and only encourages the militants.

Violence cannot possibly lead to a solution of any major problem today because violence has become much too terrible and destructive. If the society we aim at cannot be brought about by big-scale violence, will small-size violence help? It won't because violence breeds more violence and creates an atmosphere of conflict and of disruption. We have too many fissiparous tendencies in the two countries to take risks.

The basic thing, I believe, is that wrong means will not lead to right results and this is no longer merely an ethical doctrine but a practical proposition. I told this to the Kashmiri youth at a seminar in Srinagar. They did not relish the idea. But imagine the impact on Indian civil society even if 1,000 died through a non-violent struggle. It is not too late.

The writer is a freelance columnist based in New Delhi.

American policy on torture

American Secretary of Defence Donald H. Rumsfeld expressed dismay last week about editorials in which "the implication is that the United States government has, in one way or another, ordered, authorized, permitted, tolerated torture."

Such reports, he said, raised questions among U.S. troops in Iraq, reduced the willingness of people in Iraq and Afghanistan to cooperate with the United States, and could be used by others as an excuse to torture U.S. soldiers or civilians.

This was wrong, he said, because "I have not seen anything that suggests that a senior civilian or military official of the United States of America ... could be characterized as ordering or authorizing or permitting torture or acts that are inconsistent with our international treaty obligations or our laws or our values as a country."

Since Mr. Rumsfeld referred directly to The Post, we believe we owe him a response. We agree that the country is at war and that we all must weigh our words accordingly. We also agree that the consequences of the revelations of prisoner abuse are grave. As supporters of the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have been particularly concerned about the ways that the scandal - and the administration's continuing failure to come to terms with it - could undermine the chances for success.

We also have warned about the uses that might be made of it by captors of Americans. What strikes us as extraordinary is that Mr. Rumsfeld would suggest that this damage would be caused by newspaper editorials rather than by his own actions and decisions and those of other senior administration officials.

What might lead us to describe Mr. Rumsfeld or some other "senior civilian or military official" as "ordering or authorizing or permitting" torture or violation of international treaties and U.S. law? We could start with Mr. Rumsfeld's own admission during the same news conference that he had personally approved the detention of several prisoners in Iraq without registering them with the International Committee of the Red Cross.

This creation of "ghost prisoners" was described by Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba, who investigated abuses at Abu Ghraib prison, as "deceptive, contrary to Army doctrine and in violation of international law." Failure to promptly register detainees with the Red Cross is an unambiguous breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention; Mr. Rumsfeld said that he approved such action on several occasions, at the request of another senior official, CIA Director George J. Tenet.

Did senior officials order torture? We know of two relevant cases so far. One was Mr. Rumsfeld's December 2002 authorization of the use of techniques including hooding, nudity, stress positions, "fear of dogs" and physical contact with prisoners at the Guantanamo Bay base. A second was the distribution in September 2003 by the office of the top U.S. commander in Iraq, Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, of an interrogation policy that included these techniques as well as others, among them sleep and dietary manipulation.

In both cases lawyers inside the military objected that the policies would lead to violations of international law, including the convention banning torture. Both were eventually modified, but not before they were used for the handling of prisoners. In the case of the Abu Ghraib prison, the policy apparently remained in effect for months.

Did senior officials "permit" torture? A Pentagon-led task force concluded in March 2003, with the support of the Justice Department, that the president was authorized to order torture as part of his war-making powers and that those who followed his orders could be immunized from punishment. Dictators who wish to justify torture, and those who would mistreat Americans, have no need to read our editorials: They can download from the Internet the 50-page legal brief issued by Mr. Rumsfeld's chief counsel.

What is needed is a full and independent investigation of the matter, including the decisions made by Mr. Rumsfeld and other senior officials, and a forthright and unambiguous commitment by President Bush to strictly observe U.S. and international law in the future.-The Washington Post

Will Congress rule slow down reforms?

Despite the hue and cry over the recent Indian election, and the endless rhetoric about the 'fall of the fascists', it is quite incredible how little has actually changed in India. In this sense, the people of India, who have the thankless job of voting one government out only to get it back in a different guise, deserve our sympathy.

Take the votes for instance. Although Congress has increased its seats from 112 to 145, its share of the national vote has actually declined from 28.3 to 26.7 per cent. With 138 seats, the BJP, whose vote share declined from almost 24 per cent to 22 per cent, is only marginally smaller than Congress in the Lok Sabha. That this vote represents a massive backlash against the pro-free-market policies and an increasingly elitist stance of the BJP is agreed upon by all and sundry, including the BJP hardliners. That this is far from being a ringing endorsement of the Indian Congress Party (I) is equally clear from the numbers.

The story told by numbers is echoed by a qualitative assessment of the way Congress is likely to function in power. That Sonia Gandhi has declined the prime ministership, or Manmohan Singh has been put in charge of India's new government are issues of marginal importance. What matters is that the Congress is subject to pressures that are uncannily similar to those which influenced BJP policies.

On one hand of the Congress stands the Indian Left, which, given its highly 'pragmatic' approach to the market in the past can at most serve to delay rather than halt India's pro-market policies. On the other is the globalization imperative in the form of WTO regulations and the highly attractive lure of IT exports. The Indian left, with 62 seats, has a decisive influence on the policies of the Congress.

That they have declined ministerial posts and retained their independence only goes to their credit. But they lack a viable alternative. All they can do is drag their feet when the Congress begins to privatize what remains of the Indian state and altogether remove the door which the BJP opened.

That the Congress will do that is already clear, with Manmohan Singh declaring his intention to go with the state or the private sector, depending on which is more 'efficient.' Since efficiency was not why the world decided to put certain firms and sectors in state control in the first place, Singh's selected criterion reveals his intentions to continue with the IMF policy he implemented in 1991 in return for their loan.

India's tryst with globalization has developed a strong dynamic of its own. The Congress will find it difficult to resist it. The impressive success of the Indian IT sector, perhaps the leading beneficiary of liberalization, has served to produce a stark digital divide in the country. The vast majority of India's population finds itself locked out of this phenomenon. At least 40 per cent of the population cannot even read or write.

The literacy in Andhra Pradesh, whose CEO Chandrababu Naidu served as the World Bank's poster child and was a regular invitee to Davos, for instance, is about 54 per cent. It also has the highest rate of economic suicides among farmers. The way Naidu was kicked out in the recent elections highlights the tension between the imperatives of globalization and the needs of the Indian people.

The IT sector, as well as many in the pharmaceutical sector in India, want to knock down the doors and embrace free trade. This has the potential of securing them lucrative western markets. The poor and illiterate, on the other hand, gain little or nothing from this and stand to lose substantially.

Take the small manufacturing sector. This group has lost profoundly to cheaper and better quality imports from China and other countries. Similarly, Indian agricultural industry has remained almost stagnant throughout BJP's tenure, with real incomes actually declining. What works for the knowledge-intensive industry, at least in the short-run, is bad news for the labour-intensive.

As much as Manmohan Singh wants to put a human face on India's development, his government will be subject to increasing pressures from outside to privatize key sectors such as education, health and infrastructure. These trends are evident in most developing countries, and in most places have led to increased disparity between classes.

Regulatory as well as normative pressures will make India conform to the new norms. With markets taking over such key sectors, the have-nots are likely to continue their lives in abject poverty, unless the government can somehow build the infrastructure or impart the skills they require to participate in the new economic order.

The hands of the Congress government will thus be tied. Any deviance from the globalization agenda will be punished by the markets. Those benefiting from access to foreign markets will also voice their resentment internally. Under the Congress, India is likely to continue the polarization trend that we witnessed under the BJP.

Interestingly, these pressures on the Congress government are almost a mirror image of those that the BJP government functioned under. The world worries about the resistance that the CPI (M) will offer to continuing reforms. In fact, the BJP faced similar pressures from within the party, although springing from entirely different motivations.

The BJP's erstwhile supporters include several groups, including small manufacturers, who have been adversely affected by globalization. Two other close allies (which, like the BJP sprang from the RSS and are part of the Sangh Pariwar) include the Swadeshi Jagaran Manch (SJM) and the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS).

These parties impeded BJP's pro-globalization policies at various points. The SJM's mandate is to block the multinationals from capturing the Indian market, while the BMS, India's largest trade union collective with approximately 6.5 million members, is supposedly responsible for protecting the interests of industrial workers.

BJP's nationalist capitalist ideology before coming to power was closely aligned with the mandates of these parties. However, once in power, the imperatives of government and globalization forced the BJP to pursue a path that diverged from its siblings.

International investors need not worry. The Congress does not have any more retarding pressures on it than the BJP did. Since the policies furthered by the BJP were started by the Congress and Manmohan Singh, the reforms are likely to continue with alacrity.

But despite these reassuring signs, foreign investors worry that India is not as stable as they would like. They do not care whether it is the BJP or Congress in place as long as the pro-free-trade reforms continue. That the BJP passed draconian laws like the Prevention of Terrorism Act or that it was responsible for the massacre of thousands in Gujarat has never bothered the investors.

What worries them is that unlike many other countries which attract large amounts of foreign investment, India still has an active left, which, with the help of disaffected constituents, can theoretically put the brakes on the gravy train.

However, on that account too, they need not worry. The Indian Communist parties have shown great pragmatism in the past. As a Bloomberg columnist noted, when they aren't sloganeering, the Indian Marxists are a realistic bunch. The only Indian state where information-technology enabled services are labelled essential and therefore unable to go on strike is in West Bengal, which is ruled by a Communist party.

What is in the interest of foreign investors, as well as the Indian middle class is, however, not necessarily also in the interest of the vast majority of its population. Unfortunately, just as the pro-market policies are likely to continue, so is the plight of the common Indian.

While the pro-establishment think tanks like the New Delhi-based National Council for Applied Economic Research claim that by 2010, 84 per cent of India's households will earn more than $1,000 a year (currently up to 35 per cent of the Indians live on under $365/year although the government gives a lower figure), this three-fold increase is highly unlikely. For these Indians to prosper, India's gains will have to become much more broad-based, which, without substantial government spending is not possible. And if Manmohan Singh's recent statements are anything to go by, that is not looking like a distinct possibility.

The writer teaches strategy and policy at Cambridge University, UK.