Trade expansion with India

Should major political disputes between India and Pakistan be resolved or be well on their way to a solution before initiating full scale trade exchanges and larger economic cooperation between them?

Pakistan, frustrated by earlier deadlocks, insists on at least sustained and promising dialogue between them on the political issues, particularly the 57-year-old Kashmir dispute, before serious efforts for comprehensive cooperation begin.

India, on the other hand, argues that economic cooperation, cultural exchanges and people-to-people contacts will pave the way for an eventual settlement of the political disputes.

The Indian commerce secretary Deepak Chatterjee came to Islamabad last week to seek economic cooperation in 24 new areas, which go far beyond trade. They can be considered seriously by Pakistan if the political dialogue makes a headway.

However, the presidents of Pakistan and India, in their independence day exchanges of greetings, have expressed satisfaction over the progress made in the comprehensive talks so far.

But the fact is that if the two countries do not alter their approach to the basic disputes and come up with workable compromises, the deadlock will persist and the economic cooperation between them will not be very significant.

Both sides now appear to be anxious to be flexible in their approach to the disputes. The promise to do better in the next round. And there is consistency in that positive approach despite pessimistic noises here and there.

There are too many examples in the modern world of economic cooperation and cultural exchanges between political rivals or antagonistic states leading eventually to a political settlement.

A classical example of economic cooperation and cultural exchanges overriding ideological differences and political disputes was seen in the relationship between the Soviet Union and the US and the West as a whole. They traded with each other amply despite their cold war rhetoric.

Later, the same pattern was witnessed in the relations between China and the US and other western countries. Currently, we have in Asia the example of China and India putting aside their major territorial dispute and promoting increasing economic and political cooperation and even having joint military exercises.

India wants the same pattern of relations with Pakistan irrespective of the intractable Kashmir dispute. It wants Pakistan to concede the Most Favoured Nation Treatment to it after India has given the same status to Pakistan. But Pakistan is reluctant to concede the MFN status to India until it sees real progress in the negotiations for a settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

Meanwhile, the areas where the two nuclear armed neighbours have to cooperate have been increasing, and they now include the fight against terrorism, combating the spread of drugs and more confidence-building measures in respect of nuclear arms.

The Indian defence minister Pranad Mukherjee says the security concerns of the two countries have increased far more than they were in 1947 and hence the urgency for comprehensive cooperation between them.

The first round of the dialogue between the officials of the two countries under eight groups has come to an end. The foreign secretaries of the two countries are to meet on September 4 to review the progress of the talks or areas of agreement.

And the foreign ministers will meet on September 5 and 6. That may be followed by a meeting later in the month between the prime minister of India and president of Pakistan on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session in New York. Thereafter a formal summit may take place in New Delhi.

Pakistan is concerned over the balance of trade which is five-to-one in favour of India. It wants the trade to be balanced. What matters is not the balance in favour of one country or the other within one year or a short period but during a three-year period. Secondly, what matters is the kind of goods imported by Pakistan from India and their productive utility for it.

Today the talk goes far beyond trade exchanges and participation in the trade fairs of each other. There is a serious talk of joint enterprises and investment by one country in the other.

India wants to invest in the oil exploration sector, on-shore and off-shore in Pakistan and make use of its experience in compressed gas industry in Pakistan. Pakistan wants India to remove its tariff and non-tariff barriers against trade with it so that Pakistani goods could flow into the Indian market easily.

India wants Pakistan to discuss and agree to a large number of new proposals for enlarging trade between the two countries and stepping up economic cooperation. It wants Pakistan to agree to transit trade so that Indian goods could pass through Wagah to Afghanistan, Central Asia and Iran.

It wants daily flights between India and Pakistan so that businessmen and the people in general can move around freely. India seeks nationalized banks of both countries to have branches in each other country to facilitate larger trade.

India wants to participate in the setting up of telecommunication projects of Pakistan and to have a fibre optic cable from Attari in India to Lahore to link up with the national grids of the two countries.

India seeks cooperation in agricultural research and sharing of post-harvest technologies. It wants even a commemorative stamp to be issued to mark the coming closeness of the two countries and their participation in the philatelic exhibitions.

India wants harmonization of customs procedures and valuation, and cooperation in the capital market. That means eventually the people of Pakistan can own Indian shares and Indian's buy Pakistani shares.

During the commerce secretary-level talks there was the realization that the officials and businessmen of Pakistan did not have enough knowledge of the new rules and regulations governing trade in India, and such ii knowledge was essential for further talks in this regard.

So the Pakistan commerce secretary Tasneem Noorani agreed to send a trade delegation to India to update Pakistani businessmen's knowledge of Indian trade regulations, rules and new practices.

The officials also agreed that the proposals of India needed detailed discussion not only between the officials of the two countries but also the businessmen, who have to do the actual trading. Hence agreement on each of the 24 new proposals of India would take time.

Meanwhile, the political hurdle of Kashmir has to be overcome or be side stepped for some time so that the negotiators on other areas would not be in grave doubt all the time. The fact is that the officials of India and Pakistan who agreed to the SAPTA, and then the larger Safta can also overcome the barriers to trade and economic cooperation.

In this regard the need for greater exchange of views between the businessmen of Pakistan and India was also felt and the two countries agreed to promote such essential contacts.

Then there is also the larger proposals like the 3.5 billion-dollar gas pipeline from Iran to India via Pakistan in which the three countries are interested. That is truly gainful to all of them.

What is remarkable is that unlike in the past the Pakistani businessmen are anxious to promote trade between the tow countries and are not apprehensive of such trading. To that extent they have become more mature and confident in their own ability to compete with Indian goods.

The fact also remains that if Pakistan can welcome or accept the cheap Chinese goods, it need not be afraid of Indian goods which are more costly. In the world of the WTO it has to be ready to compete with the goods from all sources, more so when import tariffs are going down all over the world and the same is happening in Pakistan markedly.

The option for Pakistan is either to trade with India realising that they trade openly or let the same goods be smuggled into Pakistan and vice versa. The volume of smuggling between the countries by now is estimated at between one billion and 1.5 billion dollars.

It is better to regulate this trade officially and collect import duties and sales tax rather than let the smugglers profit by that and sell substandard goods half the time.

India wants the shipping service between Mumbai and Karachi to be restored for trade between the two countries and ships of third countries allowed to carry goods of each other to both countries, and for ships of either country to carry goods from each other to third countries. That would need amendment of the 1974 Protocol.

If along with that the Khokhrapar route for travel between the two countries is opened it would be easier for the businessmen of Mumbai, Karachi and Sindh as a whole to meet each other and boost their trade, more so with an India visa office in Karachi.

What India seeks is deep economic cooperation between the two countries which includes joint enterprises and mutual trade in the capital market. Pakistan is agreeable to such proposals in principle but wants the two countries to make simultaneous headway in the solution of the political disputes, particularly in respect of Kashmir. But India does not want to be bound down by a time-frame or stipulation of simultaneous progress in all the areas.

What is obvious is that war is no option for the nuclear armed neighbours. But real peace with a stable base is far away, although both sides want it but on their own terms. But the alternative to formal trade between them is large scale smuggling at a time when the need for cooperation between the neighbours has been increasing, particularly in the deadly area of combating terror.

Hence the leaders on both sides keep an optimistic face and do not want to disappoint their people even if there is no real headway in the negotiations. The people expect of their leaders to triumph over their difficulties or overcome their obstacles with tact, tenacity and farsight.

P.S. Tasneem Noorani, Pakistan's commerce secretary, is now quoted to have said at Faisalabad that granting MFN status to India would not hurt Pakistan's trade, and in fact it is obligatory for Pakistan to grant that status to all the 148 members of the WTO.

What happened to the dream?

On August 14, 1947, the state of Pakistan came into being. Fifty seven years on, there is cause for both celebration and reflection.

The question agitating the minds of many people, especially those who witnessed the birth of Pakistan, is whether it has fulfilled the goals and objectives of its founders? Those goals, enunciated on numerous occasions by Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, can be summed up as: a land in which all people are safe, Islam is the religion of the land but people are free to worship as they wish, the rule of law is dominant, there is prosperity and harmony, and the rights of all are protected.

Look at Pakistan today, and one can only conclude that it has some way to go before it fulfils the Quaid's vision. A "state of the republic" assessment shows a country grappling at once to deal with its history (pre- and post-Partition) and with the international spotlight, to break free of poverty, resolve basic governance issues and multiple social fault-lines.

It is a country still riven (even after losing its East wing to Bangladesh) with ethnic divisions: a country in which identification as "Punjabi", "Pukhtoon", "Sindhi", "Baloch" and "Muhajir" often takes precedence over identification as "Pakistani". Sectarian divisions between the majority Sunni community and minority Shias are also rife. Little wonder that ethnic and sectarian violence have taken so many lives.

In recent years, militant groups have widened the scope and target of their activities. No longer satisfied with killing their fellow Pakistanis, they have taken on the international community.

Pakistan today is synonymous with terrorism and religious extremism - some indigenous, the rest imported as the global jihadi mission made its home in the country's nourishing environment.

Economically, it is a country with extremes of both rich and poor. The rich hire wedding planners and import singers and dancers from India, they dine in trendy restaurants and frequent art galleries. The poor, use hand-pumps for water and outdoor latrines, and pray the power will come back on. Pakistan is a land with a few rich, but many many poor.

That divide between rich and poor is reflected in the human development indicators. Levels of literacy, maternal and child mortality, disease, poverty - while nowhere near African extremes - are nonetheless, quite grim.

Add to this endemic socio-cultural problems: a society dominated by men, with strong values of 'honour' and identity, and practices like arranged child marriages that are rooted in tradition rather than religion. All these cultural phenomena exacerbate the negative impact of poverty: they trap people in a vicious cycle of suffering.

As for democracy, look back on Pakistan's rulers over the past 57 years and, with the exception of Zulfikar Bhutto, Benazir and Nawaz Sharif and a few others, all the key names are those of military men: Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Zia-ul-Haq and now Pervez Musharraf - all army chiefs who went on to become national leaders. Army rule has been the norm rather than the exception in Pakistan.

Today, Pakistan is still ruled by an army chief, General Pervez Musharraf, albeit with the simultaneous title of president and with a nominal elected National Assembly and prime minister.

Democracy remains more an exercise in farce than a reality in Pakistan. The recent "transfer of power" from Prime Minister Jamali to Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, who will soon be replaced by PM-designate Shaukat Aziz, is proof of how artificial Pakistans democracy is.

No "state of the republic" address would be complete without some reference to neighbour India. The history of bilateral hostility hardly needs to be repeated: three and a half wars (the half being Kargil), unrealized trade potential, peoples who - despite living next door and sharing a common culture and heritage - are strangers to each other.

These last two traits - army rule (lack of democracy) and hostility to India - have actually defined and set the course of Pakistan. Many of contemporary Pakistan's internal problems - especially ethnic and sectarian violence - can be traced back to these two key traits.

Zia-ul-Haq's lack of democratic roots led him to inculcate the mullahs, and seek legitimacy through enforced Islamization - manifested in the form of religious madrassahs and repressive social policies.

It also made him follow a policy of "divide and rule." Once the Afghan war against the Soviet Union started, the madrassahs were promoted as providers of human fodder to wage jihad.

After the Soviets left Afghanistan, the same Islamic foot-soldiers were utilized to bolster the Kashmiri struggle against Indian rule. The side-effects of tolerating these religious armed groups have become almost cliches: the 'drug and Kalashnikov culture'.

Hostility to India drives (justifies) the massive army establishment, and drove the Pakistan nuclear weapons programme. Confirmed in 1998, Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability is a source of pride for its people, but a trigger for sanctions and pressure from the international community.

All combine to impoverish development programmes - there simply aren't enough funds left to provide basic health care, education and facilities to the suffering masses.

It is not all gloom, though. Pakistan has achieved at least one of its objectives: providing a safe haven for the Muslims of the subcontinent, freeing them from Hindu-majority rule and oppression.

Lest anyone be in any doubt about the potential for this among the Hindu community in India they need only look at the state of Indian Muslims since Partition - they need only look at Gujarat's crushed Muslim community.

And it can boast another achievement. In Pakistan's early years there were justifiable concerns about whether the fledgling state could survive - so numerous were the crises that it faced: refugees, lack of money, no administration, conflict with India over Kashmir, and so on.

Today, there are no such concerns. Pakistan has firmly established itself as a permanent member of the comity of nations. It no longer needs to justify its existence. It is accepted as a nation both by the international community and by its own people.

Overall, though, the problems and failures clearly outweigh achievements. The Quaid's goals have not been realized. Given the permanence of Pakistan, one could legitimately ask whether this makes any difference? Just as 'old' nations like Argentina, Poland and Turkey do not have to justify their existence - just as they can have numerous faults and still not have their viability challenged - so Pakistan should be allowed to have all its faults.

Answer: yes, it should, but those problems need to be addressed for reasons other than justifying its existence. Lack of democracy, endemic hostility with India, ethnic, sectarian and other terrorist violence, the rich-poor gulf, lagging development indicators - all these need to be reversed to make Pakistan a better place for the people who live in it. They have legitimate aspirations of a good life ('good' in the sense that they are safe and their basic needs are met).

President General Musharraf is - sadly but all too predictably - following his predecessors in preserving army rule. But he has made significant efforts to reverse their other policies: sponsorship of extremist Islamic groups, tolerance of ethnic and sectarian violence, and hostility to India.

Many extremist groups have been banned, training camps for Kashmiri fighters have been closed down, infiltration across the Line of Control curbed, and the hand of friendship extended to India.

This path that Musharraf has set Pakistan on could, if followed through, relieve at least some of the country's long-standing problems - hostility with India and an extremist form of Islam.

But the issues posed by the lack of democracy remain. Until this is resolved, Pakistan will not be able to realize either the dream of its founding father or the aspirations of its people.

Resolving Siachen issue

The Siachen affair that has been lingering on for the last 20 years or so has taken a heavy toll in terms of life and public money. Barring only the Kashmir dispute and the nuclear question, it has been the greatest source of discord in relations between India and Pakistan.

At some point in late 1984 an outbreak of war was feared. Conflicting positions were adopted on hard, verifiable facts, depending on the political situation after the June 1989 accord and the aborted accord of 1992.

As regards Siachen, India had veered to the view taken by Pakistan towards the end of 1992. But domestic compulsions stood in the way of acceptance. Thus, the decision on this crucial issue was allowed to be influenced by narrow domestic considerations.

On November 16, 1989, Rajiv Gandhi said, "we have recovered about 5,000 square kilometres of the area in Siachen. We will not forgo one square kilometre of that." Little did he realize that such recovery violated the Shimla pact.

On his return to New Delhi from Pakistan he felt that photographs of Indian troops withdrawing from Siachen would not look too good for the government in an election year.

It was in January 1978 that a mountaineer Colonel Narindra Kumar showed a map of the region to director-general military operations, India, printed in the United States, which he obtained from a German, who had been climbing various peaks in the Karakoram.

The Line of Control in Kashmir which was demarcated in 1972 ended at the map grid-point NJ 9842. The map showed a straight line extending to the northeast right up to the Karakoram Pass.

The entire area to the west of the Line, comprising almost 4,000 sq km, was thus shown as part of Azad Kashmir. Kumar sought and received the support of the GHQ, India for an expedition into the same area in the form of operational patrols. Pakistan noted Indian activities in 1978, which were led by army personnel.

On New Year's Day, 1949, the armies of India and Pakistan ended hostilities in Kashmir and declared a ceasefire. On July 27, 1949, military representatives of both countries signed an agreement in Karachi, under the auspices of the UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), defining the ceasefire line that began in southern Kashmir from the border with Pakistan and, proceeding north, turned east in an arc only to proceed further north.

The northern extremity was left vague in the vain hope that the glaciers would keep the peace. A new line of control was drawn up after prolonged negotiations and signed in the presence of senior army commanders of India and Pakistan, and conformed to the description accompanying the maps of 1949. It did not extend to the glaciers.

Clearly, there was no Line of Control in the area of the Siachen Glacier which lay beyond NJ 9842. But, the Shimla commitment that "neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation" in regard to "any of the problems between the two countries" did apply.

There is ample evidence that Indian armed forces were the first to establish permanent posts on the glacier and that they had prepared themselves long and well for the task. Operation Meghdoot carried out by India leaves little room for doubt, in fact, that the Pakistanis were caught napping.

Hostilities in the vicinity of the Siachen Glacier started in the winter of 1983-84. Earlier, Pakistan had protested to India about these activities on March 29, 1982. An extremely costly, futile, and wholly avoidable war had begun in one of the most glaciated areas of the world. The Indian troops started operations and created an emergency where there wasn't any.

Indian commander Lt. Gen. P.N. Hoon, who led the operation in 1984 as corps commander, holds that without India's control of the glacier and the Saltoro Range, Pakistan might have "soon been able to threaten the Nubra valley and even Leh".

The glacier itself has no obvious military value. The Indian fears of threat by the Sino-Pakistan Karakoram Highway to the west of the glacier were completely unfounded. The Pakistani fear was that India sought to cut off Pakistan from direct link with China by blocking the passes.

The reaction to Operation Meghdoot was only natural. Siachen represents a glaring example of political expediency in the sacrifice of human lives. Strategically, Siachen is of little importance. Contrary to Indian wisdom, the Pakistanis cannot get into Ladakh along the Siachen Glacier route, and neither can the Chinese. Nowhere has a road been built on a glacier.

At the Rajiv Gandhi-Ziaul Haq summit in New Delhi on December 17, 1985, it was agreed to hold talks on the Siachen dispute at the level of defence secretaries. Six such rounds of talks were held from 1986 to 1992. At the fifth round in June 1989, a breakthrough was achieved. The joint statement issued in Islamabad on June 17, 1989 recorded the "agreement".

It said "there was agreement by both sides to work towards a comprehensive settlement, based on the redeployment of forces to reduce the chances of conflict, avoidance of the use of force and the determination of future positions on the ground so as to conform to the Shimla agreement and to ensure durable peace in the Siachen area.

The army authorities of both sides determine these positions". The use of the word "agreement" in the joint statement, at the end of the fifth round, on June 17, 1989, is highly significant: "There was agreement by both sides to work towards a comprehensive settlement based on the redeployment of forces." The sixth round was held three years later in New Delhi from November 2-4, 1992.

In Pakistan's perception, the task was simply to implement the agreement of June 1989. Some elements in the disengagement required detailed wrapping up. For instance, how far the troops would be pulled back, and where the observation posts would be located to monitor the demilitarized zone to ensure that neither side rushed back in. Observation posts, were to be civilian and not military.

On November 11, 1992, Pakistan confirmed progress on the positions to which the forces would withdraw. Unfortunately, India imposed "certain preconditions". There should be no difficulty in the redeployment of troops on both sides to agreed positions.

It should also be possible to define a zone of disengagement which would come into being consequent on redeployment. Both sides should agree not to reoccupy vacated positions; or occupy new positions "across the alignment determined by the vacated positions". They should not undertake any military or mountaineering activity in the zone.

The present India-Pakistan talks on Siachen must succeed and the domestic political environment must not come in the way. Pending the final settlement of problems between the two countries, neither side should unilaterally alter the understanding already reached.

The writer is retired major-general of Pakistan army.

Why sectarian violence must end

On May 6, a bomb exploded in a Shia mosque in Karachi during prayers leaving 22 dead and 90 injured. This event occurred in the Sindh Madressatul Islam, the alma mater of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan.

Except for recycled statements of condemnation from official and political circles and some cosmetic administrative changes, there have been no convincing investigations or sackings, nor have any plans been worked out to prevent similar disasters in the future.

As if to prove that no deterrence was in place and mass murders could not be checked, another 18 Shia worshippers were killed in a suicide bombing on May 31 in Masjid Ali Raza.

The indifference, inaction and the lack of moral courage shown by the government, political parties, chambers of commerce, clerics, civil society and the intelligentsia is frightening. It seems that all sections of society have accepted such happenings as a fait accompli.

The reluctance to demand accountability from the police, politicians and the bureaucracy by the people, press and intelligentsia raises at least one key question.

Do we have any respect for human life? The bloodstained bodies of Shia, Sunni, Christian, American, French, Chinese and Iranian victims of the recent terrorist attacks show the answer is in negative. Further, based on an analysis of targets, frequency of attack and actual deaths there appears to be a particular irreverence for Shia lives.

Pakistan is 97 per cent Muslim, and Sunnis and Shias constitute roughly 80 and 20 per cent of the population. However, over 80 per cent of the victims are Shias. Therefore, it does not take particular forensic skills to conclude that Shias are victims of an organized campaign of targeted violence.

The response of the government, political parties and the media to the May 6 massacre is a case in point. The president condemned 'the heinous act of terrorism' and the then PM 'vowed strict punishment for the perpetrators'. In addition, the police chiefs were reshuffled and political figureheads were replaced.

These are familiar and meaningless actions. The major political parties were selective in their response. For example, the MMA led a march to protest against the killing of Mufti Shamzai who fell to sectarian violence. The ARD and the MMA joined a march to protest against the death of PPP activist Suharwardy.

Of particular concern is the role of the MMA which claims that its political philosophy is anchored in Islam. It is worth noting that apart from token condemnation, it has not categorically denounced the Lashkars, Sipahs and Jaishs and their successors for being behind sectarian massacres, nor taken any steps to extinguish the sectarian fires.

More disturbing is the silence of two small Shia parties in the MMA. They have failed to convince the MMA to change its posture towards Muslim and non-Muslim minorities which is contrary to the humane, pluralistic and tolerant principles of Islam. They have not publicly criticized MMA's indifference, inaction towards sectarian militancy and have not had the moral courage to prod the MMA to protest.

In contrast, if some Muslims are killed in India while praying, our religious elements' moral outrage would be full to the brim, deploring India's hollow secularism, and tyranny of the majority.

By the same token, if the same number of Shia Muslims are killed in Pakistan under similar circumstances, why aren't the credentials of Pakistan as a safe haven for Muslims of the subcontinent subjected to introspection? Is it hypocrisy or has the tyranny of the Hindu majority been replaced by the tyranny of the Sunni majority or both?

General Musharraf is projecting his philosophy of 'enlightened moderation' globally. Perhaps he should give priority to eradication of sectarianism and terrorism at home before he can become a credible voice elsewhere.

Instead of focussing on Kalabagh, his priority should be removal of the 'kaladagh,' (black mark) on Pakistan's face caused by sectarian massacres, blasphemy law, the Hudood ordinances and karo-kari.

Why is the government treating the perpetrators of these crimes with kid gloves? Either it is afraid of them or lacks the moral courage and political will to root them out.

The militant organizations, their leaders, and sympathizers are known since some of them were created by the government for its 'export' programmes. So what is holding the government back from arresting them?

If sectarian massacres continue, the US Congress may demand action in response to the outrage and frustration expressed by Shia American Muslims to their elected legislators. Remember the five-year three billion dollar US aid package requires annual certification and can be held back by just one Congressman in a tight vote.

So what is General Musharraf waiting for? For once why not do the right thing because 'Pakistan comes first' rather than be humiliated into doing the right thing under threat of the American whiplash.

Let us face it, the storm brewing between Shias and Sunnis needs to be brought into the open, debated and resolved in order to enable Pakistan to move forward. The leaders of Sunni Islam must recognize that the Shia interpretation of Islam is a historical reality in practice for over 1400 years, and is not going away.

Currently 20-30 per cent (240-360 million) of the ummah follows this interpretation of Islam. If the Sunni clerics do not believe in coexistence with Shias and accept them as one of the many schools of Islamic thoughts, they should publicly explain their rationale. At least a civilized discourse can then begin on whether there is a single interpretation of Islam or whether there are multiple schools of thought.

As Muslims we are united by the Book. At the same time, our interpretations vary based on the various schools of thought that we have. These interpretations are further influenced by history, geography, language, culture and time of spread of Islam to the lands it transformed. Thus, Sunni Javanese Islam in Indonesia is different from Sunni Wahabi Islam in Saudi Arabia which is again different from Shia Islam in Iraq.

And the practice and traditions of American Muslims, whether Shia or Sunni, a hundred years from now will be different from its practice and traditions in the countries of origin of today's American Muslims. The end-result is a diversity of interpretations and practices in Islam but still united by the Book and the traditions of the Prophet.

Unless all Muslims take a pluralistic view of the many schools of thought in Islam, the fires of sectarianism will continue to rage. The current practice by the majority sect of showing acceptance of the minority sect while turning a blind eye to the targeting of Shias will divide and weaken Pakistan further.

It will effectively reduce Pakistan to one-sect entity, far removed from its original conception of an Islamic republic. That may be the goal of the jihadists and some political parties but it is not consistent either with the pluralism of interpretation afforded in Islam or with Jinnah's vision of Pakistan.

The world is too interconnected by events and religiously inspired terrorism whether domestic or 'cross-border' and Pakistan cannot escape the spotlight and consequences of its actions or inactions, particularly after 9/11.

Therefore it is high time for the Pakistani intelligentsia, middle classes, press and civil society, hopefully aided by its 'enlightened and moderate' government, to look into the mirror, confront its soul and ask: Do Pakistanis revere human life? If yes, they will have to rise forcefully and demand action every time a human life in Pakistan is callously done away with.

If they do, the rest of the world will respect it and give due weightage to its protests against deaths resulting from the struggle in Kashmir, communalism in India and the Intifada in Palestine.

If they do not, Pakistan will continue to boil in sectarian mayhem while undermining the ideals of its founding father. Externally, its actions will provide additional fodder for those who have stereotyped Islam as an intolerant, extremist and violence-prone religion, further maligning its name. Meanwhile, the country will continue its slide into anarchy and chaos.

There are at least four reasons for Pakistan to put an immediate and irreversible end to sectarian massacres. First, it is in violation of the principles of Islam.

One cannot talk about Islam's message of tolerance, pluralism and sanctity of human life while callously gunning down innocent people, no matter what their faith. Second, sectarian killings are inconsistent with Jinnah's vision of Pakistan where members of all faiths - Muslims, Hindus, Christians and Parsees - would live and prosper in peace and harmony.

Third, Pakistan cannot credibly voice its concern over Indian 'atrocities' in Kashmir or Israeli 'brutality' in Palestine if it turns a blind eye to sectarian violence at home.

And, finally, killing of Muslims by Muslims strengthens the worldview held by a section of global society that Islam is an intolerant religion without respect for human life.

If Muslims can kill fellow Muslims, what is there to stop them from killing non-Muslims? Stretching further this logic, can the followers of this faith be trusted with nuclear weapons? Witness the current spotlight on Iran and past attempts on Pakistan to cap, roll-back and eliminate its nuclear weapons system.

For Pakistan the answer is simple. In order to enhance its self-respect and self-interest it must act immediately and forcefully to end sectarian violence. The first step is to show respect for human life to fellow Pakistanis. In simple terms, if Pakistanis do not respect the lives of their fellow citizens, why should the world respect them or hear their concerns?