Change in Saudi Arabia

SAUDI ARABIA has been one of Pakistan’s closest allies, especially after Faisal bin Abdul Aziz became king in 1964. What will the passing of the royal baton on August 1, 2005, to the new king, Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz, mean for Pakistan? This question needs a careful answer since it is not an exaggeration to say that what happens in the kingdom in the next few years will have a profound influence on what transpires in Pakistan. Over the last three decades, Pakistan has become closely tied with Riyadh. This has happened for three reasons.

First, as a sharp escalation in the price of oil occurred over a 10 year period between 1973 and 1982 and brought the kingdom untold riches Pakistan, perennially short of resources, looked to Riyadh for its needs. The kingdom’s rulers usually responded with generosity. Over time the Pakistani economy became closely tied with that of Saudi Arabia. Even today, Pakistan receives oil from the kingdom on highly concessional terms.

The second tie resulted from the flow of construction workers from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia. The kingdom needed imported labour as it began to put to use the windfall income that resulted from the increase in oil prices. Much of it went into massive programmes for constructing modern infrastructure, hospitals, schools and universities, housing and shopping malls. Many construction workers were recruited from labour-surplus Pakistan, in part because Pakistan was a predominantly Muslim country — the conservative Saudis initially being reluctant to bring in non-Muslims workers.

But that was not the only reason for the flow of labour from Pakistan. Some of the large construction companies that won contracts in the kingdom had observed Pakistani labour while they were occupied with the construction of the massive Indus Water Replacement Works in the 1960s. Like the Saudis, they too felt comfortable with the Pakistani labour.

Several million Pakistani workers went to Saudi Arabia on contracts that spanned short periods of time but that were long enough to expose them to the brand of Islam practised with fanatical zeal in the kingdom. Since most unskilled workers imported from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia were from the North West Frontier Province and the barani areas of north Punjab, Salafi Islam and Wahabi practices arrived with vengeance to those parts of the country. Until that time, Pakistan had been under the influence of more tolerant and accommodating versions of the religion.

The third tie between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia reinforced the second. This happened when Saudi Arabia decided to team up with the United States and Pakistan to expel the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. With these ties in place, it is understandable why Islamabad pays so much attention to what happens to and in Saudi Arabia, why all Pakistani leaders pay periodic visits to the country to confer with its leaders, why President Pervez Musharraf took with him so many senior government functionaries and politicians when he went to Riyadh to attend the funeral of King Fahd.

Even the world and the international news media recognize the close relationship between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. BBC in its live coverage of the funeral on August 2 kept focusing on President Musharraf as he stood in silence in Riyadh’s spacious Imam Turki mosque where the funeral prayers were held.

In order to understand the full intricacies of the relationship between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and to understand the significance of the change in Riyadh following the death of King Fahd, it would be useful to recount the kingdom’s history. This I will do in this new series of articles but not in great detail. My purpose is to develop some sense as to how changes have occurred as power passed from one son of King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud to another and how these changes have affected the Muslim world, in particular Pakistan.

King Fahd was one of the more than 44 sons from 22 wives of King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud who founded Saudi Arabia in 1932 following the dissolution of the Ottoman empire. Abdul Aziz’s ascent to the throne was the result in part of the restless nature of Arab society in which the free roaming Bedouin tribes were reluctant to accept any central authority unless it was imposed on them by force. This was achieved in the early days of Islam as a powerful caliphate developed immediately after the death of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and later by a series of dynasties that operated from the outside, mostly from Damascus and Baghdad. Ultimately, the Saudi peninsula fell under the sway of the Ottoman rulers who governed most of today’s Muslim world from Constantinople.

The European powers saw the Ottomans as their enemies especially when the latter had tried to invade Vienna. When the Ottomans weakened in the late 19th and the early 20th century, the British saw an opportunity to establish their influence over the non-Turkish but Arab parts of the Muslim world. This they did by encouraging the independence of Arabia, a project which involved the machinations of the legendary T.E. Lawrence, known to most of us as Lawrence of Arabia.

Largely, because of the British efforts, Arabia became an independent country in 1932. But this was not the only part of the Arab world in which the British were active. Ever mindful of protecting their economic interests, they brought Egypt under their control, turning it into a virtual colony. They needed to do that in order to protect the Suez Canal which provided the most important sea-route between Britain and their vast colonies in India and Southeast Asia.

Also sensing the critical importance of oil for their economy, the British decided to separate Ottoman empire’s three provinces that had large known reserves of oil to create a new country. They called it Iraq. While founding this country, they were careful not to make it potentially so powerful that it would be tempted to challenge their authority. To balance Iraq, London created Kuwait, thus denying the former’s access to the sea. They also encouraged the Zionist movement to establish a foothold in Palestine, which was under their protection. These manoeuvrings by the British are the source of a number of problems the Arab world faces today.

Returning to Saudi Arabia, it is useful to begin by underscoring that it is the only country in the world that carries the name of a family. The influence of the Saudi royal family on the kingdom’s affairs is unrivalled by any other institution or body of people in the country. This may not have been of great consequence for the world had the country not become fabulously rich. It was during the 21 years reign of King Aziz that western oil companies discovered the full extent of the kingdom’s oil wealth.

To secure this wealth, King Aziz concluded a treaty with President Franklin Delano Roosevelt that pledged uninterrupted supply of oil to the United States in return for American protection against any assault on the Saudi family. This treaty replaced the British protection in return for American support, an arrangement that has lasted for more than six decades.

At that point it did not matter to the Americans that the Saudi family had also entered into another alliance. This one was with the followers of the Wahabi sect of Islam who had a strong presence amongst the Bedouin tribes. The restless Bedouins were always the source of political turmoil in Arabia. Bringing them under control was the highest priority of the new ruler as he sought to establish his domain over the entire Arabian peninsula. The ruling family agreed to strictly enforce the teachings of Wahabism — an extremely austere version of Islam which owed its interpretation to Muhammad Abd al Wahab, an 18th century itinerant preacher, and which had won many adherents among the Bedouin tribes — in return for the full right to rule the kingdom. It is interesting to note that Wahab drew his inspiration from Shah Waliullah’s puritanical ideology. A link was thus established between what came to be known as Wahabism with what developed later as the Deobandi movement in British India.

As King Aziz consolidated his hold over the Arabian peninsula it was clear that the successors to his throne would come from his large family. Since he had fathered more than two score sons, some system had to be devised to choose his successor. An understanding developed among the senior members of the royal family that ascent to the throne would be by their consensus and would not be limited to some particular group of the sons of King Aziz. Among the king’s favourite wives was Hasa Suaidiri whom he married twice. She had seven sons, the so-called Sudairi brothers, the eldest of whom was Fahd bin Abdul Aziz. However, the brothers had to bide their time before they could legitimately claim the reins of government.

In 1953, King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud died and was succeeded by Saud bin Abdul Aziz (1953-1964), an incompetent and feckless man who came into conflict with Prince Faisal, the stern and austere crown prince. Faisal was Saud’s half brother but was not one of the Sudairis. A palace coup in 1964, the result of the unhappiness of some of the more senior members of the royal family with the way King Saud was governing, forced the king’s resignation and resulted in the appointment of Faisal bin Abdul Aziz (1964-1975) as the third king of the Saudi dynasty.

Faisal was an effective and popular king, the first to use the growing wealth of the kingdom to project its influence and system of beliefs in other parts of Islam. He was also prepared to work independently of the United States, looking beyond the treaty his father had signed with President Roosevelt. With the monarch’s support, several oil producing Arab states declared an oil embargo on the West, in particular the United States, following the 1973 Arab-Israel war in which Washington openly sided with the Jewish state.

King Faisal felt that there were good reasons for him to depart from the understanding his father had reached with Washington. The consequence of this action was the sudden jump in the price of oil and the gain of near-monopoly power by the oil producers and exporters cartel, the OPEC, dominated by Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia suddenly became rich — in fact extraordinarily rich.

There were several uses to which this windfall income was put to use. One of them, as I have already noted above, was to undertake a massive construction programme, a good part of which was built by labour imported from Pakistan. Another was to bring religious education to other parts of the Muslim world. Both uses of the Saudi family had profound implications for Pakistan, a subject I will pick up next week.

Missile test accord

PAKISTAN’s and India’s nuclear forces remain on hair-trigger alert. Both nations fear a surprise, decapitating first strike by the other could destroy their nuclear forces and the command units that control them.

The flight times of India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear-armed ballistic missiles are in minutes. Neither side has adequate early warning systems against a nuclear attack — or the time to consider a response when enemy missiles or aircraft are reported incoming.

On top of this, India’s nuclear command and control system is still shaky, unlike Pakistan’s which is believed to be reliable and highly professional.

False reports approaching enemy missiles or aircraft, or a missile test gone astray, could trigger a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan that would kill up to two million, cause 100 million casualties, and pollute the entire globe with radioactive dust.

During the cold war, a scientific sounding rocket launched from northern Norway caused the Soviet Union to believe itself under attack by American missiles and begin a countdown to launch its own missile force. Fortunately for mankind, the Soviets realized their error in time to abort launch sequences.

With these grim thoughts in mind, the just-concluded agreement between Delhi and Islamabad to exchange advance notice of missile tests is welcome and long overdue news.

But Indians and Pakistanis just can’t seem to miss a chance to one up each other. A week after the missile accord was announced, Pakistan proudly revealed the test of its first nuclear-capable, 500 km-range cruise missile, Babur.

Pakistan didn’t warn India of the test. Why? According to Islamabad’s contention, ‘Babur’ was an air-breathing missile and thus a different class of weapon from ballistic missiles.

Delhi was not amused. Pakistan’s test tends to undermine efforts to build confidence and normalize relations between the two old foes. If anything, the terrain-hugging ‘Babur,’ which is almost invisible to radar, poses even a greater threat to India of a surprise first strike than Pakistan’s 2,000 km-ranged ‘Shaheen II’ ballistic missiles.

Babur’s advanced radar mapping technology and engine puts it in the class of western and Russian cruise missiles — and will undoubtedly produce a firestorm of protest from America’s rightwingers and the pro-Israel lobby.

Not to be one-upped, India announced its 3,000 km-range Agni-III nuclear capable missile would be tested by year end. India’s shorter-ranged Agni II and Prithvi missiles can hit nearly all useful targets in Pakistan.

Agni-III is clearly designed to be used against China, a point not lost on Beijing. In fact, China has watched the recent strategic alliance between the US and India with growing concern

India has a very large nuclear weapons programme that is being covertly aided by Israel. India is even building sea-launched strategic missiles and developing an ICBM with a 7,000 km range that can serve only one purpose: to attack North America or Europe. America’s defence establishment has not yet comprehended this fact, or has turned a blind eye to this new threat.

Delhi has always rejected UN nuclear inspection, accusing western powers of ‘nuclear apartheid’ in seeking to maintain their monopoly on weapons of mass destruction. The Indians, and Pakistan have as much right to nuclear weapons as France, Britain or Israel, not to mention the United States which is updating its nuclear arsenal.

Eager to enlist India in its so-called ‘war on terrorism,’ and to build a strategic counterweight to China, the Bush administration recently embraced India, sanctified Delhi’s covert nuclear programme, and approved the sale of US nuclear technology to India while keeping Pakistan in the nuclear doghouse.

The Indians were overjoyed to be granted major ally status by the US and have their otherwise much-criticized nuclear programme approved by Washington. What many Indians failed to see in their euphoria was the threat their entente with Washington risked driving them into growing confrontation with neighbouring China.

The Bush administration’s powerful, pro-Israel neoconservatives opened all doors in Washington for India after it became a close ally and major arms customer of Israel. These same neocons have designated China as America’s new enemy of choice — once Iran is destroyed. They plan to use India as a weapon against China.

The Indians are no fools. They hope to use the US to advance their own superpower ambitions. But Beijing must view the new US-India alliance as a major national security threat, and India as a primary enemy. Far from promoting “stability,” as President Bush claimed, the US-India axis threatens to destabilize Asia by re-igniting tensions between India and China that led their Himalayan border war in 1962, as well as making Pakistan’s position even more precarious.

While the White House encourages India’s nuclear power, it is moving closer to attacking Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Western intelligence estimates Iran would require 10 years to develop nuclear weapons. But Israeli intelligence reportedly believes Tehran could produce a nuclear warhead by 2006.

So Israel has been exerting intensive pressure on the Bush administration through its US supporters to destroy Iran’s nuclear plants. Pakistan may be the next target.

Ironically, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea all rejected UN nuclear inspection, and all developed nuclear weapons. Iran has no nukes but is suspected of wanting to develop them behind the cover of a civilian power programme.

After resuming uranium enrichment for civilian purposes this week, Tehran now faces sanctions or even war over what it might do in the future. There is clearly no justice and no moral standards when it comes to nuclear affairs. —Copyright Eric S. Margolis 2005

Kashmir: the missed opportunities

FLUSHED with victory in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965, Field Marshal Ayub Khan and his confidants thought that the time was ripe for wresting Kashmir from India by inciting the Muslim population to rise in rebellion against the occupying power and then delivering the knockout blow through a conventional military operation by severing the road link between India and Kashmir.

When the Special Service Group (SSG), the army’s unit that specializes in special operations, was taken into confidence, they pointed out that the Kashmiri Muslims would cooperate only when they were assured of protection against the inevitable Indian retribution — that the force that is planned to be inserted was too small to give this assurance — that only a large force of at least 150,000 fighters capable of throwing the Indian forces on the defensive would inspire confidence in them — and creating this force would take at least two years.

However, when it became clear that the planners’ belief in their plan had blinded them to the faults in it, the SSG warned, them in writing that the operation as planned would turn to out be Pakistan’s Bay of Pigs.

On the night of August 5/6 1965, 5,000 lightly armed men slipped across the ceasefire line into occupied Kashmir from multiple points. They were the hastily recruited and trained Azad Kashmir civilians with a sprinkling of Azad Kashmir and Pakistani soldiers. They were the Gibraltar Force. In the early stages of the operation, while the surprise lasted, they conducted a series of spectacular raids and ambushes, which caused great alarm and trepidation in the Indian high command. Then the expected happened.

Indian retribution against Muslim villages was swift and brutal; as a result, the locals not only refused to cooperate with the raiders but also started to assist the Indian forces to flush them out. Suddenly, from hunters the raiders had become the hunted. To make matters worse, the Indian forces went on the offensive capturing Kargil, Haji Pir pass and Tithwal and threatening Muzaffarabad.

With its fate sealed, the Gibraltar force disintegrated within three weeks of the launch and its few survivors limped back to Azad Kashmir hungry, tired and defeated. Phase One of the field marshal’s plan had backfired.

In order to release the pressure being put on Azad Kashmir by Indian forces, Operation Grand Slam was launched on September 1, 1965. Its mission was to sever the road link between India and Kashmir by seizing the bridge on River Chenab at Akhnur, northwest of Jammu. In spite of making a brilliant start the operation failed due to the infamous change of command episode which consumed 36 precious hours and enabled the grateful Indians to reinforce the area.

As a professional soldier that he claimed he was, and one who was aspiring to become the C-in-C, the then Major-General Yahya Khan should have known better and prevailed upon the field marshal to defer the change of command until the capture of the bridge. The operation was finally terminated when the Indians opened up the Lahore front on September 6, 1965 Phase two of the field marshal’s plan had also backfired.

On September 8, 1965 the Indians launched their main offensive in Ravi — Chenab corridor (Sialkot sector) after crossing the Ravi at Madhopur Headworks. These headworks connect India to occupied Kashmir. In order to retrieve the situation, the field marshal played his trump card — the 1st armoured division. On September 8, it was launched in a counter offensive to sever the Indian line of communication serving their forces in the Lahore, Sialkot and Kashmir sectors, by seizing the main bridges on River Beas, east of Amritsar.

Despite the unsuitability of the area for the employment of an armoured division, the counter offensive made a brilliant start, yet, barely 36 hours after launch, it ended in disaster and was called off. The reason was that the territory captured by day was given up at night; instead of sending the logistics forward, the units were called back to rearm and refuel at nightfall on September 8 and 9. This gave a 24-hour respite to the Indians which enabled them to reinforce the area and flood it by breaching the Roohi nullah. On September 10 when the units advanced yet again, they encountered lethal fire by enemy tanks and anti tank guns from the front and flanks. Worse still, when they tried to side-step, they got bogged down in the flooded area.

The field marshal was no longer master of the situation and the Indians failed to exploit this. Both in Sialkot and the Lahore sectors, they were unable to overcome the defences as they kept attacking frontally and kept getting repulsed. Their senior leadership was as inept as that of their Pakistani counterparts. They were promoted beyond their capacity on account of personal loyalties, rather than on the basis of professional competence. In the final analysis, the valour of its jawans and junior officers, the clinical efficiency of its artillery and the daring exploits of its air force saved Pakistan.

Pakistan cannot afford to surrender time, space and initiative to the enemy, more so when the enemy enjoys superiority in resources. If it does, its limited military assets will invariably get consumed in defensive battles. Therefore, once the decision was taken to raise the stakes after Rann of Kutch, the high command should have known that Operation Gibraltar would evoke a strong response and Operation Grand Slam, even a stronger one. They should, therefore, have planned to fight the 1965 war, which they had provoked, on their own terms.

Consequently, Gibraltar should have been followed up 24 hours later by Grand Slam and another offensive in Ravi - Chenab corridor to capture Madhopur Headworks on the Ravi, and the area west of it. The Ravi could then have been flooded by releasing water in it from the headworks to preclude a counter offensive by the Indians across it — their only option then would have been to launch the main offensive against Lahore from the direction of Amritsar and Khem Karan, east and south of Lahore respectively.

The destruction of Harike Headworks on Rivers Beas / Sutlej and the main bridges on River Beas by the SSG on the same night as Grand Slam and the accompanying offensive in Ravi - Chenab corridor were launched, would have further curtailed the Indian option against Lahore. Restoration efforts could then have been thwarted by the PAF. In any case, the better part of Pakistan’s armoured division would have been available as army reserve to counter any threat against Lahore. The field marshal had squandered away the opportunity to take Kashmir.

The last opportunity came in 1971. Having opted for a military solution to a political problem, the military leadership should have foreseen war with India, and prepared for it. Consequently, their perfectly sound concept of defending the east from the west should have been translated into action in early September 71 when the Indian defences in the west had not yet been fully energized, by launching coordinated offensives to take Kashmir on the same pattern as should have been done in 1965, but on a larger scale as the army had far more assets in 1971.

By doing so, they stood a good chance of taking Kashmir and salvaging East Pakistan. By not acting in time, they stood no chance at all. They let this opportunity pass, and with it, let East Pakistan and Kashmir pass into history. And while the army’s strategic reserves in the west, consisting of two armoured divisions, three infantry divisions, an independent armoured brigade and elements of SSG, were left out of battle, the army lost its honour on the battlefield — which can be regained only on the battlefield.

Now, in the changed geo-political environment, it is unlikely that India will agree to upset the status quo in Kashmir — CBMs, sacrifices and aspirations of the Kashmiris notwithstanding.

The writer is a retired brigadier.

US threat to Iran: empty or real?

PRESIDENT BUSH has reminded us that he is prepared to take military action to prevent Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. On Israeli television recently, he declared that “all options are on the table” if Tehran doesn’t comply with international demands.

In private his officials deride EU and UN diplomacy with Iran. US officials have been preparing pre-emptive war since Bush marked Iran out as a member of the “axis of evil” back in 2002. Once again, this war is likely to have British support.

A plausible spin could be that America and Britain must act where the international community has failed, and that their action is the responsible alternative to an Israeli attack. The conventional wisdom is that, even if diplomacy fails, the US is so bogged down in Iraq that it could not take on Iran. However, this misunderstands the capabilities and intentions of the Bush administration. America’s devastating air power is not committed in Iraq. Just 120 B52, B1 and B2 bombers could hit 5,000 targets in a single mission. Thousands of other warplanes and missiles are available. The army and marines are heavily committed in Iraq, but enough forces could be found to secure coastal oilfields and to conduct raids into Iran.

A US attack is unlikely to be confined to the suspected WMD locations or to involve a ground invasion to occupy the country. The strikes would probably be intended to destroy military, political and (oil excepted) economic infrastructure. A disabled Iran could be further paralysed by civil war. Tehran alleges US support for separatists in the large Azeri population of the northwest, and fighting is increasing in Iranian Kurdistan.

The possible negative consequences of an attack on Iran are well known. These are: an increase in terrorism; a Shia rising in Iraq; Hezbollah and Iranian attacks on Israel; attacks on oil facilities along the Gulf and a recession caused by rising oil prices. Advocates of war argue that if Iran is allowed to go nuclear then each of these threats to US and Israeli interests becomes far greater. In this logic, any negative consequence becomes a further reason to attack now — with Iran disabled all these threats can, it is argued, be reduced.

Iraq is proving an electoral liability. This is a threat to the Bush team’s intention to retain power for the next decade — perhaps, as the author Bob Woodward says, with President Cheney at the helm. War with Iran next spring can enable them to win the mid-term elections and retain control of the Republican party, now in partial rebellion over Iraq.

The rise in oil prices and subsequent recession are reasons some doubt that an attack would take place. However, Iran’s supplies are destined for China — perceived as the US’s main long-term rival. And the Bush team are experienced enough to remember that Ronald Reagan rode out the recession of the early 1980s on a wave of rhetoric about “evil empire”.

Even if the US went ahead, runs the argument, Britain would not be involved as Tony Blair would not want a rerun of the Iraq controversy. But British forces are already in the area: they border Iran around Basra, and will soon lead the Nato force on Iran’s Afghan frontier. The British island of Diego Garcia is a critical US base.

It is hard to see Britain uninvolved in US actions. The prime minister is clearly of a mind to no more countenance Iran’s WMD than he did Iraq’s. In Iran’s case the evidence is more substantial. The Iranians do have a nuclear energy programme and have sought to cover up the fact. In any event, Blair is probably aware that the US is unlikely to supply him with the prized successor to the Trident submarine if Britain refuses to continue to pay the blood sacrifice of standing with the US. Tory votes might provide sufficient “national unity” to see off Labour dissenters.

New approaches are needed to head off such a dismal scenario. The problem on WMD is that Blair and Bush are doing too little, not too much. Why pick on Iran rather than India, Pakistan, Israel or Egypt — not to mention the West’s weapons? In the era of Gorbachev and Reagan, political will created treaties that still successfully control many types of WMD. Revived, they would provide the basis for global controls. Iran must not be dealt with in isolation.

As the Iran debate unfolds, we will no doubt again hear about the joint intelligence committee. We should follow the advice of a former head of the committee, Sir Paul Lever, to remove US intelligence officials from around the JIC table, where they normally sit. Only in this way, argues Lever, can the British take a considered view themselves.

One needs to be clear that British MPs have no mandate to support an attack on Iran. During the election campaign, the government dismissed any suggestion that Iran might be attacked as ridiculous scaremongering. If Blair has told Bush that Britain will prevent Iran’s nuclear weapons “come what may”, one needs to be equally clear that nothing short of an election would provide the mandate for an attack. —Dawn/The Guardian News Service.

You can’t sue me

I DON’T sue everybody, but I like to know I can if I want to. This came to mind when I read that in the Senate’s final days, just before it went on vacation, it passed a bill that I can’t sue gun manufacturers or dealers if I’m the victim of a crime.

I called up Hammer, a lawyer with Hammer, Hammer, Hammer, & Thumb, and asked him for guidance on a story.

“If a company sold a pacemaker that didn’t work, could I sue them?”

“Of course. No one wants to walk around with a faulty heart.”

I asked, “Asbestos, as in roof shingles and ceilings — sue or not sue?”

“Sue. A jury will be on your side.”

“You find a ball bearing in a can of chicken soup.”

Hammer said, “It’s been known to happen, and the soup company has to take the fall.”

“Suppose a crooked executive of a communications company defrauds billions and billions and I lose my life savings. Can I sue him?”

“Of course you can, and we would take your case. Suing people is what lawyers are for. We have one class-action suit now against a chemical company that’s running arsenic in the Hudson River. Launch a suit and they’ll settle out of court for millions.”

“What about this one? I’m in an automobile crash because the brakes on my car don’t work. The automobile maker never told anyone they didn’t work, but there are e-mails indicating the company was aware the brakes were faulty and could lead to death.”

“You can sue them for every golden parachute that the designer of the brake will get after he’s fired.”

I said, “I love America, because if somebody does you wrong, you can do them wrong.”

“Not so fast, big boy. There are things in this country that are so holy you can’t sue — even if the product is responsible for putting you in the hospital or making your wife a widow.”

“Such as?”

“You can’t sue a manufacturer or a dealer in guns if you get shot.”

“Why not?” I asked Hammer.

“The Senate passed a bill just before going on vacation that you can’t sue anyone in the gun business because it is sacred. What it means is, if, for example, someone goes to a gun show and buys a weapon to commit a crime, you can’t sue the maker or dealer. It’s not their fault.”

“Why did the Senate pass such a bill?”

“Stupid question. They were doing it to protect the Second Amendment and to support the National Rifle Association out of fear of losing money.”

“How do you feel about it?” I asked

“I’m a lawyer. They’re taking business away from me. At the same time, I believe that the Senate is looking out for my best interests. If we allow lawsuits against gun manufacturers, the courts will fill up, and then you will have to wait a long time to sue for the things the senators say you can sue for, such as sex abuse in the workplace.”

Therefore, when it comes to guns, the manufacturers had a great victory. The Senate’s bill says you can’t sue gun makers and dealers for the misuse of a firearm during the commission of a crime. If someone goes to a gun show and then uses the purchased gun to commit a crime, you can’t sue the maker and dealer, who did no more than provide the weapon of choice.

The senators passed this bill to protect the US gun manufacturers and to keep the NRA happy.

—Dawn/Tribune Media Services

Faith vs. evidence

SCIENTISTS who moaned when they read that President Bush favours teaching “intelligent design” along with the Darwinian theory of evolution should be grateful for how far the president has come.

In 1999, as Texas governor and GOP presidential front-runner, George W. Bush said much the same about creationism, which tried to force natural history to match the biblical creation story. At least creationism’s successor, known as ID to its adherents, makes room for paleontology and human descent from apes. Beyond that, politicians’ support for what they call “balance” still damages both science and faith.

In a broad interview with Texas newspapers, Bush agreed with the idea of teaching intelligent design as well as evolution, saying, “I think that part of education is to expose people to different schools of thought.” If only different schools of thought (say, capitalism versus Marxism) were involved, we’d say, sure, go for it. However, ID and evolutionary theory are not just irreconcilable; they are in realms as distant as astronomy and the polka.

ID posits (quoting from the Intelligent Design Network website) “that certain features of the universe and of living things” — the eye is often cited — “are best explained by an intelligent cause rather than an undirected process like natural selection.” Its adherents see the “intelligent cause” as a divine one.

— Los Angeles Times