Looking beyond the Charter

SOME observers would have us believe that having identified the contours of a civilised political system, got someone to put it on paper in fairly decent prose, called it a “charter” and signed it, Ms Benazir Bhutto and Mr Nawaz Sharif have buried the “hatchet” that they wielded to make life miserable for each other, when they alternated as prime minister (1988-99). This is good to hear, but one may wonder how long the “hatchet” will stay buried.

That will depend on what they intend to do. I propose to explore a few possible scenarios, which may or may not materialise. But the exercise may help us think about the future course of events a bit more realistically.

Ms Bhutto and Mr Sharif have announced certain shared objectives: they want a free and fair election next year, and they wish to play leading roles in it. They contend, however, that it will not be fair if General Pervez Musharraf and his political allies have anything to do with it, which they will, if they remain in control. They would, therefore like to see the general and his team dismissed well ahead of the election (if not right now).

Let us, for the purposes of this discussion, forgo consideration of whether these two politicians will be able to return to Pakistan and participate in the forthcoming election. Let us proceed on the assumption that they will. How can they secure the present regime’s departure? They have wisely ruled out the option of recruiting another general to do the job. Nor is it feasible to solicit the support of external powers for this venture. The only other possible course of action is to mobilise the “people’s power” to a level that is commanding enough to force this government’s exit.

Three related questions deserve to be considered. First, what will Ms Bhutto and Mr Sharif say not only about the failings of the present regime but about the package of goods they will bring to the people if they come to power? Second, when will they return to Pakistan to begin this campaign? Third, what will happen if the aroused people do force the general to quit?

We shall address the third question first. The precedents are not encouraging. A mass movement forced Ayub Khan out but, instead of yielding to his political opponents, he turned the government over to General Yahya Khan, the army chief. The movement that compelled Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to bend to its instigators (PNA) opened the way for Ziaul Haq’s military dictatorship.

Mass movements in Pakistan, launched to oust a government, succeed only if they can paralyse it. When that stage arrives, a vacuum of power has come into being, which the rioters on the streets and their managers are not qualified to fill. An organised power centre in good operational health, and external to the movement, will step in to halt the prevailing disarray and restore governing authority. Thus, even if Ms Bhutto and Mr Sharif can mobilise people’s power on the requisite scale, it is by no means assured that a peaceful and orderly transition to genuine democracy will follow.

The promise to restore democracy will not suffice to bring and keep large masses of people on the streets. Ms Bhutto and Mr Sharif will have to spell out their prescription for resolving the issues confronting the country. The issues are intractable, and some of them are explosive. Let me identify a few of them: (1) alliance with the United States in the “war on terror”; (2) fight against domestic extremism; (3) provincial autonomy, regionalism, sub-nationalism, revolts in Balochistan and the northwestern tribal area; (4) resource sharing between the federating units; (5) combating the feudal mindset; (6) unemployment, rising prices, spreading poverty, widening gap between the rich and the poor; (7) inadequacies in the health and education sectors; (8) chronic shortages of basic necessities such as water and power; (9) pervasive corruption in government and politics; (10) general breakdown of law and order; (11) settlement of disputes with India.

Each of these issues is daunting enough to bewilder even the more ingenious among us. How, for instance, will a government keep prices down and employment up even as it accepts globalisation and a free market economy? Ms Bhutto and Mr Sharif will have to tell us how they propose to meet such issues, and this they will have to do not only if they are to launch an effective anti-government movement, but also if they are to make a decent showing in the next election.

There are no indications that they plan to board a flight to Pakistan within the next few months. Assuming that they will be allowed back, they should arrive fairly early next year if they intend to launch a pre-election anti-government movement. But if that is not their intention, and if they will limit themselves to getting organised for the election, they should be expected back early next summer.

It should be noted that we have been speaking of an anti-government movement largely as a theoretical possibility. Such a movement will necessarily be a rebellion. Considering that rebellions are already going on in Balochistan and Waziristan, an additional countrywide rebellion could bring down the state, not just the government of the day. It is, therefore, most unlikely that Ms Bhutto and Mr Sharif will be allowed to organise it.

But, then, if the present regime remains in place, will it let the elections be free and fair? Two considerations may be relevant here. Opposition parties, the electronic and print media, and organs of civil society in the country are united in demanding fair elections. The Commonwealth and, to a lesser extent, governments in Western Europe, want the same.

Much more important is the fact that the US House of Representatives has most regretfully observed (June 11, 2006) that the government of Pakistan is not doing enough to restore democracy and respect for human rights. As a gesture of its disapproval, it has voted to cut US military and economic aid to this country by substantial amounts.

President Bush may refer to General Musharraf as his “friend,” but this “friendship” will come under severe strain if congressional sentiment towards the general becomes even more adverse, which it surely will if the next election is widely seen as rigged. One may then hazard the guess that while some electoral malpractice will occur, it may not assume the proportions it did in 2002.

The PPP and PML-N might form an alliance, or make mutual accommodations, as the election approaches. Alternatively, they might contest independently of each other, in which case they could be rivals in numerous constituencies where the gain of one would be the other’s loss.

Some of the goals Ms Bhutto and Mr Sharif announced in their “charter” would involve repeal of the systemic changes that General Musharraf introduced through the 17th amendment and his Legal Framework Order. This will require further amendment of the Constitution that, in turn, will require support of a two-thirds majority in both houses of parliament. That the two leaders can muster such support is unlikely. Their ability to implement the rest of their agenda will depend on whether one of them, or the two together, win a majority in the National Assembly and form the next government.

Neither the PML-N nor the PPP won even a simple majority in the elections of 1988, 1990, and 1993. In spite of all the support it had from government agencies and functionaries, the PML-Q did not gain a majority in 2002. (Nawaz Sharif’s massive victory in 1996 may be regarded as an exception to the general trend.) Neither the PML-N nor the PPP is likely to emerge as the majority party following the next election. But might they not form a majority by coming together in a coalition? Let us explore this possibility.

It is one thing for them to cooperate while they are comrades in adversity, but cooperation will be a different ball game once the election is over. It will now depend on what each has to offer the other and who else is coveting their support. But there is another impediment to consider. Their frames of reference or, let us say, their conceptual orientations are substantially different.

Most of the PML factions grew up on a diet of ideas that they have not outgrown. Muslim nationalism, two-nation theory, separate electorates were initially its main ingredients. Subsequently it came to include the notion that Pakistan must be an ideological state, and that it would remain unfulfilled unless it enforced Islamic law and injunctions.

Recall that during his second term as prime minister Mr Nawaz Sharif sponsored a bill and later a constitutional amendment, which required the government to enforce the Shariat. Recall also that following the 2002 election, as various parties looked around for coalition partners, Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, the PML-Q leader, declared repeatedly that his party and the MMA (a grouping of Islamic parties) should join hands together, for they were “natural allies.”

Many of the PPP notables may be good Muslims as much as their counterparts in the PML are. But they tend to be secular-minded in dealing with issues of public policy. They stand to the left of centre, while the PML-N folks tend to the right, on issues of equality and social justice, including those relating to women and non-Muslim minorities.

We may then conclude that while a partnership between them in governance need not be excluded from the realm of possibility, it would be hard to form and maintain.

The foregoing observations are speculative explorations of possible scenarios. Ms Bhutto and Mr Sharif may not be allowed to participate in the forthcoming election, in which case these explorations may turn out to have been in vain. Nevertheless, those who wish to engage in futuristic studies must take cognisance of the possibilities that lie beyond the horizon so long as they are not incredible or fantastic. The ones examined above do not appear to fall in that category.

The writer is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, US.

Email: anwarsyed@cox.net

Case for amending the Constitution

THE scepticism and hostility that Mr Altaf Hussain’s demand for amendments to the Constitution, or making a new one altogether, has aroused is somewhat surprising. Everybody tends to agree that the Constitution needs amendments. At what point an amended constitution becomes a new constitution is a matter of personal or party opinion.

It is also generally agreed that Ziaul Haq’s eighth amendment (in fact it was an aggregate of 50 or so amendments) totally transformed the character of the 1973 Constitution. The same can be said about Gen Musharraf’s 17th amendment.

That the much amended Constitution through all these phases was called the 1973 Constitution amounted to keeping the fiction alive. Gen Ziaul Haq was not a president in the same mould and with the same powers as Chaudhry Fazal Elahi when Z.A. Bhutto was prime minister nor is Gen Musharraf a president in the same fashion as was Rafiq Tarar during Nawaz Sharif’s tenure as prime minister.

Since there is a general agreement on substantive changes to the Constitution it might be psychologically comforting to continue to call it the 1973 Constitution but it must be rewritten to make its reading and interpretation easier. Now almost every article carries footnotes explaining how it was enacted originally, amended or repealed by Ziaul Haq, reinstated by Nawaz Sharif and restored once again (in substance if not in exact words) by Musharraf. Worthy of note in this context is Article 58 which relates to the powers of the president to dissolve the National Assembly.

It also appears necessary and advisable that the review of the Constitution should extend beyond the controversial amendments made by the two generals to cover the articles and which have not served the intended purpose or have remained moribund. Take the Council of Common Interests which has a lofty role but has hardly ever met. Then there is the Federal Shariat Court where no judge wants to go (recently a judge had to be recalled from retirement to be its chief justice) and its proceedings have made little contribution to jurisprudence or case law. The same is true of the Islamic Council which had little impact on legislation.

The Majlis-i-Shoora, the name given to parliament by Ziaul Haq, is used and irksomely repeated only in the Constitution and needs to be dropped. It should also be examined what purpose, if any at all, the incorporation of the 1951 Objectives Resolution in the Constitution by Ziaul Haq in 1985 has served.

The apprehension of Makhdum Amin Fahim of the PPP that the demand for a new Constitution is intended to strengthen dictatorship in the country stands dispelled by Altaf Hussain’s own condition that the new Constitution should be drafted or, alternatively the present one amended, by an equal number of representatives participating from each province. Quite naturally, the smaller provinces would not want to accept Punjab’s hegemony and the role of the army in the affairs of the state. On the contrary, a forum in which Balochistan will have as much say as Punjab is bound to vote for more powers to the provinces.

A recent editorial in this paper describes the very idea of a new constitution as senseless, and argues that “given the divisive nature of our politics and the nature of distrust and disharmony characterising inter-provincial relations, it would be unrealistic to believe that a national consensus can be developed on a new constitution.”

This fear may not be unfounded but the other side of the argument that must not be overlooked is whether it makes sense to persist with a constitutional scheme which has kept the nation divided and the provinces at loggerheads for 33 years. In fact, with every passing year it has exacerbated the feelings of neglect and deprivation in the smaller provinces to a point where regional nationalist parties talk not just of autonomy but of sovereignty. If Ziaul Haq could go back to a resolution of 1951 the nationalists cannot be stopped from harking back even further to the Lahore resolution of 1940.

Not only has the Constitution been unable to prevent military intervention, it has lowered the dignity, compromised the neutrality and diminished the performance both of the civil service and the judiciary. The plain truth is that since 1973 no matter whether the government of the day was civilian, military or a blend of both, the institutions have been faltering and individuals have based governance more on whims and fancies rather than on the rule of law or reason. Throughout the president or prime minister have mattered most, followed by parliament and cabinet. The bureaucracy and judiciary have mattered even less.

The Constitution needs to be amended or drafted anew to allocate more resources and powers to the provinces that remain dependent on the centre for both. Direct elections to the Senate and giving the latter a greater role in legislation and in the scrutiny of executive actions are also required to impart to the smaller provinces a sense of greater participation.

What is really troubling society is not the content of the Constitution but the measures decreed by Ziaul Haq and endorsed by his Majlis-i-Shoora.

The Hudood and other laws meant for punishing offences related to religion and that were added to the penal code by Ziaul Haq are the fountainhead of the intolerance that has led to a number of targeted killings and mass murders. Aimed by Ziaul Haq at dissidents and minorities these laws now hit all citizens equally hard.

The imam of a mosque recently murdered for allegedly desecrating the Holy Quran belonged to the majority sect. So was the alleged blasphemer who was shot dead while in police custody awaiting trial. In recent months four Ahmadis — in Sheikhupura, Sialkot, Karachi and Sanghar — have been murdered for no reason other than belonging to a particular faith. Frustration is compounded when Ahmadis are the victims for the police doesn’t feel pressed to pursue the culprits and the bereaved do not receive official condolences or compensation.

The forces of intolerance and hate that the religious laws have released are expanding their sphere. The other day the press reported some clerics as saying that although the chief ministers of the four provinces were Sunnis they belonged to the same school of thought. That to them was objectionable.

Amending the Constitution or drafting a new one would take time but the penal laws that bedevil the country can be instantly repealed for the government commands a majority in parliament. But then, we hear Chaudhry Shujaat, the mainstay of this majority, assuring the clerics that he will not allow the subject of repeal to be debated in parliament. The people thus have to learn to live with extremist violence under an authoritarian government of “enlightened moderation”.

Dumping on Doha

WHEN the latest round of talks designed to reform the rules governing international trade were launched, the world’s poorer nations were given hope by the European Union’s trade commissioner that it would have at its heart measures aimed at aiding their development and reducing poverty — in his words “a round for free”.

The commissioner was Pascal Lamy — who has gone on to become the head of the World Trade Organisation, the body responsible for running the talks. But if the draft agreement circulated by the WTO is anything to go by, to adapt Milton Friedman’s saying, there’s no such thing as a free round.

The Doha trade round — which began in a burst of multilateral cooperation shortly after September 11 — has failed to live up to Mr Lamy’s billing. The crucial Hong Kong ministerial summit in December last year failed to find much in the way of common ground. Since then deadlines have been missed and little progress has been made and now time is running out. Ultimate success or failure will likely depend on the ability of the deal to be passed through the US legislature.

To that end, President Bush has “fast-track” authority to present any agreement to Congress as a take-it-or-leave-it package. But that authority will run out in the middle of next year, making it imperative that solid progress is made now.

It was the first bright spot on the Doha horizon for some time: not only was the draft negotiating agreement published, but rumours circulated that both the EU and the US negotiators are prepared to soften their positions.

Yet the task remaining is a mammoth one: the draft text is studded with 760 individual disputed areas. The basic problems remain the same as they have since the start of the talks: the EU and the US are offering too little in cutting their massive agricultural subsidies, while demanding too much from the developing world in terms of allowing the West’s access to their markets.

To some on the right, especially in the US, developing economies should swallow the offer on the table: notional cuts in subsidies by the US, in return for opening their borders to US goods and cutting the subsidies paid to local manufacturing.

—The Guardian, London