No going back on commitments

THE elected government is still in the process of finding its feet and settling down. But even before it can catch its breath, it is coming un-der pressure, both at home and from our foreign benefactors.

The results of the Feb 18 elections represented an unambiguous expression of the people’s will, but it ensured only a transition — and not a transformation — from an authoritarian regime to a democratic dispensation. Nevertheless, the resounding success of the mainstream parties was a demonstration of the people’s maturity and belief that public pledges would be honoured.

The ‘ancient regime’, however, is still alive and kicking, fortified by the measures taken on Nov 3. There is a determined effort to remain in the driver’s seat. In such a situation, the PPP leadership’s preference for moving cautiously, lest it step on too many sensitive toes, is understandable. Nevertheless, some of its appointments have raised eyebrows, while certain statements have caused misgivings and actions given rise to speculation with regard to its commitment to the Charter of Democracy and the recent Bhurban Declaration.

Admittedly, the country is wracked by massive security problems; it is short of food and fuel; its oil bill is going through the roof, its trade deficit is growing and investment prospects dwindling. These matters need urgent attention. However, the votes were cast not for these considerations, but in support of the commitment to do away with the regime’s authoritarian measures.

Two issues, in particular, came to symbolise the people’s deepest aspirations. These included a desire to see a reversal of the regime’s anti-democratic measures — especially the unprecedented assault on the judiciary — and, more importantly, a demand for reexamining Pakistan’s relations with the US, which is seen through the distorting lens of the war on terror. The coalition’s policies on these two counts will be the litmus test that will determine its success or failure.

Not surprisingly, the PPP high command has been under pressure from ‘remnants of the past’, who are warning against upsetting the apple cart. But can this justify some of the PPP’s inexplicable actions, including its eagerness to take on board such strange bedfellows as the JUI and the MQM? A spirit of forgiveness is welcome but not by ignoring the track record of these two outfits.

The other issue appears even more problematic and full of risks. This is evidenced by the inelegant haste with which the Bush administration sought to convey its misgivings vis-à-vis Pakistan’s commitment to the undetermined agenda of our cooperation with it. Negroponte and Boucher could not, however, have been prepared for the principled position adopted by coalition leaders, and in particular, Mr Nawaz Sharif.

While desirous of strengthening Pakistan’s relations with the US and rejecting terrorism in all its forms, they emphasised that they were opposed to the manner in which decisions regarding our role in it had been made by one individual. As Mr Sharif pointed out: “We now have a sovereign parliament and everything will have to be decided there.”

Incidentally, both Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, who have been advocating moving away from Musharraf, have criticised the Bush administration’s policy of ‘personalising diplomacy’. Foreign Relations Committee chairman Senator Joe Biden has also acknowledged that the US-Pakistan relationship that has so far been ‘transactional’ needs to become mutually beneficial and ‘normal, functional’. He has also advocated a tripling of US economic assistance as a ‘democracy bonus’.

But these views are not finding favour with the White House, which is reportedly planning for greater enmeshing of its cooperative ties with Pakistan. This is evident from the list of 11 fresh demands presented just days before the democratic government assumed office. The recent assertion by CIA chief Michael Hayden that Al Qaeda had succeeded in establishing ‘safe havens’ in border areas is also an indicator of the current thinking in Washington.

More significantly, at the Bucharest Nato summit held last week, Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer confirmed that he would soon be travelling to Islamabad to discuss Pakistan’s increased role in the global war on terror.

There are reports that the US is pushing for six joint US-Afghanistan-Pakistan military intelligence centres along the border. The Washington Post also disclosed US plans to pour more arms into our tribal areas, after having “escalated its unilateral strikes against Al Qaeda fighters operating in the tribal belt, partly because of anxieties that the new leadership may object to future strikes”.

This escalation is coming at a time when there are fresh calls by congressional leaders to refocus resources on fighting Al Qaeda in Pakistan’s tribal belt, described by one lawmaker as ‘the most likely real near-term security threat to the US’. These are worrying developments, for they could very well destabilise our newly installed democratic government.

Is this what the Bush administration wants? Inspired stories in the local media have even suggested that the US could go for direct attacks on Fata, if Musharraf were forced to step down. Even by this administration’s track record of reckless actions, it is difficult to believe that Washington would want to go to these lengths to keep an authoritarian ruler in power.

While there is no doubt that peace in Afghanistan and Pakistan are inextricably linked, what is required is not simply an increase in the number of coalition forces in Afghanistan, nor more lethal strikes targeting Fata. What is needed is a comprehensive strategy, with a judicious mix of military and civilian measures. It is therefore critical that the ruling coalition does not resile from its commitment to renegotiate the terms of our engagement with the US.

The open-ended agenda of cooperation in the war on terror has neither served our interests nor US objectives. There is an urgent need to reexamine the postulates of our current policy, moving away from the current obsession with military operations and adopting a multi-faceted, nuanced approach. And, whatever be the final strategy, it should be debated, discussed and approved by parliament. Only then can our policy be credible and, therefore, effective.

Merchants of death

THE words of CIA director, Michael Hayden, in an interview with the NBC television network are ominously reminiscent of the dark days of 2003 when one heard the drumbeat of war incessantly emanating from the White House, Pentagon and 10 Downing Street.

At that time, it was claimed that Iraq presented ‘a clear and present danger’ to the US and the ‘civilised world’ and had to be dealt with immediately.

Hayden has used the exact words now by saying that the situation in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan, where Al Qaeda has established a safe haven, presents a ‘clear and present danger’ to the West, and that if there was another terrorist attack against the Americans it would most certainly originate from that region.

The reason that such language — and the barely disguised threats within it — is worrying for Pakistanis is that this kind of rhetoric preceded the invasion and conquest of Iraq in 2003 despite the fact that it was based on concoctions, lies and distortions. The American CIA and the British MI6, with generous help from the Pentagon under Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz in the US and Alistair Campbell in Britain, crafted a series of lies to convince the public in the US and Britain that Iraq needed to be attacked as it possessed weapons of mass destruction.

Iraq’s vehement denial in its weapons report was rejected outright by hawkish leaders as they prepared for the colonisation of the oil-rich country. The voices of millions of people on the streets of London, New York, Washington, Rome, Paris, Berlin and other parts of the world protesting against the impending terror attack fell on deaf ears. On March 20, 2003, the world saw the initiation of one of the biggest disasters in world history and a major humanitarian catastrophe in the cradle of civilisation.

When the world’s most powerful ‘democracies’ were launching Operation Enduring Freedom (a tragically ironic name given the genocide in Iraq) they chose to ignore the voices of the international weapons inspectors and experts who tried to warn them against such adventurism. The UN weapons inspector, Hans Blix who led Unmovic, and the IAEA director Mohammad ElBaradei, repeatedly advised caution in interpreting the outlandish claims made by the CIA and MI6.

Tony Blair frightened Britons into acquiescence by claiming that Iraq could assemble a nuclear weapon and attack London in 45 minutes! The Americans provided ‘credible evidence’ that Iraq had obtained uranium from Niger! Both these claims were proved wrong with strong suspicions that they were deliberately fabricated for dramatic effect.

An embarrassed Colin Powell presented unconvincing satellite pictures to the UN Security Council to bring Russia, France and other sceptics on board. The shadowy figure of the then CIA director George Tenet sitting right behind him seemed like a back-up in case the world body remained incredulous.

In the aftermath of the apocalyptic tragedy, every nook and corner of Iraq was searched for the elusive WMD and no smoking gun emerged. The Iraq Survey Group (ISG), a joint venture of the CIA and the department of defence, was tasked under David Kay to search for the weapons which had escaped the UN inspectors. After six months, the ISG issued an Interim Progress Report on Oct 3, 2003. The team found evidence of ‘WMD-related programme activities’ but no actual chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.

On Jan 23, 2004, the head of the ISG, David Kay, resigned his position, stating that he believed WMD stockpiles would not be found in Iraq.

“I don’t think they existed,” commented Kay. “What everyone was talking about is stockpiles produced after the end of the last Gulf War, and I don’t think there was a large-scale production programme in the nineties.” In a briefing to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Kay criticised the pre-war WMD intelligence and the agencies that produced it, saying, “It turns out that we were all wrong, probably in my judgment, and that is most disturbing.”

Kay’s successor was the former UN weapons inspector Charles Duelfer, who stated at the time that the chances of finding any WMD stockpiles in Iraq were ‘close to nil’. On Sept 30, 2004, the ISG released the Duelfer Report on Iraq’s WMD programmes. Among its key findings: Saddam ended his nuclear programme in 1991. ISG found no evidence of concerted efforts to restart the programme, and Iraq’s ability to reconstitute a nuclear weapons programme progressively decayed after 1991.

In March 2004, Hans Blix and El Baradei reported that the US had ignored evidence against the existence of WMD in Iraq and the basis of the war was unjustified. In 2004, Blix published a book Disarming Iraq in which he gave his account of the events and inspections before the coalition began its invasion. Ultimately, no stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction were found.

Bush and Blair, and their cronies, Aznar of Spain and Howard of Australia, also tried to argue that Iraq was supporting Al Qaeda and had been involved in the events of 9/11. No evidence for these claims was found. All the different reasons given for the illegal attack on Iraq were found to be contrary to the truth. The last, and most ridiculous, excuse for the invasion was ‘spreading freedom and democracy’ in Iraq. How cruel this joke was is only too obvious from the subsequent descent of Iraq into chaos and near-disintegration. Over a million Iraqis are dead but the murderous orgy continues.

There is a dire lesson here for Pakistanis and their newly-elected civilian government. There is no reason to believe that the claims of Michael Hayden are any more truthful than those of the earlier CIA operatives. One is reminded of George Orwell’s 1984 in which the ministry of truth was established to manufacture and spread lies. What is of imminent concern is the reason for the claims made by Hayden. Is it in preparation for war or strikes as in the case of Iraq? Is it to browbeat a nascent democratic government in Pakistan into submission?

The elected government has the people’s power behind it. It has the capacity to resist arm-twisting by the US unlike the previous dispensation which lacked legitimacy. The path of dialogue and engagement that has been chosen by our representatives may be eminently more fruitful and humane than the kill-all ideology of the neocons. Resist we must, and resist we will, if we are to avoid an Iraq-like fate.

Reflections on a very large cabinet

I DON’T really care if the cabinet eventually includes all 342 members of the National Assembly. As an analyst, I am interested in understanding what the size and distribution reveal about the nature of politics in Pakistan.

I want to explore why an opposition, vociferous in its condemnation of the previous government’s excessively large cabinet, feels so compelled to go one better when it inherits power.

What has happened is obvious: a largely indiscriminate division of portfolios without matching qualifications to job requirements. Why it is going on is of greater interest. Mark first the discussion about who should get what. A lot turns on the ‘deservingness’ of the candidates. How unfair to deny X who spent the most time in prison while the leaders were exiled. How about Y who had her assets confiscated and was humiliated to boot?

This is the politics of reward. The spoils are distributed to supporters displaying the greatest loyalty in the greatest adversity. Next, it is the politics of appeasement — nobody important can be left out who would promptly switch loyalties to the other side. And finally, it is the politics of pacification — all those who might create problems in their home districts would be safer amusing themselves in the capital. Add up all those who can assert a claim on the state and it turns into a very large number.

Now think: how is this any different from the Mughal durbar at Agra or the court of the Sun King at Versailles? Imagine all the favourites and potential troublemakers dallying at court under the watchful eye of the royal intelligence. And instead of going off for foxhunts in the Bois de Boulogne, large contingents fly off for the modern equivalent at Saks Fifth Avenue.

Understand I have nothing against democracy and this is not a brief for authoritarian rule. There is no difference in this regard between the two in Pakistan. And that is the point. It is the nature of our politics that drives this phenomenon and it is this nature we need to understand to intervene in a meaningful way. Simple homilies about the return of true democracy will make not one whit of difference to our fate.

Perhaps Pakistan needs a super-sized cabinet because it is neither fish nor fowl in terms of governance. A democracy doesn’t need to deal with loyalists and potential turncoats; an authoritarian state like China doesn’t need to please anyone as long as it delivers to its citizens — the number of ministries is down from 100 in 1982 to 28 and is to be reduced further to promote efficiency; and a monarchy can distribute jagirs to loyalists while entrusting governance to the qualified — Akbar’s nau ratan were truly nine gems.

Pakistan can best be characterised as a monarchy dressed up as a democracy, sometimes less, sometimes more authoritarian. In this state, ministerial and public sector portfolios are the only jagirs that can be distributed openly and with abandon.

There is no questioning of the huge cost to the efficiency of governance when a butcher is entrusted the job of a baker, and the practice will continue until someone in civil society begins to push back. After the independence of the judiciary, let us put this as the next item on the agenda.

The writer is the 2007-2008 Pakistan Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Centre for International Scholars in Washington, DC. She writes at

www.thesouthasianidea.wordpress.com