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In the evening of July 4, a meeting of the cabinet, with all the chief ministers and the Chief of Army Staff Gen Ziaul Haq was convened, wherein Bhutto announced that he wanted to sign the accord next day, i.e. July 5. Hafeez Pirzada presumed that there had been some development as Bhutto had earlier told him that he wouldn’t sign the accord too early because then the PNA would consider him weak. Now Bhutto’s announcement of his intention to sign the accord initiated a brief argument between him and Pirzada. “But sir…”
“Shut up, Hafeez,” Bhutto said, “Enough is enough. I want to finish it.”
“Sir, what will happen then?” Hafeez asked. “These people are unreliable. They might raise another issue. We have taken the winds out of their sails. Their agitation has petered out. People are sick and tired of them. They cannot restart before three or four months. If they come out again, there is the possibility of martial law but we will have enough time to settle scores with them.”
After the meeting Bhutto took Gen Ziaul Haq to his room where both stayed for about 10 minutes. Perhaps Bhutto wanted to ask him about the information he had received from the US ambassador, Arthur W. Hummel, regarding the chances of ‘takeover’. In the morning also Bhutto had received a message that he should immediately sign the accord or the military would execute its plot to overthrow him.
The ministers and officials left after dinner but were soon called back with the message that Bhutto was addressing an emergency press conference at 11.30pm. That was the last press conference he addressed as prime minister.
He told the newsmen that despite the fact that the PNA had brought 10 new demands, he had decided to sign the accord. A change in his usually aggressive speaking style was evident; however, he remained composed. Perhaps Gen Zia had assured him of his loyalty.
At the time when Bhutto was addressing the media, Gen Zia was at the GHQ, where all principal staff officers and a few directors had been called in. Some generals asked about the urgency for a meeting at that hour to which Brigadier Khawar Latif, principal assistant to Gen Zia, had a simple answer: “There was no need of prior information for this meeting.”
During the meeting it was revealed that as the government had failed to bring peace to the country and that martial law had become a necessity. Most of the generals supported Zia’s viewpoint that this coup should be named an “interim arrangement” or else an “arrangement for elections” but Gen Jamal Syed Mian told Gen Zia that he effectively wanted to stage a coup and simply did not want to name it as such. “Better call it martial law otherwise it may lead to complications.” To this Gen Zia said, “But I do not want to be blamed for breaking the Constitution.”
Later, Chief Justice Yaqoob Ali Khan was also called in; he suggested that instead of abrogating the Constitution it should be put in abeyance for some time.
Gen Zia informed his colleagues that Gen Faiz Ali Chishti was implementing “Operation Fairplay” under his orders. Chishti returned to the GHQ at 02.15am. When asked about the ‘accomplishment’ of the operation, a very composed Chishti replied, “Don’t worry, everything has been taken care of.”
After the press conference, most of the ministers left the PM House. Jatoi and Pirzada left at 01.30am but Mumtaz Bhutto stuck around for some time. On his way out he saw some movement of army troops and immediately informed Bhutto about the situation. Bhutto called Gen Imtiaz and Gen Zia, but was told that both were at the GHQ. As the army cordoned off the PM House it became apparent that a coup d’état was underway.
When Bhutto got through to Gen Zia and asked about the army movement, Zia simply replied: “What you have heard is correct, sir. I am sorry there was no other way out.” Bhutto asked about his future, to which Gen Zia said that he would be taken to Murree next morning. Bhutto told him that his family had come from England only that evening but he was told that he could stay with the family that night but the next morning he would have to go to Murree.
The next morning Bhutto was driven in his Mercedes to Murree where he was kept in custody.
The PNA leaders had spent the evening at Sardar Abdul Qayyum’s house and were awakened by army men at about 02.00am and sent to Murree. When the army men got into Asghar Khan’s room he was not sure whether the coup had been staged by the prime minister or the army. The rest of Pakistan heard of the takeover at 06.04am on July 5, when Radio Pakistan broadcasted the news. Pakistan thus witnessed the beginning of a dictatorship that would last 11 years.
Next week: It becomes evident that the planning for the coup was underway for quite some time.
