IS the turf war within the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan an outcome of muscle-flexing or a shift in the militancy scenario? More importantly, what role does power and money play as the proscribed militant organisation extends its network to lucrative urban areas?

Fazlullah lacks the credentials of his Mehsud predecessors.

Power transfer is not a new issue within TTP ranks. It started soon after the death of the TTP’s chief Baitullah Mehsud in a 2009 drone strike. The ensuing confrontation was finally resolved through a compromise in which the newly appointed chief Hakeemullah Mehsud made Waliur Rehman his deputy. Soon after the deaths of both TTP commanders in US drone strikes, however, the fault lines reappeared.

Fazlullah was made TTP chief because the militant group’s council wanted to avoid the impending infighting among commanders from the Mehsud tribe. The decision was also meant to give non-Mehsud commanders an impression that the top slot is not reserved for militants hailing from a particular tribe. The experiment, however, does not seem to have worked.

Intra-TTP clashes between two Mehsud commanders have so far claimed the lives of over 60 militants, which prompted Fazlullah to sack the dominant Khan Said, alias Sajna. How effectively would the TTP council handle the challenge depends upon the ability of its central command.

Apparently, Fazlullah lacks the credentials and charisma of his predecessors from the Mehsud tribe. Second, by removing Sajna the TTP chief lost a sizable following of diehard militants.

In order to explain the intra-TTP power struggle, we must know that geography, ‘jihad’, and the black economy go hand in hand in the tribal areas. Organised militancy in Fata is largely the product of religiously motivated youths belonging to two rival tribes — the Mehsuds and Waziris.

It is no coincidence that Waziri militants earn from peace, but their Mehsud ‘cousins’ sustain themselves on war. For example, Waziri militants led by Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan and the Maulvi Nazir group in South Waziristan enjoy official patronage under the ‘good Taliban’ tag. Both earn in two significant ways; from providing vehicles to safely carry students of the Razmak Cadet College [now shifted to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa] and from benefiting from developmental projects in the area.

Meanwhile, the ‘good Taliban’ status helps Waziri commanders to enjoy the confidence of their own tribesmen who are indebted to them for keeping bombardment and military shelling away in order to market the produce of their orchards in Wana or engage in trade (read smuggling) with Afghanistan.

Keeping the black economy in perspective, geographical stakes dictate to the Waziri militants to avoid confrontation with the state, which then requires them to focus on ‘jihad’ in Afghanistan. Mehsud commanders, on the other hand, took a strategic decision after the Lal Masjid episode in 2007. They did the opposite of what their Waziri rivals had done — expanding their presence inside Pakistan instead of carrying out cross-border operations.

But this required them to open their ranks to ideologically reactionary and criminal elements. This strategy made the TTP a major terror enterprise. The TTP’s expansion to Islamabad, Lahore and particularly Karachi can be understood from this perspective.

In many cases, businessmen send their men to North Waziristan to bargain over money. In one case a bearded resident of Lahore visited North Waziristan to pay ransom money on behalf of a relative. The visitor’s appearance impressed the TTP commander so much that he requested him to lead the prayers. Still, the ransom was paid to stop the militants delivering on their threats, as they had already killed two relatives of the visitor before sending threats to the third.

With more militants rising up the TTP ranks, the command has slipped out of the Mehsuds’ hands. An estimated half a million Mehsuds are already displaced while their houses were razed as a result of a military operation. A recent media report said that the material of 57,000 buildings destroyed in the Mehsud area is being used by the Frontier Works Organisation to build the Wana-Tank road — a facility to serve Waziris. Was this the state’s revenge against the Mehsuds or just a coincidence?

But understanding militancy through the narrow lens of the media is problematic in one major way: attention on high-profile commanders at the top makes us blind to the role of foot soldiers at the bottom. In every terror outfit the politically motivated top depends more on the ideology-driven bottom. By focusing on the fight between two Mehsud commanders we should not ignore pressure coming from the bottom.

Mehsud commanders derive their power mainly from foot soldiers belonging to different branches of their own tribe. Because every Mehsud knows the price they have paid for changing their ‘jihad’ route, therefore, consciousness about such stakes is also very high.

Unrest in the TTP ranks is the product of this consciousness revolving around the high stakes in which Mehsud commanders believe they are the losers. They have to keep intact the steady flow of incoming foot solders, which requires resources largely coming from the urban spaces such as Karachi. In any case, Fata is a less productive space for Mehsuds to maintain their power even inside the TTP, which will lead militancy to explode under the burden of its own weight.

Though it will relieve the state of organised attacks on sensitive military installations, small groups of militants will still be more threatening for soft targets such as civilians and businesses.

The writer is a freelance journalist.

syedirfanashraf@gmail.com

Published in Dawn, May 19th, 2014