The American political scientist Francis Fukuyama gained much acclaim for his essay on the demise of the Soviet Union, The End of History? Although he shared reservations on the interpretation of his popular work, its main theme was simple: with the defeat of communism, liberal democracy was the only form of government compatible with socioeconomic modernity.

However, the politico-economic developments of the last two decades stand in contradiction to Fukuyama’s triumphant prophecy. China has successfully amalgamated state capitalism and authoritarianism, Russia is rising from the ashes of Marxist USSR, and the Arab Spring didn’t usher in democratic utopias in the Middle East. In the wake of such developments, the prophet of The End of History? was forced to revisit his ideas on the origins and evolution of political systems throughout the ages. And, to the surprise of many, he revisited them quite well.

After a quarter of a century, he still believes in the relevance of democratic institutions. His focus has now shifted from the external threats to democracy to the internal discords of the system. In his two-volume magnum opus, Fukuyama is seeking an overall pattern in history that can describe the rise and fall of states and governments. In The Origins of Political Order (2011), he analysed the socio-political history of societies and states from pre-historic primates to the French Revolution. He carries on this quest in Political Order and Political Decay (2014) which traces events from the 19th century to the present world order.

In this volume, Fukuyama, supplemented by empirical data, embarks upon a theoretical quest to determine whether liberal democracy is the universal destination of humankind. He has highlighted the role of three essential elements of liberal democracy: the state, rule of law and accountability. In other words, a society needs a stable government with a transparent system of law to ensure equality of its citizens. Furthermore, the state needs to be responsible to the will of the people. In Fukuyama’s words, “the study of development is not just an endless catalogue of personalities, events, conflicts, and policies. It necessarily centres around the process by which political institutions emerge, evolve, and eventually decay.” This volume is more interesting than the first because it deals with the more complex features of modern polities, whereas the previous one focused on primitive societies.

Fukuyama examines contemporary government machineries, their administrative responsibilities and the importance of their efficiency for the masses, and questions the real prospects for democracy. He goes on to contrast Britain’s and America’s successful evolution from patronage-based society to Greece’s and Italy’s failure to do so. Other nations with varying degrees of success are also analysed. He admits that “There is no automatic mechanism that produces clean, modern government”. Peculiar circumstances of each society result in varying, and sometimes diverging, political systems, he argues.

The dilemma in modern political thought, according to Fukuyama, is that liberal democracy is the only option that works best for modern societies and Chinese, Russian, or Islamist alternatives cannot overweigh the benefits of liberal democracy. Liberal democracy as implemented in the Western world is not ideal or perfect.

For Fukuyama, as for many political thinkers, political development is an evolutionary process. State institutions take time to establish and even more to keep improving themselves. Unlike the theorists Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx, who attribute such social development to Zeitgeist and Means of Production respectively, Fukuyama does not attempt to reduce this progressive movement in history to one basic force. Instead, he recognises the existence of myriad factors, including identity, geography, commerce, tradition, climate and simple luck that influence the complex system of politico-administrative manifestations.

Following in the footsteps of Max Weber, Fukuyama recognises the importance of an autonomous, meritocratic civil service for modern states. Dull subjects such as the functioning of the administrative arm of modern states have been presented quite interestingly by Fukuyama. He cites the example of Prussia that instituted an effective bureaucracy at the start of the 19th century — well before the establishment of democracy in that country — that helped in the process of German unification.

Greece, by contrast, could not develop an autonomous system of administration and used political patronage to fill bureaucratic ranks that proved disastrous for the country. Pakistani readers will find a lot of similarity between Fukuyama’s description of Greece and Pakistan. Like Greece, Pakistan inherited strong civil and military bureaucracies from the British government. However, a weak tradition of rule of law and a lack of political accountability added to the problems of the democratic system of the country.

Perhaps the most interesting part of the book is the discussion of the United States. The American experiment of state-building is used to illustrate the evolution of democracy. Movements like Industrialisation, Progressivism, Imperialism, New Deal, and the Civil Rights Movement transformed the US into a strong and effective state. It shows that democracies can build strong states, but that doing so requires a lot of effort of dedicated citizens over a long time. However, Fukuyama also builds the case that for the last couple of decades, the American political advance has reversed. He puts the blame on the growing economic inequality and the influence of the wealthy classes on the government through lobbies and interest groups. This hampers democratic governments from resolving contemporary issues that are in the best interest of the American masses.

Fukuyama does not want developing countries to follow in the footsteps of the American government: “While the American economy remains a source of miraculous innovation, American government is hardly a source of inspiration”. As a consequence of the theory of checks and balances among government organs, Fukuyama argues, to the surprise of many, the executive branch of the government is meddled with by hostile Congressional committees and is micromanaged by the judiciary. A similar argument has been presented by former vice-president, Al Gore, in his book The Future: Six Drivers of Global Change when he states: “American democracy has been hacked,” and that Congress “is now incapable of passing laws without permission from the corporate lobbies and other special interests that control their campaign finances.”

A staunch advocate of liberal democracy, Fukuyama believes that good governance and laws that protect the weak are more or less universally desired. He says the problem most of the world faces is “getting to Denmark” — where Denmark means “an imagined society that is prosperous, democratic, secure, and well governed, and experiences low levels of corruption”. The problem, however, is that “we don’t understand how Denmark itself came to be Denmark and therefore don’t comprehend the complexity and difficulty of political development”.

The rise of the middle class, Fukuyama rightly points out, is the main cause behind the Arab Spring of 2011 and the political upheavals in Turkey and Brazil in 2013. Contemporary generations of the middle class in developing countries, financially empowered by their respective growing economies and aware of the duties of welfare states, are not satisfied by the present political order in their countries.

Even in a country like the United States, the socio-political movement, Occupy Wall Street, emerged as a result of widening income disparities. Fukuyama’s arguments can apply to Pakistani politics too. Since the ‘lawyers’ movement during Pervez Musharraf’s regime, the middle class of the country has taken a keen interest in political developments.

The dilemma in modern political thought, according to Fukuyama, is that liberal democracy is the only option that works best for modern societies and Chinese, Russian, or Islamist alternatives cannot overweigh the benefits of liberal democracy. Liberal democracy as implemented in the Western world is not ideal or perfect. In fact, no actual political or economic system can be perfect. It needs to continue to reform, evolve, and adapt to the changing circumstances of time.

Political Order and Political Decay
(POLITICAL SCIENCE)
By Francis Fukuyama
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York
ISBN 978-0374227357
672pp.