PAKISTAN can learn from the UK’s counterterrorism (CT) approach. The UK has 35 years of experience fighting a variety of militant groups. Its history of dealing with terrorists dates to the 1605 Gunpowder Plot.

In the first quarter of the 20th century, Michael Collins, an Irish nationalist, led a revolt against the British. The Easter Uprising of April 1916 was dealt with harshly by the British government. In 1921, the Irish republicans achieved success with a peace treaty signed between the UK government and Irish republicans paving the way for an independent Republic of Ireland in 1921. The UK, however, managed to salvage six Protestant-dominated counties comprising Northern Ireland.

The second phase of the Irish armed movement against the UK began with Bloody Sunday in 1972 in Belfast. Again London responded with a heavy hand and fourteen protesters lost their lives. The resurfacing of the IRA (then called Provisional IRA) as a result of Bloody Sunday heralded an era of terrorist attacks in Northern Ireland and in mainland Britain. The IRA unleashed its long militant campaign across the UK over the next 25 years. More than 3,500 people lost their lives in 500 terrorist attacks during ‘the Troubles’.

By the late 1990s, UK policymakers had realised the need for involving all stakeholders in the conflict. The Republic of Ireland appeared to be a safe haven for IRA militant leaders and the group’s rank and file, therefore it was asked to be part of the next round of negotiations starting in 1998. The US government was invited because many IRA donors were Catholic Irish-Americans who despite the efforts of the UK government were funnelling money for the Irish cause.

Pakistan would do well to study the British CT strategy.

The Good Friday Agreement was signed after the multi-party talks in 1998. The UK devolved many Irish institutions as a measure of granting more autonomy; the Northern Ireland Assembly and Northern Ireland Executive were created after a referendum. All sides recognised the special status of Northern Ireland. The IRA had agreed to decommission which was done in 2005.

The UK’s use of excessive military force in Northern Ireland backfired after Bloody Sunday. Had the military not been called in ‘the Troubles’ could have been avoided. A limited military role to aid the police would have been a better option to contain the Irish militants.

Britain’s problem of terrorism did not end with the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. The 9/11 attacks and UK’s partnership with the US during the ‘war on terror’ allowed the already present radical Islamists in the UK to plan and execute terrorist attacks there. Their plans culminated in the July 7 attacks in 2005. To deal with the problem of Islamist militancy, the UK’s response was the Counter Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST). The carefully studied strategy was drawn from the UK’s experience of Irish militancy. Its CT policy is pillared by the Four ‘P’s: prevent, protect, prepare and pursue. They have worked as no major terrorist attack has been reported since 2005.

The ‘prevent’ part includes de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation measures; moreover isolating terrorists and not allowing them to mobilise. ‘Protect’ means reducing the vulnerability of critical national infrastructure on the basis of risk assessment reports and then boosting available resources to stop terrorist attacks in the UK or British interests abroad. The ‘prepare’ part chalks out measures to increase response capabilities and to recover during terrorist attacks. ‘Pursue’ is about effective and proportionate CT measures to detect, investigate and disrupt terrorist attacks.

Since the start of the ‘war of terror’ in 2001, more than 55,000 Pakistanis have lost their lives. Economic damage has amounted to over $80 billion. Pakistani policymakers may avail themselves of learning opportunities for formulating concrete and well-structured CT and counter-insurgency policies.

What Pakistan needs to learn from the British experience is to devise strategic steps modelled on the UK’s measures, keeping in view our own environment of course. Heavy reliance on military means and over-militarisation must be avoided. However, strengthening law-enforcement agencies including the police and making effective use of all intelligence agencies must be the first line of defence in preventing terrorist attacks.

For devising a concrete CT strategy for Pakistan the British experience must be studied, analysed and evaluated for replicating some of the policy measures, keeping in view our local tribal culture and religious norms.

Militants in Pakistan, either Islamists or others, are not invincible. They could be defeated in a convincing manner, provided a sound CT strategy is devised and implemented. Fighting terrorism is without any doubt an expensive exercise, but losing the war is also not an option.

The writer is a senior police officer with a PhD in terrorism studies.

Published in Dawn, May 4th, 2015

On a mobile phone? Get the Dawn Mobile App: Apple Store | Google Play