BE under no illusion: IS has arrived in Afghanistan. Just as the country is gripped by an economic exodus of people seeking better opportunities elsewhere, the self-styled Islamic State is spreading its tentacles into Afghanistan’s most lawless territories in an attempt to establish influence in a region seen as vital to the group’s endgame: a caliphate.

The first whispers of IS activity in Afgha­nistan emerged exactly one year ago. Initially, it constituted nothing more than media-driven hearsay rather than any actual ground presence; IS in Afghanistan was roundly dismissed as a ‘virtual reality’ organisation.

Even as the first quarter of 2015 passed, the IS presence was a ‘will-they, won’t-they’ discussion, with analysts suggesting the group was merely a band of ex-Taliban militants opportunistically rebranding themselves in the hope of coat-tailing on the symbolic capital of the official network in Syria and Iraq.

Yet as the summer began to heat up, so did the IS presence. Violent clashes with the Taliban ensued, ending questions about possible alliances. The focus on Helmand, a traditional insurgent heartland, shifted to the Pakistan-bordering Nangarhar province; home to the notorious mountain caves at Tora Bora where Osama bin Laden and his cronies once evaded coalition forces before slipping silently over the border into Pakistan.

In recent weeks, IS in Afghanistan has regrouped.

Whether it was inordinate media attention, persistent scaremongering from certain Afghan political elites, or because the group began to achieve gains in some Nangarhar districts, the IS threat was upgraded from ‘nascent’ to ‘operationally emergent’. Backed by US drone strikes, Afghan security forces mobilised and eliminated multiple IS leaders along with dozens, if not hundreds, of militants. Afghanistan’s secret service then ‘swept-up’ recruiters as the government dispatched representatives to at-risk districts to boost its presence and engage with tribal elders.

The strategy worked. IS in Afghanistan had been beheaded. The group’s activity dropped to a minimum, although this could partly be attributed to a diversion of attention to the Taliban’s own internal struggle, sparked by the death of its enigmatic leader Mullah Omar. Yet optimism was premature. One common trend between IS in Afghanistan and ‘IS-proper’ in Syria and Iraq became clear: resiliency.

In recent weeks, IS in Afghanistan has regrouped, wreaking havoc among Nanga­rhar’s communities, barbarically murdering tribal elders, clashing with the Taliban, imprisoning families and enforcing strict rules on women. Afghan security forces are reacting but remain overstretched due to operations against strong Taliban offensives elsewhere.

It is yet to be determined whether or not these recent IS activities will cement their presence. Afghanistan does not provide a natural constituency from which IS can recruit, meaning the group will rely heavily on defections from existing insurgent outfits. The danger is that the group has become the most likely vehicle for Taliban militants, disaffected with their own internal struggles or reticent about possible engagement in a peace process, to continue profitable jihad.

For now, the overall conclusion is that IS does not yet represent a significant strategic threat to Afghanistan. What it has become is a complicating factor politically, as it affects how government actors and other insurgent groups formulate policies, including towards peace talks. For that reason, IS in Afghanistan must be countered. And fast.

An immediate counter-strategy is needed to avoid inevitable high costs if the group is allowed to grow and develop. This requires a deeper understanding of the group’s own dynamics; IS cannot be effectively countered unless it is understood properly.

Afghan security forces and international partners must determine whether IS truly believes its own apocalyptic rhetoric about a final battle in the Pak-Afghan region. Can we be sure that the group has a genuine strategic interest in Afg­hanis­tan or is it purely an opportunity-driven presence?

The Afghan government must also find ways to degrade the IS brand and support base, given that it grows as much through fear and propaganda as coordinated ground action. Efforts must also be made to follow the money, recognising that modern insurgencies often stray from claimed ideological goals; they are industries like any other in which few are willing to fight for free.

We must recognise that models of analysis based on Iraq and Syria will not translate to Afghanistan. Effective responses require an awareness of IS aims, strength and capabilities in the Afghan context, where insurgent groups are fertilised by public disaffection with the government. As long as the government remains a better option for the public, then IS (or Taliban) support will remain low.

Put simply, aerial bombardment and military efforts against IS in Afghanistan will only go so far. An effective counter-strategy will be one that focuses on better local governance and service provision in at-risk districts. The people must put faith in their government. We got IS wrong in Syria at tremendous cost. We can still get it right in Afghanistan.

The writer is Special Representative of the European Union in Afghanistan.

Published in Dawn October 1st, 2015

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