As tensions simmer in the Middle East, the Pakistani leadership has decided to play mediator between Tehran and Riyadh. Rather than choosing between the two, Islamabad is trying to balance its relationship with both sides.

To understand what kind of cooperation is expected of Pakistan and what the purpose is of the Saudi-led ‘counterterrorism coalition’ that it has joined, Dawn spoke to Prof Max Abrahms, who teaches conflict and warfare at Northeastern University in Boston.

Q: What exactly is the purpose of the ‘counterterrorism alliance’ the Saudis are putting together?

A: There are two main explanations for why the Saudis have decided to lead the alliance; counterterrorism or alienating Iran. I see the logic of the first explanation, but the second explanation is backed by stronger evidence.

In theory, the Saudis should take the lead against international terrorism today.

After all, the two most important international terrorist groups – Islamic State and Al Qaeda – have ideological roots in Wahhabism. Further, Saudi Arabia has supplied large numbers of foreign jihadis to these groups, which increasingly threaten the kingdom and perceptions of it around the world.

Although there are plenty of incentives for the Saudis to assume a leadership role against IS and Al Qaeda, the true purpose of the alliance seems to be weakening Iran, which has, in fact, been far more helpful in confronting these threats.

Without the Shia militia, IS would have likely taken over Baghdad. And in Syria, the Iranian-supported Syrian army and other non-state agents such as Hezbollah have helped to defend Damascus from IS and other rebels.

If the Saudis were really prioritising counterterrorism, Iran would not have been excluded from the alliance. In fact, Iran should lead the alliance rather than Saudi Arabia.

The timing of the alliance is also suspicious because it coincides with a low-point in Saudi-Iranian relations. Even beyond the alliance, the Saudis are aggressively courting other Sunni countries to break relations with Iran.

It also coincides with a major rapprochement in US-Iranian relations as reflected in the nuclear deal and resulting sanctions relief, which will only boost Iranian influence in the coming decade.

Q: Given Islamabad’s unique relationship with the Saudis, as well as the fact that it cannot afford to sideline Iran since it is a neighbour and a potentially powerful ally, what do you think are Pakistan’s options?

A: Pakistan is trying to stay neutral in the conflict, or at least avoid siding categorically with one side over another.

This week, Pakistani leaders were engaged in shuttle diplomacy between Saudi Arabia and Iran to cool the bilateral impasse.

Pakistan is in a good position to serve as mediator because it has close ties with Saudi Arabia; it has the largest army in the region that is closely tied to the Saudis; it has one of the largest Shia population other than Iran and benefits from substantial economic ties with Iran.

But Pakistan is not seen as reflexively pro-Saudi against Iran. In Yemen, for instance, Pakistan has been careful not to tilt too heavily in the Saudi-led military campaign against the Iranian-supported Houthis.

That said, Pakistan does have better relations with Saudi Arabia than Iran, so it will not be seen by both sides as an ideal mediator. What Pakistan wants to do is ameliorate the Saudi-Iranian fallout without compromising relations with either country.

Q: Do you think Pakistan will end up committing any part of its formal army to this alliance?

A: No, I do not foresee Pakistan investing heavily in the Saudi-led alliance. Cooperation will likely be limited to training and advising – not so-called boots on the ground. Not only does Pakistan want to keep its distance from the Saudi-Iranian dispute, but no two countries share the same threat perceptions when it comes to counterterrorism.

In theory, all governments are worried about terrorism and therefore have mutual interests in fighting it together.

In practice, deep cooperation is the exception because different governments place different emphasis on both - how much to prioritise and wage counterterrorism. A good example is the U.S.-led anti-IS coalition in Syria. On paper, many countries are participating. But in actuality, the levels of contribution are far from evenly distributed among members, some of which are participants in name only.

Published in Dawn, January 21st, 2016