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After the all-party conference and the cabinet meeting, the prime minister, Mohammed Khan Junejo, was sure that he would succeed in having his way against Gen Zia’s wishes. On the other hand, Zain Noorani kept both of them guessing as to what was happening at Geneva, and in the end both found themselves bluffed. On his return to Islamabad, he explained his position, communicating to both that the international stakeholders wanted some more time to think.
During his stay at Geneva, Noorani faced all kinds of pressures to sign the accord without insisting upon the formation of an interim government after the removal of the Najeebullah administration.
The Soviet Union wanted to resolve the issue without meeting the condition of forming a consensus government. The United States too was interested in that perception and supported the USSR — perhaps it was more interested in the ouster of Russian troops than a stable government in Kabul, because the US did not want Gorbachev to claim the credit of vacating Afghanistan as a unilateral act.
Gen Zia wanted his proposal to be adopted as part of the final accord, but the US continued to dissuade him
All the powers seemed to be overactive in resolving the issue in a way that was more suitable for them. Gen Zia seriously wanted his proposal to be adopted as part of the final accord, while the US continued to dissuade him. When it became difficult for the US to influence Gen Zia it imposed a 120-day ban on aid to Pakistan. The US wanted to show its anger; it feared that perhaps Gen Zia wanted to make Afghanistan a laboratory for his fundamentalism and might lead to the formation of a new fundamentalist bloc in the Central Asia.
Efforts were still afoot in various directions and at different levels when on the morning of April 10, Islamabad and the garrison town Rawalpindi experienced a dreadful tragedy. It all began with two huge explosions; and in a couple of minutes missiles, rockets and all kinds of projectiles were raining on the twin cities. It was revealed that the storehouse of Ojhri near Rawalpindi, meant for storing arms and ammunition for the Mujahideen, had exploded sending missiles and bombs raining down. While more than 100 people had been killed and many more injured, the extent of damage to the property was incalculable; the military sheds were completely gutted. The magnitude of loss was still to be ascertained. The armed forces were shocked but they had to ascertain the causes, the magnitude of loss and, finallythe responsibility.
The nation was in a state of complete confusion, with no clue as to how it happened and who could be held responsible for the colossal loss. While Junejo and his administration diverted their attention towards minimising the damage and finding out the causes of the Ojhri disaster, Noorani continued to sift through the huge pile of papers and documents to meet the deadline as the peace planners were busy figuring out an agreeable solution to the Afghan issue.
World leaders were unable to reach a decision as to what could be done in a situation of chaos and confusion, utter disillusion and hopelessness. All parties were already busy to evolve an acceptable accord since the talks were postponed in March, and a series of meetings and parleys had already taken place. A new round of talks that was initiated by the UN secretary general Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, won a popular support. With this development someone thought of moving things further. Finally, a draft of the accord was finalised, duly helped by the UN secretary general, and copies were distributed to all countries concerned including Pakistan, though Gen Zia didn’t like it.
The draft accord was accepted by most parties and finally it was ready by the evening of April 13, 1988. All parties were optimistic. The historic Geneva Accord was signed at Geneva the next morning, witnessed by the US Foreign Minister George Schulz, the UN diplomat Diego Cordovez and Zain Noorani of Pakistan. On April 15, when the news broke, Gen Zia reacted before his companions in a terse and happy mood. He continued slaying the exclusion of his proposal about the Najeebullah government and feared a worst series of battles in Afghanistan. But for the record, he issued a statement, welcomed the signing of the accord, and termed the return of Russian troops a miracle of the 20th century. He remarked that the Najeebullah government should have gone earlier as its presence could reignite another flare-up.
The draft accord was accepted by most parties and finally it was ready by the evening of April 13, 1988. All were optimist. The historic Geneva Accord was signed at Geneva the next morning, witnessed by US foreign minister George Schulz, UN diplomat Diego Cordovez and Zain Noorani of Pakistan.
The world was satisfied to have witnessed an accord which brought an end to the war. However, the destruction and misery left behind remained a stark reminder of the war for decades to come. Pakistan became the worst affected country, with the introduction of narcotics, arms trade and factionalism; besides its economy was heavily burdened by having to feed about four million Afghan refugees for nine years.
The accord mainly emphasised non-interference in Afghan policies, with international guarantees, and voluntary repatriation of Afghan refugees and their rehabilitation. In all, the accord included several instruments and a bilateral agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan on the principles of mutual relations. An agreement was also signed on the inter-relationships for the settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan, signed by Pakistan and Afghanistan and witnessed by the Soviet Union and the United States.
The agreements also contained provisions for the timetable of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. It officially began on May 15, 1988 and ended by Feb 15, 1989, thus ending a nine-year-long Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, January 24th, 2016
