One evening in September 1988, the Mall in Lahore witnessed a number of people arriving at a bungalow, apparently to attend a meeting. They were eagerly received and led to their respective seats, where they sat listening to lofty speeches sketching out the political scenario of the country.
For Lahore this was not unusual. But this particular gathering was however different, as there were no roaring slogans or heated speeches, nor did it culminate into a rally.
After a dozen or so speeches, the formation of Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), or Islamic Democratic Alliance was announced. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi — a former PPP stalwart and the chief of National People’s Party (NPP), a breakaway of PPP — was elected as the IJI chief. Interestingly, the man behind him was Nawaz Sharif, who had been Gen Zia’s man previously.
Though the main components of the alliance were Muslim League-Junejo and Jatoi’s NPP, there was a conscious effort to bring more right-wing parties in order to reach the figure of nine; equating the number of parties in the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) of 1977, which launched an agitation against Zulifikar Ali Bhutto resulting in the overthrow of his government, promulgation of martial law and takeover by Gen Zia. For the following 11 years Gen Zia ruled the country in the name of religion and false promises, punishing the politicians for their past corrupt deeds.
A political alliance was formed to confront the PPP, which enjoyed a substantial sympathy vote bank
After Gen Zia’s death, the establishment covertly took upon itself the responsibility of implementing his vision of governance. With PML and NPP in the forefront, the other parties brought to the IJI fold were Jamaat Islami, Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam, Nizam-i-Mustafa group, Markazi Jamiat Ahle Hadith (Lakhvi group), Jamiat-i-Mashaikh Pakistan, Azad Group and Hizbullah Jihad. Other mainstream religious parties, Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Fazl and Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan Noorani, stayed away from the alliance, as did some nationalist parties like Awami National Party and Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party, opting to contest polls from their own platforms.
Since the first post-Zia polls were only a few weeks away this was a pre-election exercise. Those who were aware of the major actors behind the scenes also knew of what was going on in the background. The alliance was the brainchild of Gen Hamid Gul, the then director general of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). He was not in favour of the left-leaning PPP, then led by Benazir Bhutto, daughter of Z.A. Bhutto, winning the elections. Instead, he preferred Nawaz Sharif, a businessman-turned-politician, who was mollycoddled by Gen Zia for his political ends, and who had by now grown into a politician, acceptable to the establishment.
As the intelligence reports indicated that an increase in the PPP’s sympathy vote threatened to push it into power, the top military leadership decided to bring forth the alliance of rightist parties and Gen Hamid Gul ensured that all went well. With little pursuance, the acting president Ghulam Ishaq Khan also fell in line with them and allowed IJI to establish a cell at the Presidency to monitor and assist the alliance with their plan. The flag of the alliance was designed to match the PNA (Pakistan National Alliance) flag of 1977.
Whether this kind of interference had ethical or legal support was a question to be decided by the people at the top; however, it was disliked by all democratic elements. Many years later when, after retirement, Gen Hamid Gul faced severe criticism over this overture, he proved too rigid and had no regret about it; instead he proudly stated that he would readily face any prosecution in this regard. On Oct 11, 2012 while being criticised for his role Dawn News, he said that the politicians in Pakistan were corrupt and if they continued to tread on the same path, the military would continue to intervene in affairs of the state. Admitting that he was responsibility for creating IJI, he said that he was not afraid of any case filed against him. During the interview, he said that he didn’t do anything against his conscious nor did he have any regrets. He was very vocal about the military’s role and said: “The army cannot be controlled by politicians as it has complete control on itself.”
Sharp criticism followed the airing of his interview. Two days later, the minister for information and broadcasting, Qamar Zaman Kaira (PPP), asked for a report of his activities during his time as a serving general. “If his office, home and institution were used in the formation of IJI, then he is responsible to the nation ... no one has the right to become the security adviser of the nation himself. This is the job of the state.” Kaira added that IJI was formed to steal the mandate of the people through ulterior motives that prevented PPP from winning the elections.
The election schedule was tight. Almost all parties began canvassing in their own way, refreshing old contacts. PPP leader Benazir Bhutto did not pay any attention to Sindh, as its provincial leadership claimed that they were well aware of what they had to do; however, she made quick visits to the rest of the country and at times addressed public meetings, while PML chief Nawaz Sharif, too, tried to match her speed. Foreign monitors and media observers who had come to Pakistan to watch the important elections marked the indicators which showed an unclear picture, as there were still some legal handicaps for both parties that had to be removed before going to the polls on Nov 16, 1988.
Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, May 15th, 2016
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