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WE can pretend they’ll do the right thing. Nawaz will go to parliament and answer his accusers — fully, without fudging and without fear of the consequences.
The opposition will use Nawaz’s candour to steer the national conversation towards systemic improvements and public accountability while offering itself up for similar scrutiny.
Democracy will be strengthened and the boys, chastened and thus beaten back, will go back to fighting militancy as priority No 1. The media will pull itself out of its frenzy and the public will settle down for elections in 2018.
But why pretend?
Nawaz is in trouble. A world of trouble and it’s trouble that isn’t going away. King of Punjab, the man who was creeping towards a permanent majority, three-term PM — Nawaz is fighting for his political life.
Panama was never about legal minutiae and never really about offshore accounts. It was a hook on which to hang whatever you like — public anxiety about a corrupt plutocracy, the political ambitions of Imran, the institutional interests of the boys, the anti-democratic agenda of sections of the media.
Nawaz’s mistake was to argue he hasn’t done anything wrong instead of offering to do something right. He wanted to prove he isn’t corrupt, when what would have helped is nudging the democratic project forward.
His mistake was also to believe that just enough is good enough — that if he stays on track to win another election, he’d be all right. His mistake, ultimately, was to be himself.
He may yet survive. Ouster is easily dreamt, but hard to effect. But because it’s on the cards, let’s work through the options.
A decision is made — Nawaz has to go. Inside parliament, there is only one forcible route: a vote of no confidence.
Because the N-League has a majority in the National Assembly and the 18th Amendment disqualifies anyone who votes against his party in a no-confidence vote, the route to parliamentary ouster seems closed.
Nawaz’s mistake was to argue he hasn’t done anything wrong instead of offering to do something right.
But there’s a lacuna in the disqualification clause: if a MNA votes against his party in a no-confidence vote, the party has the right to seek his disqualification — meaning it’s not clear what happens to the vote itself when it’s cast.
Essentially, a PML-N MNA votes against Nawaz in a no-confidence vote. Nawaz and his remaining supporters in the PML-N would reasonably argue any N-League votes cast against him are unconstitutional — but they’d have to get a Supreme Court judgement to say that.
By then politics would have already overtaken the law — it would be clear, whether constitutional or not, that a majority in the National Assembly does not want Nawaz as PM.
The real problem with the no-confidence vote, though, is political: in addition to breaking some PML-N votes, easy enough to engineer if there’s the will, the entire opposition party would have to vote against Nawaz too — something much harder to arrange.
So, to outside parliament we must turn. Street power is an option, but Imran may have undermined himself here. The endless rallies have made people used to rallies — just another week in the life of Imran.
To resonate more widely and shake the political foundations, the PTI would have to pull off another Oct 2011 or possibly something even bigger. A historic rally in the heart of Punjab on a single-point agenda — the ouster of Nawaz.
It could happen. But it’s tough.
Then, there’s the real option: Raheel leaning on Nawaz. Mr Prime Minister, in the interest of the nation and for the sake of stability, would you please consider stepping down.
Below the nuclear threshold — dissolution of all assemblies and snap elections — are a couple of options: same NA, new prime minister; or NA-only elections, leaving the provincial to carry on.
(There’s no constitutional reason for NA and provincial elections to be held at the same time and, arguably, staggered NA/PA elections could be a long-term answer to political instability.)
The Raheel option works because, well, it’s the boys we’re talking about — you can imagine that even the most resistant civilian can be prevailed upon by a determined enough chief.
Finally, there’s what Nawaz could do. He could gamble and call an election himself, hoping to win a fresh mandate. But he’s already boxed himself in.
With no presence outside Punjab, he would need to win massively in Punjab again. Conversely, his foes — civilian and otherwise — would just need to block him in a minority of seats in Punjab to prevent Nawaz from forming a government on his own.
So back it would be to coalition — possibly a fate worse for Nawaz than trying to hang on till 2018.
Or Nawaz could take the martyr route — force Raheel or a combination of PTI and the establishment to do something so ugly to chuck him out of power that an election or two later, the PML-N could bounce back.
Is any of this likely? Who knows; Pakistan is an uncertain place again.
Panama is not going away. Yes, Panama is also about the political ambitions of Imran. Yes, Panama is because of the institutional interests of the boys. Yes, Panama is about the anti-democratic agenda of sections of the media.
But there’s also the original truth: we only have Panama because Nawaz chose to do dodgy things and then let his family do dodgy things.
So, do we blame the vultures or the one who gave us the corpse?
The writer is a member of staff.
Twitter: @cyalm
Published in Dawn, May 15th, 2016
