TAKING the fight to the militants in North Waziristan was an essential and non-negotiable requirement for internal stability in Pakistan.

Two years on, many of the effects can be seen and felt across the country — Pakistan is, both by statistical and psychological yardsticks, significantly more stable and calmer than it was before Operation Zarb-i-Azb.

Some years ago, no national holiday or religious occasion could pass without a great deal of trepidation and fear — such was the impact of the banned TTP’s campaign of terror. And rare was the month where an attack of distressing proportions did not take place.

Indeed, it was the infamous Karachi airport attack that triggered the formal launch of Operation Zarb-i-Azb.

Two years on, the sacrifices of the 390 soldiers who have lost their lives and the many more that have been injured in the campaign deserve to be put front and centre — truly, it is their blood that has helped to save Pakistan, and the nation owes the soldiers on the frontline a debt of gratitude.

It is the nature of counter-insurgencies, however, to move in a phased manner from reclaiming territory to establishing true and familiar normality.

Today, it is at the policy level where the big questions remain, the soldiers on the battlefield having done, and continuing to do, all that has been asked of them.

The military leadership has indicated its preferred course of action: counterterrorism operations across the country and improving border management on the Pak-Afghan border.

The military leadership, as evidenced by DG ISPR Gen Asim Bajwa’s news conference on Wednesday, has also indicated where it considers the political government to be falling behind in its commitments to implement the National Action Plan.

Prima facie the political government does appear to not be taking the fight against militancy seriously. From failing to launch a major crackdown in Punjab to thwarting the military from launching an operation of its own, and from failing to develop civilian counterterrorism platforms to appearing happy to claim political credit for military gains, the PML-N government has fared quite poorly in its internal security responsibilities.

Yet, there are at least two other parts to the story of civilian failure and military success. One, the military leadership’s focus on NAP is also selective — anti-state militants are being fought, while anti-Afghan or anti-India militants continue to thrive on Pakistani soil.

Surely, the fight against militancy will never be one until there is a clear and evident policy against all militant groups. Two, the military leadership’s criticisms ignore the reality of the civil-military dynamic in Pakistan.

Neither shaming nor intimidating the political leadership will achieve much more than an even greater civil-military divide. If the goal is truly a stable Pakistan, the solution lies only in institutional cooperation according to the constitutional scheme of things.

Published in Dawn, June 17th, 2016