CAN there be a single source for generating healthy narratives in Pakistan? Particularly given the context of current domestic and regional developments, where not just multiple narratives but also multiple processes of narrative persuasion exist and are at work?

Let’s have a look at some of the current topics under public discussion and their orientation.

Apparently, things are going smoothly on the internal security front. Apart from Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani’s fresh accusations against Pakistan — which form the usual anti-Pakistan rhetoric — nothing of particular importance is happening on the regional level. Yes, the assassination of Burhan Wani in India-held Kashmir is a new development that looks like it may lead to another summer of unrest in the valley. But what is the government doing? Look at Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed. She is not ready to come out of denial of the fact that Islamic State has made inroads within elite segments of her country. At home, another season of the politics of agitation is brewing. The world will, once more, witness the ‘dirty’ picture of Pakistani politics.

Ultimately, the Constitution is a formal social contract built with consensus — and it binds us together.

These visibly casual perceptions cannot be defined as ‘narratives’ — but are one outcome of certain narratives which are deep rooted in these societies, and which impact upon people’s patterns of thoughts and behaviours.

Recently in Islamabad, the construction of narratives was an important issue taken up in some sessions of policy and intellectual debate with regards to countering violent extremism. Many experts thought that the religious extremists believe in and promote their own parallel legal/jurisprudential narratives on religious grounds; the language, idiom, and rationale of their narratives are all religious.

Interestingly, the behaviours and narratives of the power elite and establishment also came under scrutiny, which many experts found to be as unhealthy as those of non-state actors. The reason for this, they said, was due to the establishment’s lack of trust in the social contract between state and society. The Constitution of Pakistan, it seems, remains the least sacred document in the country.

Ironically, both the establishment and non-state actors are largely confronting each other outside of constitutional and democratic domains. This is perhaps why militants oppose constitutions and democracies. Moderate religious scholars may contest the issue and declare militants as being ‘ignorant’, but the fact remains that militants seek their legitimacy from religion. Importantly, the Constitution of Pakistan prohibits the raising of any sort of private army or militia under Article 256. It says that any such private organisation is illegal.

Instead of seeking power from the Constitution, democratic norms and principles of democratic accountability, the establishment tends to counter militants’ arguments and narratives with jargon such as ‘governance’ and ‘corruption’. They use these two keywords in an attempt to gain moral authority, believing that good governance and the elimination of corruption alone will defeat militancy and extremism. This, obviously, increases the burden on others. Who are these ‘others’? They are politicians, both good and bad, and those segments of the media, intelligentsia and civil society, who believe in democratic values and constitutional norms.

What develops is an interesting situation where those who believe in the supremacy of the Constitution and democratic values have little relevance in the larger national, religious and political discourses — those of the militants as well as of the establishment. Militants and their sympathisers label them as transgressors, deviants, ignorant, puppets of the West and — most importantly — ideologically corrupt creatures. Meanwhile, the establishment considers them financially and morally corrupt people.

This may be perceived as a dilemma, paradox or dichotomy — but our generation has also developed a tendency to think along similar lines.

Now let’s revisit the debate on narratives and imagine the kind of alternative narratives that we require in Pakistan. Can the Constitution provide and strengthen such narratives that may weaken the narratives of non-state actors? Alternatively, will the good governance mantra thrown around by the establishment be enough to defeat militancy in Pakistan?

The Constitution of Pakistan is a comprehensive social contract upon which most parties, espousing different thoughts, agree. Many experts believe that the Constitution has the power to eradicate negative narratives, and that this activity will help in laying the foundations for positive thinking. They argue that it is the only document on which all segments of our society — including nationalist, secular, liberal, moderate and religious forces — are in agreement, despite their divergent views and reservations on certain clauses. They can launch campaigns against such clauses. Political parties can contest elections to seek the mandate to amend such clauses. But, ultimately, this is a written, formal social contract built with consensus — and it binds forces of divergent views and values together. The Constitution and democratic system can ensure transparency and accountability.

Of course, someone else could argue that strict systems, authoritarian rule, and monarchies can also bring about some extent of social order. However, this depends on how one defines ‘good governance’. Can a sort of authoritarian discipline, different types of suppression and bans on divergent expressions be thought of as characteristics of good governance? Which would be considered a model of governance: a functional delivery system with all, or limited freedoms? Most importantly, can such paradigms remove multiple ambiguities prevailing in our society? Would it be enough to actually bring the extremists on the right path?

Those who believe the answer to be in the affirmative would then observe that the country does not need a counter-extremism policy, that it deserves applause for what it has attained in the form of a state of ‘new normalcy’. So what, they would say, if it is not up to scratch in terms of global norms, or that our society seems morbid from the outside. There are many states in the world which are surviving with even worse indicators. Why is the world worried about us? May be we have something beyond mere narratives that worries the world.

The writer is a security analyst.

Published in Dawn, July 17th, 2016