The cabinet in Pakistan from 1947 to 1977 remained an effective decision-making institution. Its effectiveness varied during different phases and on different issues. The cabinet was highly operative and influential under Liaquat Ali Khan, Ayub Khan, and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. It was partially influential under Khawaja Nazimuddin, Mohammad Ali Bogra, and during the period of the coalition cabinets (1955 to 1958). It was not viable during Gen Yahya Khan’s period when the military high command was the sole decision-making authority. The cabinet’s role in deciding economic and political matters remained vital during all regimes except for the Yahya Khan period. However, it was given somewhat free hand to deal with matters relating to foreign policy till 1969. Issues related to foreign policy were not brought to cabinet meetings during the periods of Gen Yahya and Bhutto.

The selection or nomination of cabinet ministers was given due weight by all regimes. Ministers were taken from different sections of society: The present study has found no evidence to support the general perception that landlords dominated the cabinet. A study of the socio-economic profile of the ministers has established that the majority of them belonged to the group of professionals during the entire period of this study. Landlords dominated only the last cabinet (1974-1977) of Bhutto.

The cabinet exercised an important role in economic issues during the years after Partition

The ratio of representation of one or the other group had an impact on the formulation of various policies. The urban social background of the majority of ministers led them to initiate urban-based reforms in the first decade after Independence. They focused mostly on the problems of urban areas during the first parliamentary phase and neglected to initiate agricultural reforms and pro-rural policies. The situation in the later years of the first military ruler, Gen Ayub, however, was different, when a broad-based agricultural reform package in the shape of the Green Revolution was introduced. The post-1974 period of Bhutto, with a majority of the feudal ministers in the cabinet, opted for a policy of status quo, the most popular among feudal lords. This study has revealed the fact that the specific social backgrounds of the ministers had an impact on the formulation of government policies. The institution of the cabinet played a significant role in almost all of the governments regarding economic issues. In the early phase, cabinets had been successful in establishing a significant number of economic institutions, including the Planning Advisory Board, the Planning Commission, the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, the National Economic Committee, the Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation, and the Pakistan Industrial Finance Corporation. The objectives and targets of all such institutions were designed by the cabinet. The cabinet kept strict control on import and export policies; import-export licences were awarded with the approval of the cabinet. The import of all such items that were produced in the country, and the export of all agricultural yields or crops which were required for the local industry were banned. This helped local industries to flourish. The cabinet determined the prices of major crops to support industry. It had direct control over all major economic activity in the country during the first parliamentary phase, which resulted in developing infrastructure and flourishing industry, but at the same time was harmful for agriculture, the backbone of Pakistan’s economy. This experiment of the cabinet in the early phase enabled the future cabinets of the military regime to learn lessons from past mistakes.

Gen Ayub’s cabinet successfully developed a strong monitoring mechanism for economic institutions and policies. The cabinet and the other economic institutions enjoyed cordial relations, worked in a harmonious way, and largely followed cabinet’s advice. The cabinet used to issue a list of favoured industries for investment; investors needed the approval of the Economic Coordination Committee of the cabinet to invest in industries other than those on the list. Trade was also controlled by the cabinet or cabinet-oriented institutions such as the Economic Committee of the cabinet. The cabinet provided export incentives through direct and indirect subsidies. The import policy of the military regime’s cabinet was more relaxed than in the previous era. Ministers of Commerce and Industries, Bhutto and Ghulam Faruque respectively, were highly active in initiating new trends for the promotion of exports.

The cabinet used to issue a list of favoured industries for investment; investors needed the approval of the Economic Coordination Committee of the cabinet to invest in industries other than those on the list. Trade was also controlled by the cabinet or cabinet‑oriented institutions such as the Economic Committee of the cabinet. The cabinet provided export incentives through direct and indirect subsidies. The import policy of the military regime’s cabinet was more relaxed than in the previous era.

Gen Ayub’s cabinet also introduced considerable changes vis-a-vis the agriculture sector. Although the cabinets consisted mostly of urban professionals and bureaucrats, Gen Ayub’s rural background and understanding of the food problem in Pakistan led his cabinets to design pro-agriculture policies. The cabinet established institutions such as the Agricultural Policy Committees and the Agricultural Development Corporations to look after agricultural products. The export of agriculture-oriented goods was encouraged. The Green Revolution, which increased agricultural productivity, was a great initiative introduced by the cabinet. The perception that Gen Ayub was the sole decision-making authority in terms of the economy is unfounded. The present study has found that he listened to his ministers and advisors. Had he not listened to the expert advice of ministers like Bhutto, Mohammad Shoaib, and others in the cabinet, such outstanding economic progress would not have been achieved by his regime. It was actually the result of teamwork, whereas the role and decision-making powers of Gen Yahya’s civilian cabinet was insignificant rather non-existent, and no prominent economic activity was initiated. His civilian cabinet was powerless and had little or no share in the decision-making process.

Two opposite views exist regarding the cabinet’s decision-making authority during the Bhutto era. One opinion is that Bhutto took many important economic decisions on his own and sought only formal approval from his cabinet; the second says that his cabinet decided issues relating to the economy. This study has provided evidence that the cabinet and the prime minister worked in harmony when important economic issues were decided. Neither did the prime minister try to impose decisions on the cabinet, nor did the ministers enjoy total freedom to decide issues. Ministers having a socialist ideology, like Mubashir Hassan, J.A. Rahim, Sheikh Mohammad Rashid, Khursheed Hasan Meer, and others, were able to convince Bhutto on certain matters. But this practice was only followed until 1974, i.e. the exit of leftist ministers from his cabinet. Later, Bhutto seemed to be guiding his cabinet most of the time. The rightist elements dominated the cabinet in later years. They were Rana Mohammad Hanif, Rafi Raza, Yusuf Khattak, and Feroze Qaisar. As the rightist and landlord ministers were mostly in favour of maintaining the status quo, little or no changes were introduced in the economic field in the post-1974 era. Overall the cabinet’s control over the economy was stronger during this period than during previous regimes. Economic institutions including the Economic Coordination Committee of the Cabinet, the National Economic Council, the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council, and the Council of Common Interests consisted mostly of the members of the cabinet: ministers were actively involved in policymaking at all levels.

The federal cabinets, during almost all regimes, kept an eye on political matters or issues relating to the provinces. This study has provided sufficient evidence to negate some existing perceptions about the decision-making process regarding provincial political matters.

The above excerpt is taken from the chapter ‘Conclusion’.

Excerpted with permission from
The Federal Cabinet of Pakistan
By Naumana Kiran Imran
Oxford University Press
ISBN: 978-0199403370
436pp.

Published in Dawn, Books & Authors, August 14th, 2016