THE militant Islamic State group, that calls itself the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), is an ultra-ideological group. It is a well-structured non-state actor of its times. At the same time, it is a well-studied group that continues to attract the attention of academics and researchers. Several security experts, social and political scientists, and religious scholars have tried to deconstruct the violent outfit from a variety of perspectives. Hundreds of research studies have been conducted and books published on the group. Many of these publications are repetitive accounts, probably produced to fulfil the market demand, and hence contribute little to developing a deeper, systematic understanding of the group.

Fawaz A. Gerges’s ISIS: A History is a comparatively different account of study. It examines the rise of the militant group in the contemporary sociocultural, political, and ideological contexts that have contributed in shaping the violent movement. Peter Bergen, a United States-based counterterrorism expert, has rightly pointed out that “in the flood of recent publications about ISIS, Gerges provides a welcome island of thoroughly researched analysis”. Gerges, a professor of international relations and Chair of contemporary Middle East studies at the London School of Economics and Political Science, depicts the militant group as a new wave in ‘jihadism’ and believes that Arab countries are, in part, responsible for its growth. He argues that chaos in Iraq and Syria provided the militant group with fertile ground to consolidate itself. Secondly, the failure of the Arab states to represent the interests of their citizens and to construct an inclusive national identity, strong enough to generate social cohesion, also contributed to its growth. At the same time, it was a major military and security failure of the US and its allies who raised and trained the Iraqi security forces and invested around $25 billion. The US leadership and its trained forces eventually failed to cope with the group’s military surge.

In fact, the US and Western security institutions failed to gauge the level of the threat posed by the group. Even the US president, Barack Obama, had earlier dismissed that the organisation represented a serious threat to America’s regional allies or interests. As the international community witnessed the rise of the militant group, by the end of 2014 it had captured approximately a third of Syrian and Iraqi territories and had edged closer to the Iraqi-Jordanian-Saudi Arabian frontiers, with significant networks of supporters in both Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

Tracking the rise of the militant group that holds parts of the Middle East hostage

However, the book mainly focuses on four key factors in the group’s rise, as Gerges himself describes: “The first is that ISIS can be seen as an extension of AQI [Al Qaeda in Iraq], which was itself a creature of the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq and its aftermath. Second, the fragmentation of the post-Saddam Hussein political establishment and its incapacity to articulate policies that emphasised the country’s national identity further nourished inter-communal distrust, thus deepening and widening the Sunni-Shia divide. Thirdly, the breakdown of state institutions in Syria and the country’s descent into a full-blown war is a significant factor in the revitalisation of ISIS. Finally, ISIS could not have consolidated the gains it made with the Syrian war without the derailment of the Arab Spring uprisings and the consequent spreading fires in neighbouring Arab countries.”

Apart from highlighting these structural factors behind the rise of the militant group, Gerges emphasises that its worldview and ideology must also be taken seriously. He dedicates one full chapter to explaining the group’s worldview and how the Salafi-jihadist ideology is a source of strength for it. He asserts that “ISIS is first and foremost an extension of the global Salafi-jihadist movement”. But the group has added certain elements in this movement. For example, its widespread use of suicide bombers constitutes a recent modus operandi rather than a return to the roots. Gerges argues that in the group’s worldview, the caliphate is not just a political entity, but also a collective religious obligation, a means to salvation.

Gerges traces the ideological roots of the group in the thoughts of Abu Bakr Naji and Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi. Al-Maqdisi was a prominent Salafi-jihadist scholar. Very little is known about Naji’s credentials, but his book, The Management of Savagery, is considered the operational manual of the militant group. Gerges notes that in his book, “Naji offers an expansive plan with three stages in which violence would be escalated qualitatively and strategically rather than in an ad hoc and random way. He also emphasises the significance of the media and propaganda as an ideological tool to mobilise and recruit the Muslim masses”.

Gerges argues that chaos in Iraq and Syria provided the militant group with fertile ground to consolidate itself. Secondly, the failure of the Arab states to represent the interests of their citizens and to construct an inclusive national identity, strong enough to generate social cohesion, also contributed to its growth.

Gerges also mentions two books by Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir and Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (also known as Dr Fadl) which contributed in shaping the group’s ideological contours. The books — Introduction to the Jurisprudence of Jihad by al-Muhajir and The Essentials of Making Ready [for Jihad] by Dr Fadl — have become central texts in the group’s ‘jihadi’ training.

It may interest readers that Dr Fadl was a close associate of Ayman al-Zawahiri, but both had parted ways after the Sept 11, 2001 attacks, engaging in a public feud over ideology and the future direction of the global ‘jihadist’ movement. Gerges writes that “while serving a life sentence in an Egyptian prison, Dr Fadl subsequently disowned his ideas and called for the demilitarisation and deradicalisation of the Salafi-jihadist camp”.

In Gerges’s view, al-Muhajir’s work is more critical as he opposes the consensus among jurisprudents developed over the centuries and asserts that “killing kuffar [infidels] and fighting them in their homeland is a necessity even if they do not harm Muslims”. Al-Muhajir does not distinguish between ‘civilians’ and ‘combatants’ among non-Muslims because he bluntly confesses that the main reason for “killing them and confiscating their property” is the fact that “they are not Muslims”. The militant group’s ideological foundation and its arguments “offer alienated Muslim youths a utopian worldview and a political project: restructuring the lost caliphate, and their point of departure is that the Islamic State can only be nourished by ‘blood’ and erected on ‘skeletons and human remains’”.

Though the group has suffered a military setback in recent months, Gerges sees no major shift in its operational strategies that it would start targeting far-away enemies in the near future as it has limited networks of followers and stay-at-home groupies in Europe and North America. He predicts that Riyadh, Baghdad, and Damascus will be the group’s immediate strategic targets, not Rome, Paris, London, and Washington. He agrees with the popular argument that the strategic use of sectarian violence greatly benefited the group and shaped its activities and he adds that this is not only confined to the group — most Salafis-jihadists are nourished on an anti-Shia, anti-Iranian propaganda diet.

Another aspect, where Gerges has come up with a new dimension on the subject, is that the militant group is an outcome of the derailment of the Arab Spring uprisings. He believes it has sabotaged the aspirations of millions of citizens who wanted a revision of social contracts and civil rights. He also highlights the role of monarchists in the Middle East, especially the Saudi kingdom, in sabotaging civil liberty movements in the region. A quote from his book will help understand his perspective on the issue: “As the Arab uprisings gathered steam, Saudi Arabia spent more than $100 billion at home in an effort to keep domestic peace and buy the loyalty of its citizens. The Saudi kingdom also invested billions of dollars in Bahrain, Egypt, Oman, Yemen, Morocco, and Jordan to prevent revolutionary change and keep its conservative Arab allies in control.”

It was not only the Saudis who were afraid of the Arab Spring uprisings; Iran also saw an opportunity to increase its influence in the region while pouring gasoline on a raging sectarian fire in Iraq, Syria, and beyond. Gerges observes that the anti-Shia, anti-Iranian factor provided the legitimacy to the “ISIS sectarian stance and it reacted in a harsh way and ISIS has successfully developed a narrative rooted in a pan-Sunni identity that is intrinsically opposed to what it portrays as an aggressive and expansionist Shia ideology that has infiltrated and is engulfing the Islamic world”. He concludes that the Arab Spring was sabotaged by a multitude of actors and all of these actors had a common interest in blocking peaceful political change.

The last part of the book discusses ideas on how the brutal ideological movement can be defeated and delegitimised. Gerges thinks a lot depends on the ability of Arab societies, together with the regional and great powers, to politically resolve spiralling communal conflicts and to support state-building structures along transparent and legitimate lines. He also suggests ideological responses to the movement, as they are as critical as the military responses.

Overall, the book is a comprehensive read about the growth of the group and the factors which contributed to its construction, and also forecasts the future of the movement. This can be marked as a handbook on the militant Islamic State group.

The reviewer is a security analyst and director of the Pak Institute for Peace Studies, Islamabad.

ISIS: A History
(TERRORISM)
By Fawaz A. Gerges
Princeton University Press, US
ISBN: 978-0691170008
384pp.

Published in Dawn, Books & Authors, January 8th, 2017