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THE progress on Operation Raddul Fasaad is being reported as satisfactory. Press briefings by law-enforcement agencies create the impression that terrorists are on the run and security forces are killing dozens and arresting hundreds of terror suspects on a daily basis. Counted together since the launch of the operation, the number of these reported arrests would be in the thousands.
These claims may create a counterterrorism hype but they will certainly not resolve the problem. Many experts even doubt these claims, thus questioning the government’s purported achievements. Last week, an op-ed piece on these pages rightly called for ‘conclusive evidence’ about these arrests. We do not even know who these detained suspects are and where they have been kept. Do our lock-ups and prisons have the capacity to accommodate hundreds and thousands of detainees?
At the same time, reports about citizens being subjected to police misconduct during these search operations keep surfacing. The government and security institutions deny they are carrying out ethnic or sectarian profiling but the situation on the ground belies that claim. The majority of the operations target slums and suburbs of major urban centres, which are mostly home to the poor. Many of them hail from the tribal areas, mainly Bajaur and Mohmand agencies, from where they were either displaced by conflict or migrated in search of better prospects. However, the poor belonging to other ethnic groups are also facing similar hardships. Although there is no concrete evidence to suggest that terrorists hide only in slums, law-enforcement agencies always view low-income localities with suspicion.
Terrorists consider the police as protectors of the power elites.
Unfortunately, the state only bestirs itself when it has its back against the wall. Not only have state institutions constructed their responses under certain pressure they have also learnt the art of passing on the pressure to one another. During emergency security situations, the police face the ultimate pressure and come down hard on the poor and powerless. Carrying out operations in slums is easy because law-enforcement agencies barely encounter any resistance. Nor does anyone from outside come to the residents’ rescue despite the fact that excesses by law-enforcement personnel are frequently reported.
It is well known that during high security alerts, motorcyclists suffer the most. And during search operations, tenants of small houses have to bear the brunt both in physiological and financial terms. Consider Transparency International’s recent report, which stated that around 70 per cent of Pakistanis have to pay bribes when they come into contact with police or courts. The conduct of the police and its corrupt practices are making the counterterrorism challenge more complex.
No doubt police have also sacrificed a great deal in the war against terrorism. According to a database managed by a security think tank in Islamabad, 2,426 police personnel have been killed and 3,916 sustained serious injuries in terrorist attacks across the country since 2005. The number of fatalities among the police is surpassed only by the civilians who have lost 22,716 people during this time. The attacks on police include high-intensity assaults on police training centres in Quetta and Lahore as well as the targeted killing of personnel by sectarian and other terrorist outfits.
The sacrifices made by police in the war against terrorism notwithstanding, has anyone bothered to properly investigate the reasons why terrorists target the law enforcers? Based on their experiences and perceptions, but without any concrete evidence, the government and police officials offer plenty of theories. These range from sectarian motives to capacity issues of the police force but one popular argument is that the police are a symbol of the state’s writ and always remain at the forefront in the war against terrorism.
It is no secret that many terrorists who previously belonged to banned organisations fighting in India-held Kashmir and Afghanistan or were involved in sectarian violence in the country, turned against the state after 9/11 as a reaction to the police and security institutions’ crackdown against them. They were arrested, tortured and forced to become informants. Even the new breed of terrorists, who were not linked with such banned groups, express anger towards the security institutions, mainly police. This is quite evident in reports and interviews published in militant organisations’ publications. Most dangerously, terrorists also justify their actions from the class perspective, considering the police as protectors of the power elites.
To tackle this challenge, the state has to institute proper and citizen-friendly policing in the country. The police and other law-enforcement agencies have failed to develop their counterterrorism skills and are stuck in conventional operational modes. The state has not taken the challenge of capacity building of the police seriously; its threat perception is still vague and suffers from an ‘externalisation syndrome’. Experts and police top brass have been continuously demanding serious police reforms and their views have been reflected in these pages. It seems that police reforms are the lowest priority for the federal and provincial governments. Their attitude illustrates the terrorists’ argument that the police are subservient to the power elites.
It is unfortunate that the law-enforcement agencies have even failed to prepare an authentic, updated list of terrorist suspects and their supporters under the Fourth Schedule of the Anti Terrorism Act. The failure also contradicts the perception that the police have eyes and ears everywhere. After all, they have failed to maintain surveillance even on those suspects they themselves have identified. In fact, it exposes the weakening grip of not only the police but also that of the other security departments who are responsible for maintaining the Fourth Schedule. This includes the provincial counterterrorism departments and the National Counter Terrorism Authority. They are supposed to process and maintain a database of suspects on the Fourth Schedule, but there remains a big question mark over their contributions.
Instead of reforming the police, policing powers are being given to the paramilitary forces, which further aggravates the problem. The paramilitary forces can do nothing without actionable intelligence. It appears that the poor and powerless citizens of the country will continue to be the victims of state confusion and inaction. The worst thing is, they do not even know how and to whom they should complain.
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, March 12th, 2017
