In the mid-1990s, I attended a seminar on ‘Anthropology and Politics’ at a hotel in Karachi. One of the speakers was a professor of anthropology from Germany, but unfortunately I have completely forgotten his name. Recently an off-the-cuff anecdote shared by a colleague reminded me of the anthropologist — rather about something he had said about anarchy. The anecdote that my colleague shared was about his father. He said that back in 1971, just days after the country lost its eastern wing (East Pakistan), someone stole the back tyre of his father’s motorbike. His father visited a nearby police station to report the incident but found the station extremely quiet. He said the cops were just loitering around, doing nothing. What’s more, the SHO refused to register a complaint against the tyre theft.

The SHO told his father that even if he did pen his complaint, it will remain on his table because “there is no government left.” My colleague was told by his father that everything seemed to have ground to a halt. Yet, there were no riots or looting. This little piece of information reminded me of the German anthropologist’s lecture during which he had explained that when a state collapses, and it seems there is no government left, a country does not immediately fall into anarchy. He added that it may actually take months for a collapsing country to slide into total social, economic and political chaos.

According to the anthropologist, this occurs because even though governance and the state itself have collapsed, the perception (in people’s minds) of their being strong institutions and in control remains ingrained for months. It is when this perception begins to erode that the country plunges into anarchy. The anthropologist had given examples of Bosnia and Somalia, saying that in these countries the state and government’s writ had begun to corrode and evaporate months before these realms eventually plunged into complete anarchy.

When there seems to be no government left, a country does not immediately fall into anarchy

I had initially not thought much about what my colleague had related to me. But after recalling the German professor’s lecture, I did wonder, what the SHO had meant when he told my colleague’s father, “There is no government left.” When did that happen in Pakistan?

I could not pinpoint such a claim anywhere when I looked through old newspapers from December 1971 or in books written about the immediate aftermath of the East Pakistan debacle. But only last week, while going through Hamid Khan’s excellent book Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, I was taken aback when (in a chapter on the East Pakistan civil war) he writes that between December 18 and 20, 1971, “The country was virtually without a government.” Had this situation triggered riots and violence, I am sure it would have been more robustly documented, but the country had remained calm. This can also be explained by the German professor’s theory and observation that even when a government or state collapses (thus creating a huge political and social void) society does not immediately fall into this void. The mind takes some time to register the collapse because it is initially conditioned to believe that there is always someone on top in control.

But what exactly happened between December 18 and 20, 1971? Hamid Khan writes that by mid-December, Pakistan had clearly lost its eastern wing. The state had been defeated. Gen Yahya Khan, who was the military chief and president during the martial law regime at the time, was expected to step down. He didn’t.

Both Hamid Khan and also one of the founding members of the PPP, Dr Mubashir Hasan in his book The Mirage of Power, suggest that though Yahya Khan refused to resign, he was completely cornered and rendered powerless by a group of angry officers. Hamid Khan writes that Yahya Khan “was more or less a prisoner” (of these officers). Dr Mubashir writes that on December 17, 1971 two senior military officers, Gul Hasan and Rahim Khan, visited Yahya Khan and told him that the officers and soldiers wanted him to step down. Yahya Khan refused.

According to Hamid Khan, when Gul Hasan and Rahim Khan insisted that Yayha Khan resign, he finally agreed but on the condition that he would remain the army chief. The officers refused the deal. Yahya Khan then asked Gul Hasan to take over as president and Rahim Khan to become the military chief. Dr Mubashir writes that Yahya Khan made this suggestion because he knew Gul Hasan was part of a faction within the military that wanted PPP’s chairman Z.A. Bhutto to come into power — his party had won the majority of seats in West Pakistan in the 1970 election. Bhutto at the time was in Rome.

The state had been defeated. Gen Yahya Khan, who was the military chief and president during the martial law regime at the time, was expected to step down. He didn’t.

Hamid Khan writes that when Gul Hasan and Rahim Khan went to meet Yahya Khan, he was preparing to deliver a speech on radio and TV. Gul Hasan stopped him. On December 18, Yahya Khan was still president and army chief but with no powers whatsoever. Dr Mubashir and Hamid Khan narrate that on December 19, 1971 other senior military men suffered the same fate when, in a meeting, officers ”used harsh language” against their superiors. Indeed, when on December 20 Bhutto arrived from Rome and Gul Hasan and Rahim Khan quickly drove him to the President House, there was no government in Pakistan. Dr Mubashir writes that “Bhutto was nervous.” He wasn’t sure who was in charge. No one was.

On that very day, Gul Hasan and Rahim Khan made Yahya Khan hand over power to Bhutto. The SHO’s statement suggests that those working in state and government institutions were aware that the government had evaporated. But the people were not. If one is to apply the German professor’s theory, then it is possible that had the impasse between Yahya Khan and the officers continued a bit longer, panic would have set in, followed by anarchy.

When Bhutto took over as president and chief martial law administrator, Gul Hasan became the new military chief. Owen L. Sirrs in Pakistan’s ISI Directorate: Covert Action & Internal Operations writes that Gul Hasan greatly decreased the role of the ISI. In response, the ISI began to directly report to President Bhutto. In March 1972, Bhutto quietly dismissed Gul Hasan, replacing him with Gen Tikka Khan. According to Dr Mubashir, Bhutto suspected Gul Hasan of indulging in ‘Bonapartism’. Nevertheless, after December 20, 1971 my colleague’s father managed to finally get a complaint lodged against the tyre thief.

Published in Dawn, EOS, October 29th, 2017