Nobel Prize winner Gunnar Myrdal stated in his book Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations that “there are many Indians who still doubt that Pakistan can hold together and who believe in particular that East Pakistan will break away from West Pakistan.” It did break away on Dec 16, 1971 — not because there was any structural defect in the two-nation theory, but because of our own failings to implement it.

Almia-i-Mashriqi Pakistan’s English version, The Separation of East Pakistan: The Rise and Realisation of Bengali Muslim Nationalism, by Zaheer Hasan was published in 1994 by Oxford University Press. It is an analytical study of the events between 1947 and 1971 that led to the separation of East Pakistan. The events covered are based on referenced books, documents, official publications and — more importantly — the author’s own diary containing records of high level meetings that he attended as a civil servant between 1954 and 1971. The book, as such, provides an insight into the causes of East Pakistan’s separation and has remained a source of information for commentaries, articles, editorials and research papers written in subsequent years on the subject.

Much has been written about Zaheer’s book and its contents during last 23 years. However, there is still some room for comment on his conclusions about the causes of the country’s breakup. The author singularly attributes it to Bengali Muslim nationalism without substantiating the thesis with solid arguments. The only argument given in the book is about the election results of 1937 when Indian Muslims stood factionalised into various groups following Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s self-imposed exile to London during 1930-1935. Zaheer would not have come to this conclusion had he juxtaposed it with a wider perspective of historical facts around the founding of the All India Muslim League in 1906 by Bengali leadership in Dacca [Dhaka], with the stated objectives “to protect and advance the political rights and interests of the Musalmans of India”, with East Bengal’s most fervent and solid support — more than that of any of the territories later included in West Pakistan — to the Muslim League before Partition, with the moving of the Lahore Resolution in 1940 by Bengali leader A.K. Fazlul Huq, and the solemn resolution moved by Bengali leader Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy that “the safety, security, salvation and destiny of the Muslim nation inhabiting the subcontinent of India lies only in the achievement of Pakistan.” This was at a gathering in Delhi in 1946 of all elected members of the central and provincial legislatures. The resolution was unanimously adopted. These facts hardly indicate that East Bengal followed a stand-alone policy woven around Bengali nationalism.

Could history be repeating itself?

Zaheer was posted as sub-divisional officer and deputy commissioner between 1956 and 1962 and later from May 1971, as a coordinator with the status of a provincial secretary for administrating relief, rehabilitation, foreign assistance and other matters related to the crisis arising from the army action of March 25, 1969. In Almia-i-Mashriqi Pakistan’s preface, he observes that there was a sense of oneness and complete bonhomie between him — a West Pakistani — and the Bengalis. He muses: “10 years later in May 1971, when I was again posted to East Pakistan, I came to a different world in Dhaka. This time I was part of what the Bengalis regarded as the West Pakistani occupation forces. I was not regarded as one of them or for them.”

Surely, there must be some cogent reasons that built up over time to turn the comradeship between the two brother nations into hostility. As far back as 1950, the first Basic Principles Committee report — which envisaged the allocation of seats in the House of People on the basis of population — was opposed tooth and nail by Mian Mumtaz Daultana, then chief minister of Punjab. He demanded that seats be allocated according to the Muslim population of each province in view of a large proportion — 25 percent — of Hindus in Bangladesh.

The underlying fear was that Bengal, enjoying a majority in the House, may continue to rule a united Pakistan. This was not acceptable to the leadership of the Punjab. Lawrence Ziring in his book Pakistan at the Crosscurrent of History reports that “the Punjabi chief minister, Mian Mumtaz Daultana, chided Liaquat [Ali Khan] on the representation issue and insisted that he would not approve a report that reduced the level of Punjabi expression. He demanded that the prime minister personally travel to the Punjab to sell the Basic Principles Report to his people.” Liaquat Ali Khan went to Rawalpindi to address the crowd on the subject and was assassinated on Oct 16, 1951.

The constitutional deadlock could not be broken until 1956 when the democratic principle of one-man, one-vote was compromised by the Bengali leadership under stewardship of the then Bengali prime minister, Suhrawardy, by accepting the principle of parity between the two wings. The gesture made by Bengal aimed to preserve the unity of the country. However, there was a fear among the West Pakistani leadership that if elections were held under the 1956 Constitution, the chances of West Pakistan continuing to govern the country and maintain the status quo were remote. It was in this background that martial law was imposed on Oct 7, 1958, by then president Iskandar Mirza, who was removed by Gen Ayub Khan on Oct 27, 1958.

Under his own-enacted Constitution of 1962 that stipulated transfer of power to the Speaker of the National Assembly in case of relinquishment of office of the president, Gen Ayub transferred power on March 25, 1969 to Gen Yahya Khan, commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Army, instead of the Bengali speaker Abdul Jabbar Khan.

Gen Yahya abrogated the 1962 Constitution and issued a legal framework order that annulled the one-unit in West Pakistan, restored the four provinces and replaced the parity principle with the one-man, one-vote formula, giving Bengal an edge in representation in the Constituent Assembly/federal legislature.

In the general elections of December 1970, the Awami League contested on the Six-Point Formula and won 52 percent of seats. While negotiations were underway, West Pakistani leadership, in consort with some army generals, tried to sabotage the Constituent Assembly’s convening of the session. This convinced the Awami League that, as in the past, the western wing would never transfer power to them to rule over a united Pakistan. Accordingly, their insistence on the Six Points became tougher during negotiations between Gen Yahya and Mujibur Rehman, leading to army action on March 26, 1971. What followed next is exhaustively described by Zaheer in his book, and includes the active role of India in ensuring the separation of East Pakistan and realisation of its objective of breaking Pakistan.

Zaheer dwells at length on the tactics employed by India and its allies in the eastern wing to ensure the break-up, and reminds us that similar tactics were employed by India and its allies in West Pakistan in the preceding 10 years to destabilise the country. The tactics included hard and soft measures. Hard measures were the continuous use of fire from light and heavy equipment from across the border and deployment of guerrilla forces of extremist elements that were reared, raised, trained, armed and financed by India and its allies. These groups massacred more than 70,000 citizens in East Pakistan, including members of law enforcements agencies, destroyed civilian and military institutions such as schools, bridges, railway tracks, gas and telephone networks and airports and brought almost 50 percent of East Pakistan’s population below the poverty line.

Soft measures involved building public opinion in favour of India and its allies’ agenda in the region. For the purpose, non-governmental organisations were financed to mould public opinion at the grassroots level, campaigns in print and electronic media were launched and books questioning the partition of the subcontinent on the basis of the two-nation theory were published.

The conclusion made by the author is that the break-up of Pakistan was largely because of discontent with the discriminatory political and economic policies pursued by the West Pakistani leadership with the sole aim of retaining power with West Pakistan at any cost. This created a cleavage between the two wings and weakened the unity of the state. The disunity within was fully exploited by India who had never reconciled with the creation of Pakistan. India lent political, financial and diplomatic support to indigenous armed groups and in the end invaded the eastern wing with full military might to ensure the emergence of a separate and independent state of Bangladesh as power struggles within the Establishment of Pakistan continued. The situation in Pakistan today is no different, as several entities contest to grab power. This has encouraged India to apply the same strategy as it did in the past, with the intent to bring Pakistan under its hegemony in South East Asia.

The reviewer is a retired senior government official and author of Pakistan Under Siege

Almia-i-Mashriqi Pakistan
By Hasan Zaheer
Royal Book Company, Karachi
ISBN: 978-9694074528
300pp.

Published in Dawn, Books & Authors, December 17th, 2017