FOLLOWING a six-day marathon session of talks between the Afghan Taliban and Zalmay Khalilzad in Doha, the US special representative announced that ‘progress had been made’. This progress, says The Economist, had “all four main elements of the deal — the exclusion of international terrorists, an American withdrawal, a ceasefire and talks between the Taliban and the government — as an indivisible package”.

Mr Khalilzad said, “Nothing is agreed until ­everything is agreed”, and “‘everything’ must include an intra-Afghan dialogue and comprehensive ceasefire”.

Many ‘learned’ comments and ‘disclosures’ by American, Afghan, Pakistani, Iranian, Russian and Indian analysts have followed. These confirmed some things such as Iran’s contacts with the Taliban; Kabul’s rejection of a Rand report proposal for an interim government; concern that a precipitate US withdrawal would resemble the one from Vietnam; doubts about Pakistan’s commitment to bringing the Taliban to the table given its apprehensions about Indian influence in Afghanistan; and the view that Pakistan would not want a Taliban-dominated government.

In many commentaries, there is an underlying understanding that failure of reconciliation will unhinge the region with the greatest impact on Pakistan. Despite fencing, Pakistan will be the recipient of economic and political refugees and chaos in regions bordering Afghanistan’s eastern and southern provinces.

If there is no Afghan reconciliation, the greatest impact will be felt by Pakistan.

The most important developments, then, are what President Trump and Secretary Pompeo have said about US intent. In a recent interview to CBS, Trump said he planned to keep a small contingent in Afghanistan for ‘real intelligence’ purposes and that US forces would return to the country if necessary. On Feb 5, President Ghani said that in a phone conversation, “Secretary Pompeo stressed that there is no uncertainty and ambiguity about the US commitment to Afghanistan and our enduring partnership”, and that “our military partnership is unwavering and will remain until a lasting and inclusive peace is achieved”. (The State Department readout on the call spoke of “the importance of an intra-Afghan dialogue and the role of a ceasefire in ending the violence and creating the conditions for the Afghan government, other Afghan leaders and the Taliban to sit together and negotiate a political settlement”. This suggests a broader negotiating team than the one President Ghani put together.)

Ghani, in a letter to Trump, said he could offer to reduce by $2 billion the amount needed to support the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces but also made it clear, implicitly if not explicitly, that assistance was needed to continue for an extended period.

The US intelligence community in congressional hearings expressed scepticism about a peace deal being reached but said that if it did happen the recommendation is “to maintain pressure”, and that “a very robust monitoring regime would be needed” — in effect, calling for a US counterterrorism presence and implicit continuance of financial assistance to ensure the peace deal’s implementation. (Trump in his State of the Union address affirmed he supports the negotiations and will insist on a CT presence.)

The meeting in Moscow with the Taliban was ongoing as I wrote this. It brought together Northern Alliance leaders Atta Mohammad Noor, Yunus Qanuni, Mohaqiq and a smattering of Pakhtuns, notably former president Karzai, Hanif Atmar and Syed Hamid Gilani to talk to a Taliban delegation led by Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanakzai, and not Ghani Baradar the designated negotiator.

The ostensible purpose is to pave the way for Taliban talks with the Afghan government. This is the brainchild of Zamir Kabulov, the Russian representative for Afghanistan and perhaps the most knowledgeable foreign observer of internal Afghan dynamics. Russia, after Pakistan, is most affected by instability in Afghanistan. It is the market for at least 15 per cent of Afghan opium and is rightly apprehensive that components of the TTP, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Chechen contingent and even the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement pose a threat to the Central Asian Republics that Russia regards as its ‘near abroad’. Its desire for active involvement is understandable.

Currently, however, this meeting only serves to underline the resurrection of the Northern Alliance and sends out the signal that Afghanistan will return to the position of having the Taliban control much of the territory but face a Northern Alliance in the north which subsists with the same supporters it had in 1996.

A sustainable peace in Afghanistan is dependent on the following economic factors:

Afghanistan’s exports are about $1.1 billion while its imports exceed $8bn. These imports ­provide much of its tax revenue and generate employment. Its imports from the UAE, for the most part, are of items smuggled into Pakistan; these will have to dry up as part of the implementation of Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity.

It must continue to receive assistance beyond 2024, perhaps up to 2030, before exploitation of its strategic location to provide connectivity between South and Central Asia; the exploitation of its mineral resources can give it some economic stability.

Last year, over 800,000 Afghans were expelled from Iran while some 30,000 returned from Pakistan. This year, more will return from Iran. Supporting these returning refugees places another burden on the Afghan government’s finances.

Opium production dropped from 9,000 tons last year to 6,400 tons this year and the farm-gate has come down to $94 per kilogram — a welcome development but a contributor to rural unemployment and economic hardship for farmers, again creating new demands for financial assistance.

No regional country or group of regional countries comes close to providing such assistance. This financial support can come only from the US. Some argue that Europe too must join in to provide such support, or else there will be another mass exodus of Afghans seeking asylum in Europe and ­exacerbating the migration problem. If aid ­continues at present or reduced levels, Ghani has proposed it will constitute, along with the ­envisaged CT presence, less than 6pc to 7pc of the $716bn US defence budget, a small price to pay for sustained Afghan peace.

The writer is a former foreign secretary.

Published in Dawn, February 7th, 2019