The allure of history lies in its propensity to come full circle, diluting the divide between the past and the present. This phenomenon contextualises what Edward Hallett Carr, in his essay ‘The Historian and His Facts’ said, when he postulated a debatable notion that “the historian belongs not to the past but to the present.” What is beyond question is the thematic nature of history.

As of this writing, the two Asian titans, China and India, are at loggerheads in Ladakh. The current stand-off on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) has resulted in the deaths of at least 20 Indian troops and possible casualties on the Chinese side, too. A 1962-like flare-up is being hypothesised. According to India and the United States, China’s military coercion along the LAC and elsewhere is a fitting manifestation of its expansionism. This is pretty much similar to what the 1962 war made many believe about China.

According to Neville Maxwell, author of India’s China War, there was a general agreement that China was a “bellicose, chauvinist and expansionist power.” Almost six decades down the line, New Delhi and Washington agree on the threats from Beijing and the need for thwarting those. The US-Sino rivalry is intensifying, with many talking about a new Cold War between the two. Given that the US wants to solidify its bonhomie with India as part of its Indo-Pacific strategy aimed at countering China, the general perception is that their alignment is inevitable. By extension, many watchers believe that the Indo-US alliance will be seamless and pose a grave challenge to China’s meteoric rise. This euphoria stems from the belief that the China factor is the new fillip to US-Indo relations.

Dr Tanvi Madan, a Washington-based Indian historian and foreign policy expert, provides a nuanced perspective on what to expect from US-Indo relations — one that avoids the trappings of overweening confidence and sheer despondency. In her latest book, Fateful Triangle: How China Shaped US-India Relations During the Cold War, Dr Madan traces the genesis of US-Indo relations during the Cold War and the role China played in shaping them. In her research-laden study of a 30-year period from 1949 to 1979, Dr Madan tells, to borrow Lt Gen B.M. Kaul’s book title, an untold story.

Dr Madan’s dexterous use of archives enables her to trace the impact of China’s centrality to US-Indo relations. Contrary to popular views, Dr Madan argues that the vitality of the China effect is not a recent phenomenon, but as old as US-Indo relations. However, bringing in a plethora of evidence, the author convincingly contends that the China phenomenon did not have a linear impact on these relations. The crux of her argument is that merely agreeing on the ends in regard to China is not sufficient to undergird a robust US-Indo partnership. She writes: “This book argues that a US-India partnership to tackle China is neither inevitable nor impossible.”

A new book provides a historical perspective on what to expect from US-Indo relations vis-a-vis a rising China

Divided into four parts, Fateful Triangle engages with this inevitability-impossibility matrix, by delving into four distinct phases in the relationship during the three decades it deals with. In part one, which corresponds with the period termed “Divergence”, Dr Madan compellingly argues why disagreements on the means and ways to deal with China outweighed the concurrence on the ends. Perhaps, then Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s conspicuous prudence in dealing with China — while creating a gulf between the two countries in how to handle China — gave the impression that India’s end state vis-à-vis China was also somewhat dissimilar to what the US had envisaged.

Dr Madan notes America’s exasperation in these words: “Nehru’s visit, with public hints that Delhi was close to recognising the communist regime in China, made clear to the American public what had been apparent to some observers within the administration: the US might have assigned India a role in its strategic script, but India was not willing to play that role in the way the US wanted.”

That the ends-ways-means triangle today is certainly not like what it was during 1949-56, is a good sign for US-Indo relations. However, as the book accentuates, the heydays of US-Indo ties cannot be witnessed absent the fulfilment of certain conditions. The high point in ties was reached not only when both countries aligned their policy triangle on China, but also when they played down their differences by adopting a ‘let it go’ approach. Washington’s tilt towards development instead of defence, and its focus on looking at India as a counter-attraction rather than a counterweight to China, typified the best epoch of the relationship.

The increase in military cooperation between the two notwithstanding, whether this equation can be replicated today remains to be seen. However, if the US’s vacillations and the America First refrain are anything to go by, one might not witness such a cooperation, especially so long as Donald Trump is at the helm. Also, it is rather difficult to confidently predict that both will de-emphasise their points of friction.

Dr Madan meticulously garners evidence to carry out a SWOT analysis of the US-Indo association during the three decades in question. The relationship drew its strength from the interaction between “India is too big to fail” and “US cannot be jettisoned” arguments. These two phenomena will continue to be the bedrock of this relationship. Also, at least in the decades to come, neither will Washington and New Delhi see Beijing through different lenses as they did from 1969 to 1972, nor will Beijing’s importance for both countries recede precipitously as it did from 1973 to 1979. Indeed, this augurs well for what is tipped to be a burgeoning relationship.

That said, factors that marred ties during the Cold War are very much in the fray today. Relations were stifled because of India’s bid to diversify its foreign policy options, as it believed that the greater the degree of strategic autonomy it retains, the lesser would it be tethered to one power. Thus, India’s growing closeness to the then Soviet Union was a stumbling block. Today, India’s relations with Russia and Iran could impede efforts to strengthen US-Indo relations in a manner that could effectively challenge the elephant in the room.

Pakistan also has a role to play in Fateful Triangle. Dr Madan adroitly sheds light on how the gap between how Washington and New Delhi perceived Islamabad caused estrangement. For Washington, Islamabad was part of the solution to the China challenge; New Delhi saw it as a problem. Dr Madan talks about how the US prodding India to negotiate with Pakistan irked New Delhi. She writes: “In parliament, Nehru expressed his disappointment with the US and UK, noting that on Kashmir and Goa the two countries would ‘almost invariably be against us’.” While analysing the famous Nixonian tilt towards Pakistan, Dr Madan assesses the US’s willingness to reward Pakistan for its help in establishing links with China. She contends that the name of the USS Enterprise still ruffles feathers in India. Almost five decades later, India vehemently objected to President Trump’s offer of mediation on Kashmir in his meeting with Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan. This overture was ostensibly made as part of the reward for Pakistan for facilitating the US’s peace negotiations with the Taliban.

Dr Madan’s arrangement of the balance sheet of the relationship shows the China effect as a constant. As things stand today, both countries will not dispute the threat from China. Moreover, the ways and means to undermine China might also be akin, with little vicissitudes here and there. However, certain factors can preclude the development of a formidable US-Indo partnership against China.

The author’s dissection of India’s non-alignment framework towards the end of the book brings that potentially vexatious element to the fore. As the US prepares to establish a network of alliances against China in the Indo-Pacific, India’s space to diversify might shrink. Dr Madan rightly outlines the merits and demerits of diversification. However, those may vary in today’s strategic landscape. With the US ready to lead the charge against China with full gusto, it will be interesting to see how India strikes a balance between tilting towards, and aligning with, the US. Will India have options to continue with a policy of diversification? One can say that a lot will depend on how the US balances its approach towards India between what strategist Ashley Tellis calls strategic altruism and geopolitical quid pro quo.

While highlighting the significance of this piece of history in mapping the milieu of today, Dr Madan asserts: “The past shapes many of today’s perceptions and concerns. It influences the ideas of American and Indian foreign policymakers and the publics about what India has done and can do, and about the limits and possibilities of the US-India relationship.”

It is apt to say that this historical account is an all-important read for not only those who want to grasp the historical antecedents of this triangular connection, but for those who want to dive deep into understanding the threats and opportunities for India and the US, as they prepare to confront what they describe as a revanchist and revisionist China.

The reviewer is a research associate at the Centre for Security, Strategy and Policy Research at the University of Lahore

Fateful Triangle: How China Shaped US-India Relations During the Cold War
By Dr Tanvi Madan
Brookings Institution Press, US
ISBN: 978-0815737711
375pp.

Published in Dawn, Books & Authors, August 23rd, 2020