Kim Jong Un and the Bomb: Survival and Deterrence in North Korea
By Ankit Panda
Oxford University Press, India
ISBN: 978-0190060367
416pp.

Nuclear weapons have long enriched the discourse on international politics. The doyens of nuclear strategy have looked at the effects of what military strategist Bernard Brodie called the “absolute weapon.”

Expositions on nuclear weapons highlight how they’ve made the use of force less viable, if not impossible. This is because the destructive capacity of a nuclear device helps dissuade an aggressor from punishing another state forcefully.

In other words, nuclear weapons can help states convince their adversaries that the costs of their actions will far outweigh the benefits. This ability to keep the enemy at bay, by credibly threatening to cause unacceptable damage, is termed ‘deterrence’.

Deterrence is oftentimes conflated with defence — understandable, given that weaker states look to defend themselves via deterrence. With nuclear weapons added to the mix, conventional asymmetry attenuates in importance. Deterrence is elicited if Country A holds hostage what Country B values the most. This phenomenon hurts the capacity of a state to punish, and even cow, its nemeses.

However, such a situation is least likely to occur if one of the states does not possess nuclear weapons. The nuclear rivalry between North Korea and the United States best typifies how a weaker power deters a stronger one. It is also emblematic of how a semblance of parity is least desired by a behemoth force. Washington and Pyongyang have resorted to sabre-rattling and diplomacy to shape the future of the latter’s nuclear programme. Washington’s strategy towards Pyongyang seeks to pressure the latter to give up its nuclear weapons.

In his new book, Kim Jong Un and the Bomb: Survival and Deterrence in North Korea, US-based scholar Ankit Panda compellingly forms an inexorable connection between the survival of North Korea’s ruler Kim Jong Un, deterrence and the bomb.

Panda lays bare why the bomb is so dear to its all-powerful leader, and posits survival and deterrence as critical propellants for Pyongyang to nuclearise. This underlines how Kim has internalised the very essence of classic deterrence theory. It is Pyongyang’s assessment and understanding of deterrence that Panda brings to light.

Panda assiduously traces Kim’s transformation from an erratic rocket-man to erstwhile US president Donald Trump’s friend. In linking survival and deterrence, Panda rightly challenges Kim’s characterisation by, and in, Washington and, in instructive analysis, shows Kim is not oblivious to the need for completing the deterrent.

Firstly, Panda amplifies that, absent the ability to hold US cities hostage, North Korea’s deterrent would have remained hollow. Therefore, Washington has to see the Pyongyang conundrum through the lens of deterrence theory. Secondly, it was the completion of its nuclear deterrent that made Pyongyang resort to diplomacy with Washington. Thus, Washington has to deal with a recalcitrant Pyongyang that will zealously guard its nuclear deterrent — a factor that has catapulted it within the comity of nations.

Panda correctly argues that Kim would never surrender the only thing that perpetuates his rule, and strengthens his argument by analysing how nuclear weapons are ensconced in Pyongyang’s survival toolkit. Panda adroitly explains Pyongyang’s ‘Byungjin’ gambit, a strategic directive that calls for bolstering the regime through a set of two developments: one, the establishment of credible and cross-domain nuclear capabilities, and two, increasing Pyongyang’s economic self-sufficiency. It would not be unreasonable to argue that a nuclear deterrent increases a state’s propensity to tread the path towards autarky.

Delving further into why Kim’s treasured sword elongates his rule, Panda brings up a takeaway from the demise of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi: hold on to nuclear weapons. This point lies at the heart of Kim’s ruminations on nuclear weapons. Certainly, he needs to demonstrate that he not only has a most destructive weapon in his repertoire, but will use it if push comes to shove.

Panda dabbles in disquisitions about two of the most vital cogs in a nuclear deterrence mosaic: nuclear strategy and command and control (C2). Identifying Pyongyang’s multiple-audience problem, Panda contends that Kim will have to go first and go big, correctly arguing that Kim can ill-afford to let his adversaries draw first blood. That said, with Pyongyang gaining the ability to hold US cities hostage, the chances of a US first-strike have reduced, denting Washington’s ability to denuclearise the North Korean regime.

Panda brilliantly expounds on Kim’s C2 predicament. By shedding light on scholar of civil-military relations Peter Feaver’s always/never dilemma, Panda makes sense of why pre-delegation might not be favoured over assertive control. However, he also explains the snags associated with Kim not being ‘always’ available to authorise a nuclear launch.

Panda looks at another approach: devolution. But, given the likelihood that C2 is designed to fail deadly, devolution might not even be needed and automaticity would be the order of the day. In other words, if deterrence fails, the handlers of nuclear weapons will know exactly what to do next.

Panda’s book has some lessons for Washington’s policymakers. One, Pyongyang is a veritable nuclear-armed state and has no incentive to denuclearise. Two, Washington will not launch a decapitation strike on Pyongyang, because of the latter’s ability to carry out a countervalue strike on San Francisco, Seoul, or Tokyo.

Panda’s basic premise is sound. A forced denuclearisation will fall in the realm of what nuclear strategist Thomas Schelling called “compellence.” Both deterrence and compellence are methods of coercion, but the former challenges the latter. Thus, it is for Washington to realise that trying to achieve compellence under a bilateral deterrence framework is incendiary, and reflects what international relations theorist Hans Morgenthau called “conventionalisation.” Panda’s seminal work will surely help explain the real nature of the challenge that Kim poses.

The reviewer is a strategic affairs and foreign policy analyst

Published in Dawn, Books & Authors, December 6th, 2020