Going into the World T20, Pakistan seems to be in good shape. Of our two major problems, middle order batting and fielding, we seem to have found a solution to at least one.

The strategy of sending Shadab Khan and Mohammad Nawaz up the order, which doesn’t just cover a weakness but converts it to a genuine strength, has lifted our ceiling from semi-finals to winners. If we can hold our catches — we don’t have to be the world’s best fielding side but we certainly can’t afford to be the worst — we can go all the way.

It is hard to understand why it took so long for Shadab and/or Nawaz to be promoted to number 4 and/or 5. The preferred choices, the likes of Khushdil Shah or Iftikhar Ahmed, have miserably failed for a long time.

Moreover, as data nerds like Rehan-ul-Haq and Hassan Cheema have consistently pointed out, the concept of “low value wickets” — where a batsman plays higher than his planned position with the explicit instructions to not care a whit about getting out, in order to increase the run rate — is tailor-made for Shadab and Nawaz, who play in those positions for their PSL sides. Notable proponents of the idea have included Mohammad Wasim, the Chief Selector, who has previously suggested the idea to the management.

Sending Shadab Khan and Mohammad Nawaz up the order may have not only covered Pakistan’s middle-order weakness but could have some great repercussions both above and below them

Better late than never. If the flexibility in the batting order continues, Pakistan will be tough to beat in Australia. The bowling should be the best in the tournament, alongside perhaps South Africa’s. If Shaheen is indeed match fit and not, as feared, undercooked or rushed, we have all bases covered: new-ball wickets with him and Naseem, middle overs strangulation from Shadab and Nawaz, and death overs destruction from Haris Rauf.

In addition to their own runs, promoting Shadab and Nawaz in the middle overs has positive externalities, both above and below them. It allows Iftikhar and Asif Ali, much more comfortable against pace than spin, to bat in phases more suitable for their skillset. More crucially, however, it may generate enough confidence in the top order to play more freely, both in the powerplay and middle overs.

The debate about the strike rates of our top three, and especially our openers, while rancorous, has not been misplaced. Aaqib Javed may have been gauche in his phrasing, and social media brickbats may have gone overboard, but in truth, the top order needed introspection.

Babar, for his part, seems to have taken the criticism constructively, clearly making an effort during the New Zealand tri-series to play more attacking strokes. Rizwan, however, seems to be another matter.

From his unbelievable and, frankly, unsustainable peak in 2021, Rizwan’s strike rate has dipped, from 135 last year to 126 in 2022. That is not a trivial change: across 20 overs, it amounts to 11 runs, a match-changing sum. Rizwan’s powerplay batting can be problematic, but it is his middle overs play that genuinely costs the team.

There are two immutable certainties about T20 batting. First, the scarcest resource available to teams is deliveries, not wickets. This is a radical departure from Test and even ODI cricket. In T20s, unlike other formats, wickets can be wasted, but balls cannot. Second, the most opportune time for hitting boundaries is during the powerplay, by dint of the obvious fact that five fielders on the boundary are more difficult to pierce than two.

Rizwan’s raw numbers, peppered with “big” 50s, look good. But, especially recently, such runs are not necessarily beneficial for the team, because they can come too slowly. When batting first, we leave runs on the table; when chasing, we leave too much for the lower order to do.

We now have a large enough sample size for the validity of this claim. Some examples from batting first:

• Against Australia in the World T20 semi-final, Rizwan played half the powerplay deliveries at basically a run a ball (21 off 18) as we laboured to 70 in the first 10. He eventually played almost half the innings (52 balls) at a strike rate of 128, ensuring we ended up with a below-par 176, while losing only four wickets. Australia chased with an over to spare.

• Against India in the Asia Cup, it took him 18 balls in the powerplay — three full overs — to hit his first boundary. He ended up scoring 43 off 42 balls. India chased our below-par total (147) with ease.

• Against England in the 4th of the seven-match series, Rizwan struck impressively at 146 in the powerplay. He then promptly slowed down (non-PP strike rate: 121), hitting only three boundaries in the remaining 14 overs. We set a below-par 166 but Haris Rauf, as he is wont to do, produced a death overs miracle.

• Against Bangladesh in the tri-series, Rizwan’s strike rate to the point he made his 50 was 131. After reaching the milestone, he smashed 28 off his next 12 balls (SR: 231).

Some examples from chasing:

• Against Sri Lanka in the Asia Cup final, chasing 8.5 RPO at the start of the innings, Rizwan played almost half of Pakistan’s deliveries (49), striking at 112. Basic arithmetic meant that everyone not named Rizwan therefore had to score above 10 an over, that too without the benefit of fielding restrictions. We lost by 23 runs.

• Against New Zealand in the tri-series finale, in a near-replay of the Asia Cup final, we needed 8.2 RPO at the start of the innings. By the time Rizwan left — having batted the entirety of the batting powerplay — the required rate was 10.6. Only Nawaz’s brilliance, and Haider Ali coming from nowhere, saved us.

• Against Bangladesh in the tri-series , Rizwan consumed half of the balls available after the powerplay (42), but hit only two boundaries in those seven overs of batting, including zero 6s. We needed Nawaz to make 45 off 20 balls to eke out a win with one ball to spare.

A general picture emerges from these vignettes. Rizwan is often too conservative in the powerplay and too rarely hits boundaries outside it.

Part of this is ability: he can score boundaries only on one side of the pitch. When fielding restrictions relax and captains can more securely patrol the leg-side, especially square of the wicket, Rizwan’s options for 4s and 6s drastically reduce.

But part of it, at least recently, is willingness. Unless we are chasing a huge score, Rizwan seems content to turn strike over to a hitter at the other end, a strategy that may make sense, depending on circumstances, in the first 10 overs, but almost never in the second 10. In addition, he has recently appeared interested in waiting to hit 50 before upping his ratio of attacking shots.

Make no mistake: Rizwan is a fantastic cricketer, one of our three most valuable across formats. Even sophisticated measures of T20 batting performance, such as Cricviz’s “Match Impact” scores, show him to be among the world’s elite. He has helped change the culture of our side.

Fans know it is not beyond him to play modern T20 cricket. Babar and Rizwan have been responsible for not one, not two, but three chases of 200 or more in T20s. The mindset of going hard from ball one and not stopping until you are out is something they are clearly capable of — not to mention, pretty good at.

If Shadab and Nawaz at 4 and 5 do nothing else but lead to a more confident, attacking approach from our top three, that alone would make it worthwhile.

The writer is an assistant professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University in the US.

He tweets @ahsanib

Published in Dawn, EOS, October 23rd, 2022