Huddled around a table at a bustling Islamabad tea stall, a diverse group of men — young and old — associated with madrassa education and Islamist politics, debate the bitter aftertaste of defeat.

Their faces are etched with a mix of bewilderment and anger.

The February 8 elections dealt a crushing blow to Pakistan’s Islamist parties, and this gathering, on a cold night two weeks later, is a microcosm of the soul-searching gripping the entire Islamist political movement.

“It’s better to be late than wrong,” says a teacher from a suburban madrassa, his voice carrying the weight of experience. He is referring to the recent criticism of the military’s role in politics voiced by Maulana Fazlur Rehman, the head of the Jamiat-i-Ulema Islam-Fazl (JUI-F), a major Islamist party that also experienced a humiliating defeat. The teacher admits that a lot of voters genuinely came out in support of Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI), showing their anger over the ongoing crackdown on the party and its leaders. 

Across the table, a man in his 40s speaks in measured tones. He is a madrassa graduate from Pishin in Balochistan, now pursuing further studies at a government university in Islamabad. “We need to introspect,” he says, “if we fail to adapt to the changing times, we will become irrelevant.”

The surprisingly dismal performance of Pakistan’s Islamist parties in the recently held elections has prompted introspection among the likes of JUI-F and JI regarding their political future. Why did these parties fail to capture the attention of voters? And is the TLP a far stronger political force than many realise?

“There’s a disconnect,” a fiery retort comes from a young man, his eyes blazing with conviction. “The leadership chases power through elections,” he says, his voice laced with frustration, “while the base yearns for the implementation of Sharia law. We celebrate the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan, yet embrace a democratic system here — a glaring contradiction, wouldn’t you say?”

Following the humiliating defeat of almost all major Islamist parties in the February 8 elections, similar conversations are resonating within their circles across Pakistan. What are the root causes and why are Islamist parties becoming less relevant in Pakistan’s electoral politics? Should Islamist parties focus solely on preaching or engage in both electoral politics and cadre development simultaneously?

These are the ongoing debates among the leaders and cadres of Islamist parties, raising questions about their long-term viability in the country’s political landscape.

THE POLITICS OF PAKISTAN’S ISLAMIST PARTIES

Pakistan’s political landscape includes a significant number of religio-political parties. Out of the 167 parties registered with the Election Commission, roughly 25 have Islamist or sectarian names, reflecting their religious affiliations.

Notable among them are the JUI-F, the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), the Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), the Majlis-i-Wahdat-i-Muslimeen (MWM), the Pakistan Rah-i-Haq Party, the Pakistan Markazi Muslim League, and the Jamiat-i-Ulema Islam-Nazriati, all of which actively participated in the February 8 polls.

The Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC) has, of course, assumed greater importance despite not being a major contender in the polls, since the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf used it as a party vehicle for its independently elected members after the elections.

While their recent electoral performance was weak, the influence of religio-political parties on Pakistani politics goes beyond winning elections.

In a chapter on religious parties in Pakistan in the book Pakistan’s Political Parties: Surviving Between Dictatorship and Democracy, Johann Chacko, a doctoral researcher at the School for Oriental and African Studies (Soas) in the University of London, highlights that, despite poor electoral results, Islamist parties have collectively played an outsized role in national political life — particularly in shaping discursive norms.

Chacko writes, “This distinctive trajectory of Pakistan’s religious parties has been determined by South Asia’s intra-sectarian denominational diversity, which operates in the context of competitive politics within a populist Islamic republic overseen by an authoritarian weak state.”

While these parties often use broad Islamist rhetoric, each prioritises a specific religious denomination [maslak] within Pakistan’s diverse Muslim population, and strives to represent and defend the interests of a particular sect or community within the political system.

The JI attempts a more inclusive approach, while other Islamist parties, such as JUI-F and TLP, focus on Deobandi and Barelvi Sunni schools. Similarly, MWM represents the Shia community. Shamsudin Shigri, a Karachi-based researcher studying Islamist movements, says, “This focus on specific denominations limits their broader appeal to the entire electorate.”

Chacko further notes that these denominational parties have historically been competitive in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, holding majority control in provincial legislatures six times. Notably, they have played only a marginal role in Punjab and Sindh, which together account for 74 percent of Pakistan’s population and the majority of parliamentary seats. The latest major Islamist party to emerge in Punjab and Sindh is the TLP, Chacko writes.

A DISMAL SHOWING

In the February 8 polls, Islamist parties received almost 12 per cent of votes in the country, according to a report by Gallup Pakistan. After PTI-backed independent candidates, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) respectively, the fourth largest party in the country was TLP, with 2.8 million votes. 

At the national level, JUI-F and JI received 2.1 million and 1.3 million votes respectively, and their combined votes are only slightly more than the TLP. Bilal Gilani, the director of Gallup Pakistan, says, “The average vote for Islamic parties is around 5 per cent. So, vote wise, they seem to have done well. However, the ability of Islamist parties to convert votes into seats saw a setback both in 2018 and in the 2024 polls.”

Despite lots of fanfare, the JI’s thunder in Karachi was stolen by the Muttahida Qaumi Movement-Pakistan (MQM-P), and the JUI-F was wiped out in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP) by the PTI. The TLP continued to act as a spoiler in Punjab, but did not achieve much beyond that, Gilani explains. 

“Islamist parties, except for the TLP, face the same dilemma as other old traditional parties such as the PML-N and the PPP — an inability to make themselves attractive to new voters,” Gilani says. 

Niloufer Siddiqui, the author of the book Under the Gun: Political Parties and Violence in Pakistan, argues that the February 8 polls’ results show, once again, that street power cannot be used as a proxy for electoral success.

Despite lots of fanfare, the Jamaat-i-Islami’s thunder in Karachi was stolen by the Muttahida Qaumi Movement-Pakistan (MQM-P), and the JUI-F was wiped out in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa by the PTI. The TLP continued to act as a spoiler in Punjab, but did not achieve much beyond that.

JUI-F’S ELECTORAL WOES

While the JUI-F secured four seats in the National Assembly, making it the largest Islamist party in parliament, this performance represented a significant decline, compared to its performance in 2018. The JUI-F faced heavy defeats in its KP stronghold.

Party chief Maulana Fazlur Rehman, his sons and other prominent leaders lost to PTI-backed candidates. Only Fazl’s brother, Maulana Ubaidur Rehman, managed to retain his provincial assembly seat. This loss in its traditional base served as a major blow to the party.

JUI-F emerged as the third-largest party in the Balochistan Assembly, primarily due to pre-election inclusions of tribal chieftains, such as former chief minister Sardar Aslam Raisani. Fazl secured a national assembly seat from Pishin district through an alliance with the Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP). However, the party’s provincial leader, Maulana Abdul Wasay, lost his provincial seat to a dissident member Maulana Noorullah. A JUI-F cadre member from Balochistan points out that “none of the party’s 10 provincial assembly members are religious scholars.”

JUI-F leaders privately admit that the poor performance of the previous Shahbaz Sharif-led coalition government, of which they were a part, contributed significantly to their losses. They attribute the rise of the opposing PTI to public dissatisfaction with inflation and the government’s crackdown on the PTI.

Tahmeed Jan Azhari, an Islamabad-based researcher, says that, besides the PTI’s popularity wave, severe disagreements within JUI-F over ticket allotments in its strong electoral constituencies, a reluctance to adjust seats with other political parties, the hope that elections would be postponed, and extraordinary self-confidence were also other major reasons for the party’s poor showing. 

“The heavy reliance on landlords and electables instead of religious scholars during the polls was also a factor behind the defeat,” he adds. Using Mardan as an example, Azhari highlights that the JUI-F did not give the ticket to Maulana Qasim, a former MNA and influential scholar with a significant following, and instead awarded the ticket to a landlord. “Because of this decision,” Azhari explains, “local clerics associated with the party also refrained from cooperating with the electables in the polls.”

The experiment with the electables proved relatively successful in Balochistan. However, according to a JUI-F leader in Quetta, “The issue is that MPAs who are elected on the JUI-F ticket are not loyal to the party. They are known for changing parties in every election.”

Experts have also pointed out that threats from the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) also significantly hindered the party’s ability to organise electoral rallies. In late July, ISKP claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing at a JUI-F rally in Bajaur, resulting in over 55 casualties, while JUI-F leader Hafiz Hamdullah narrowly escaped a suicide bombing in Mastung, Balochistan.

TLP’S POTENTIAL FOR FUTURE DISRUPTION

While the pre-election spotlight in Punjab was on PTI-backed independents and the PML-N, a quieter force was building momentum elsewhere. The TLP may not have secured any National Assembly seats, but the votes it secured and its presence could pose a significant challenge to other parties in the future. 

Sohail Attari, an ardent supporter of the TLP in Lahore, points to widespread rigging as the primary explanation for the party’s failure to secure seats. He suggests that “Western pressure”, especially from Europe, prevented the TLP from entering parliament due to its uncompromising stance on blasphemy issues.

Many experts, however, see a different picture. They acknowledge the TLP’s role as a spoiler, similar to their impact in the 2018 elections. Niloufer A. Siddiqui, a political science teacher at the State University of New York at Albany, points out that, even without winning seats, the TLP’s vote share increased in Punjab by nearly two percent, and the TLP emerged as the third largest party in terms of votes. However, the largest decrease in TLP votes was observed primarily in Karachi.

According to Siddiqi, “The spoiler role should not be discounted, since parties, recognising this, may be interested in making accommodations or seat adjustments with TLP in future elections.”

However, she also offers a cautionary perspective: “In general, I would caution against using election results to assess the extent to which the TLP’s message resonates in society. After all, if five percent of voters support the TLP, this still implies millions of supporters, many of whom are likely fervent in their support. Recent incidents related to allegations of blasphemy and mob or vigilante violence suggest sympathy for TLP positions is more than sufficient to cause violence.”

A US-based PhD candidate studying TLP politics, who wishes to remain anonymous, points out there has been a significant increase in the party’s vote share in urban Punjab, particularly in Lahore and Rawalpindi, reaching nearly 10 percent. 

“Notwithstanding the very serious question marks over the credibility of official election results,” he says, “if we take the party vote shares based on Form-47 notifications at face value, it emerges that the TLP has expanded its vote bank in urban Punjab.”

He anticipates the TLP to retain a strong foothold among income-poor, educated, and young voters in these areas, based on potential post-election voter statistic trends.

JI — STRUGGLING FOR RELEVANCE

Like other Islamist parties, members of the Jamaat-i-Islami have been questioning the party’s future relevance due to consistently poor electoral performances. Despite participating in national politics since the country’s birth, JI has consistently underperformed in the elections, with a single notable exception: its participation in the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) alliance that governed KP from 2002 to 2007.

Disillusionment runs deep within the party. “We’ve been in the game for a long time, but the results just aren’t there,” says a JI member from Upper Dir, a region traditionally considered a party stronghold that also swung towards PTI in these last elections. “Look at the February 8 elections — over 200 candidates fielded, not a single seat won.” 

Despite the JI running an extremely organised and well-resourced electoral campaign, the dismal performance even prompted party leader Sirajul Haq to resign, though the party’s central council ultimately rejected his move. “Our strategy is flawed,” admits another JI worker from Karachi. “The theoretical discourse is ineffective and, perhaps, the leadership is confused or the workers are directionless. We lack a crowd-puller, an aggressive leader who can connect with the masses.”

Many within JI point to the rise of PTI as a key factor in their decline. According to a JI worker in Karachi, “PTI has eaten into our base, particularly in traditional strongholds.” Some believe that JI’s attempt to woo PTI supporters after the May 9 riots backfired.

One JI workers reveals, “They adopted a sympathetic line to inform and influence PTI workers, but it caused discord within the Jamaat itself. Many felt this approach compromised their identity and ultimately proved ineffective.”

Faizullah Khan, a Karachi-based journalist, sees the reasons for JI’s struggles rooted in both the past and the present. In the 1990s, the JI attempted to position itself as a third force against the established parties, the PML-N and the PPP. He says, “They launched anti-corruption protests and formed a youth wing, Pasban, which initially attracted young people. However, Pasban eventually splintered.”

Khan notes that JI’s anti-corruption message was later adopted by Imran Khan and his PTI party. The key difference, he argues, “lies in leadership. Khan’s celebrity status from cricket helped him connect with voters, something JI couldn’t replicate.” He says that another experiment was the formation of the Pakistan Islamic Front, with anti-corruption slogans, but it couldn’t materialise during the 1993 elections.

The party is internally divided regarding leadership choices as well, with some advocating for more assertive figures, such as its Karachi leader Hafiz Naeemur Rehman, while others emphasise adherence to ideological principles over personality-driven politics.

THE BACKBENCHERS

The MWM, a political party representing the Shia community, participated in the February 8 polls. Through an alliance with the PTI, they secured a National Assembly seat in Kurram district, marking their first time in the assembly.

The Pakistan Rah-e-Haq Party, an electoral front of the proscribed Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan or Ahle Sunnat Wal Jammat, also contested in the elections in various cities, including Karachi, Peshawar, Jhang and Battagram. However, its candidates, including the group’s top leaders — Maulana Ahmed Ludhianvi, Maulana Aurangzeb Farooqi and Hakim Ibrahim Qasmi — could not win a single seat.

The Pakistan Markazi Muslim League (PMML), widely seen as an electoral front for the banned Jamaat-ud-Dawa led by Hafiz Saeed, also met with no success. The PMML represents the Ahle Hadith or Salafi school of thought. Some analysts suggest that the PMML’s participation was a government strategy to potentially integrate such groups into mainstream politics. 

THE FACTORS BEHIND AN UNIMPRESSIVE SHOWING

In Pakistan’s Political Parties: Surviving Between Dictatorship and Democracy, Johann Chacko outlines the constrained electoral potential of individual Islamist parties, attributing it to three key factors. Firstly, he emphasises the significant political fragmentation within a devout yet diverse religious populace, characterised by numerous factional denominations.

Secondly, he underscores the inherent challenges faced by social movements in aligning their broader objectives with electoral strategies. Finally, he highlights the prevalent preference among voters for patronage over religious adherence, noting the resource limitations hindering religious parties’ competitiveness against affluent business magnates and feudal landowners.

Based on discussions with various stakeholders, including leaders and cadres of Islamist parties, voters and political analysts, the following major reasons emerge as key factors contributing to the decline of Islamist parties in the February 8 elections.

The Rise Of PTI

The rise of PTI under Imran Khan dealt a significant blow to the electoral fortunes of Islamist parties. Firstly, PTI effectively positioned itself as the outsider, challenging the status quo traditionally associated with both the PML-N and PPP, and some Islamist parties, including the JUI-F and the JI. Khan’s populist rhetoric resonated with voters yearning for a break from the perceived corruption and inefficiency of the past.

Secondly, PTI focused on a broader national agenda that transcended purely religious themes. The researcher Tahmeed Jan Azhari argues, “Khan publicly champions liberalism while simultaneously appealing to Islamic values, such as his references to the state of Medina and anti-Western sentiment.”  This strategy has proved successful.

Khan’s use of the “Medina state” reference, a historical Islamic polity seen as a model for social justice, resonated with voters seeking a society based on Islamic principles without the perceived extremism and sectarianism of some Islamist parties. 

Generational And Digital Disconnect

The rise of PTI wasn’t just a political shift, it was a generational one. Pakistan’s youthful population, increasingly connected to the world through social media, is less swayed by traditional religious affiliations at the ballot box. This younger generation prioritises solutions to real world problems — unemployment, economic instability and rising living costs — areas where Islamist parties often struggle.

The proliferation of social media and access to diverse information has empowered a more informed and discerning Pakistani electorate. Many Islamist parties are struggling to adapt. Clinging to outdated platforms and messaging, they fail to resonate with this broader and more critical voting bloc.

Gallup’s Gilani says that, among Islamist parties, “the TLP attracted new voters by using modes of communication more akin to a new class of voter, while other old guard Islamist parties, such as the JUI-F, need to reinvent their politics to remain relevant in Pakistani politics.”

JUI-F’s experience exemplifies this struggle. A young party activist saw an opportunity in TikTok, creating an account to promote the JUI-F’s activities. However, “he was snubbed by the party’s leaders and asked to delete the account”, revealing an initial resistance to embrace new communication methods. While JUI-F has since established a dedicated social media team, some argue it’s a case of “too little, too late.”

The JI also attempted digital marketing for the elections. However, experts claim their message failed to resonate with young voters. This suggests that simply being present online isn’t enough — the content and messaging must be relevant and engaging.

The Anti-Establishment Narrative

In a March 7 provincial meeting held in Lahore, Maulana Fazl delivered a pointed message, stating, “We will not accept the supremacy of one institution.” Although refraining from explicit references, his caution to those in power to “stay within their boundaries” resonated strongly.

Analysts see Fazl’s stance as a symptom of a larger trend. Pakistan’s political landscape is experiencing a surge in anti-establishment sentiment. Voters, particularly younger generations, are yearning for change. This trend propelled PTI to a strong showing in the recent elections, highlighting the power of this anti-establishment wave.

Religious parties like the JUI-F, however, find themselves caught in a precarious position. Traditionally seen as having close ties to the military establishment, they risk alienating voters seeking a break from the status quo. 

The connection between Pakistan’s military and Islamist parties has always been a complex dance. Early on, the military viewed these parties as a way to counter secular and leftist movements, offering them a degree of political space. However, Islamist parties such as the JI remained on the margins, lacking broad electoral appeal.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan marked a turning point. The military, needing allies, saw Islamist groups as crucial for recruiting mujahideen fighters. Parties such as the JUI-F and JI actively supported the Afghan resistance, significantly boosting their domestic influence. Gen Ziaul Haq’s subsequent ‘Islamisation’ policies further solidified the link between the state and these religious groups. That link itself may have become the albatross around their necks in the changed political scenario.

Religious Values Vs Practical Politics

Experts say that many people in Pakistan perceive a disconnect between religious values and practical politics. According to Shigri, the Karachi-based researcher studying Islamic movements, “They believe political parties prioritise pragmatism and compromise moral principles, leading to a perception of deceitful tactics and disconnect from religious ideals. This fosters a view that religious scholars should avoid politics entirely and focus solely on offering spiritual guidance.”

He also says that Islamist parties often focus solely on religious issues, neglecting the pressing economic and social challenges faced by ordinary people, “This lack of a comprehensive and appealing manifesto for the common man fails to resonate with voters looking for solutions to everyday problems.”

While the majority of Pakistanis are religious, people may not subscribe to the specific religious ideology of any particular party. “They might lean towards Islamist parties with a religious element, but this isn’t always a guarantee of support,” argues Shigri. “This strategy becomes further complicated by the country’s diverse religious landscape, making it difficult for any single party to cater to the entire spectrum of religious beliefs.”

A CRITICAL JUNCTURE

While the electorate’s rejection of Islamist parties weakens their push for stricter Islamic laws, it risks creating a breeding ground for resentment among their supporters. If these frustrations remain unaddressed and mainstream political discourse fails to offer a compelling alternative, extremist groups, such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the ISKP, may find fertile ground to exploit. 

Adding to these concerns, Chacko highlights the “inherent tension between movement activism and electoral politics”, where movements often hold “narrow — sometimes extremist — views” compared to the centrist approach required for elections.

This tension is further exemplified by the TTP’s recent statement calling on defeated Islamist parties to unite for an Afghan Taliban-inspired order, showcasing the potential dangers of a political vacuum. Moreover, the association of certain religious groups with proscribed militant organisations has tarnished the image of Islamist parties among the public. Pakistan’s ongoing fight against terrorism has led to a growing weariness towards religious parties perceived as sympathetic to extremists or incapable of controlling them.

In navigating these complexities, Pakistan’s political landscape stands at a critical juncture, where addressing grievances, promoting inclusivity and fostering stability are imperative for sustainable democratic progress.

The writer is a journalist and researcher who writes for The New York Times and Nikkei Asia, among other publications. He also assesses democratic and conflict development in Pakistan for various policy institutes. X: @zalmayzia

Published in Dawn, EOS, March 17th, 2024

Header image: Illustration by Sarah Durrani