The future of Pakistan — good or bad — will be determined by its young; most especially by those who are between 15 and 29 years of age today.

This, of course, is a cliché. But it happens to be a cliché that is quite literally true. Here is why.  Pakistan’s ‘youth bulge’ is palpable. Just over two out of every three Pakistanis today are below the age of 30 and just under one in every three is between 15 and 29 years of age (our definition of youth).

What the demographic momentum imbedded in this one statistic implies is that Pakistan is not just a young country, but that it is going to remain young till at least to 2050, possibly longer.  More importantly, my own research suggests that the youth of Pakistan know this and they expect being given the attention and respect this demographic reality demands.

Others who have looked at the question have come to similar conclusions. But the fact of the matter is that we do not need statistics to tell us that Pakistan is a young country. You just need to look around you. Any street. Any marketplace. Advertising on your television set. Certainly, on your Twitter feed. Any political jalsa [gathering]. Any office. Even elected officials and unelected political influentials.

The generational change is not on its way. It’s here. It’s set. And, most importantly, it’s here to stay. At least for, and probably for more than, the next two decades.

With the majority of Pakistan’s population below the age of 30, the young will invariably influence the country’s future trajectory. However, where the youth of today take this country will depend on the choices that today’s policymakers, Pakistani society and the young themselves make. Eos presents an excerpt from an essay by Adil Najam from the book Pakistan: Search for Stability, published by Oxford University Press…

BEING YOUNG IN PAKISTAN

In 2017, the Pakistan Human Development Report produced a comprehensive profile of youth in Pakistan, including a wealth of empirical and opinion data on the young, collected from an estimated 130,000 Pakistanis. However, the key question that we, the authors of the report, were most concerned with was “what does it mean to be young in Pakistan?”

Not surprisingly, no easy answers were forthcoming. Like so many other places in the world, being young in Pakistan is both exciting and frustrating. The space that the young occupy in Pakistani society is vast and full of possibilities but, in their own words, is often described as crumbling, contested and constrained on the one hand, and uneven, unfair and uncertain on the other.

It is a space that is defined by high hopes, but also deep fears. As subsequent research and events have confirmed, to be young in Pakistan is to be highly agitated, and very often angry. Our research does begin pointing out some of the reasons why this is so.

For example, if you were to computationally condense the over 60 million young Pakistanis aged between 15 and 29 into a statistically representative one hundred young people, you would find that just 30 of them consider themselves to be functionally literate, 29 would never have gone to school (despite all being 15 or above), only 6 would have 12 or more years of education and just 39 would be employed.

More telling, however, are the structural depravations which highlight that the space ‘to be young’ is severely constrained and shrinking. Of the 100, only six would have access to a library, only seven to a sports facility, just 21 to a park. Only three would have ever been to a cinema, only three to a live music performance. Fifty-nine would say that they do not play sports, or only infrequently.

One in the 100 would own a car, 12 a motorcycle, 10 a bicycle and 77 would have no means of personal mobility. Each of these depravations becomes even more acute for women, rural youth, and other marginalised groups within the young.

And, yet, within this notional 100, we also found a spirit of great national pride, high aspirations, much hope, and tremendous expectations. They were eager to announce, to any who wish to ride the tiger of Pakistan’s youth, to never forget that this is a generation that demands and deserves better. They are politically excited, excitable and astute.

While only 24 percent said (in 2016) that they trusted political leaders, 90 percent of young men and 55 percent of young women claimed that they would vote in the next elections. Of every 100, 48 believe that Pakistan’s future will be bright — although 36 fear it will be bleak.

Most tellingly, 67 [of the 100] believe that their lives are and should be better than their parents, only 15 expect themselves to be worse-off than their parents; 89 say they feel happy; 70 say they feel safe. All of them demand the space and conditions in which they can achieve their aspirations.

In short, the world of young Pakistanis is as diverse, as differentiated, and as divided as the rest of Pakistan. However, they also have greater expectations and aspirations which, if nurtured, could yield high dividends. Much more telling, however, is the palpable impatience and restlessness which, if ignored, could result in disaster.

There are three things to keep in mind as we think about youth anywhere in the world, but certainly in the context of Pakistan.

First, and most importantly, youth is a defining category. The reason to think of the young as a category is not just because they are so many, but because — even if they were not this many — the 15-29 year age bracket is where ‘citizenship’ matures.

Second, youth is fleeting. Analytically, too, youth is a transitory and dynamic category. Because changes happen fast and furious when one is young, the definition of youth identity and what it stands for can change rapidly, even whilst within that category. Those turning 15 or 16 today can find themselves very distant from those turning 28 or 29 and will very likely not easily recognise the passions of those who would be 16 by the time they turn 28.

This may well be true for other categories too but is consequential here, because the short window of this category and the rapid changes within it make notions of what “youth believe”,  “youth stand for”,  and “youth want”, or even ideas of the “youth vote”, are much more transitory and contestable than many analysts assume, and do compound the challenges of youth representation.

Finally, youth — especially in Pakistan — is an extremely diverse category. At one level, any category of well over 60 million individuals cannot possibly be homogenous and would demand an investigation into its internal contradictions. But, much more than that, each of the major cleavages that exist in Pakistani society are compounded in its young: gender, class, rural-urban, wealth, technology, ethnicities, religiosity and sectarianism, and geography.  

PAKISTAN AND ITS YOUNG: THREE PROPOSITIONS

Building and extending on the available research, let us review three key propositions — political, societal and developmental — on how the young of Pakistan might influence the future trajectories of the country’s society and politics.

These propositions are offered not as predictions or scenarios, but as choice points. Embedded within each proposition are levers of possible change — where the youth of today take this country will very much depend on the choices that policymakers, Pakistani society and the young themselves make on each of these dimensions.

Proposition 1: The young of today are defining tomorrow’s politics, but not always in ways we imagine

On the face of it, the bold sounds, sights, language, and even substance of Pakistan politics today seems driven by the young. Even where mainstream political parties are still led by septuagenarians, they wrap themselves in the emblems of youth; political rallies of all parties, even religious ones, feel like high-intensity concerts; political communication is not only geared towards the young but most often crafted by them.

On the one hand, this is not entirely new, nor surprising. On the other, however, there is something palpably different, as if what would have been ‘regular’ youthfulness is now on steroids. There is significant reason to believe why it is, and will remain, so.

At a basic demographic level, all political actors realise how the maths works: the young are the single largest bloc of new and impressionable voters in Pakistan and there is a long-term and steady supply of them. The demography described in the Pakistan National Human Development Report suggests that every election in Pakistan between now and around 2050 will be defined by the youth vote — including, of course, by their choice to vote or not. 

Notwithstanding the dichotomy of young Pakistanis claiming high intent to vote and a history of not having done so in the past, the number of young entrants into the voting mix means that, mostly within two election cycles, today’s new voter would be about to — or would already have — enter(ed) a burgeoning 30-49 years middle-age category historically the most reliable and loyal voting group in Pakistan. The political logic of investing in the young voter is impeccable.

But demography alone does not explain the dominance of the youth voice in Pakistani politics today. Technology seems to have played an even more defining role; a role that is likely to be as enduring. That the rise of ‘new’ (especially social) media would trigger a steep decline of the ‘old’ (particularly print) media was probably inevitable, but the ‘control’ younger political operatives now exert over social media in all political groupings is remarkable and is now driving significant parts of the political narratives in the country.

Of course, certain leaders and parties have capitalised more on courting the youth vote than others and have been differently successful in it. This matters, but mostly in ways that it has always mattered. One should not expect permanence in youth loyalties, not least because it remains a dynamic and diverse category.  It remains to be seen if the current and emerging youth bulge will practically change ballot box behaviour, but conditions are certainly ripe to create the possibility.

Finally, a very remarkable feature of Pakistan’s emergent political discourse is how explicit mention of youth issues is nearly absent from political narratives. This, despite the feverish pitch of the political discourse, despite the active participation of the young in this discourse, and even despite the role the young are clearly playing in shaping the narratives.

A possible explanation for this anomaly could be that politically active youth in Pakistan have convinced themselves that the pathway to material benefits for themselves — particularly, for example, in the area of employment and improved living conditions — lies through the choice of political leadership rather than of policy.

Proposition 2: Give the young the ability to be young or expect a Pakistan tomorrow that is as divided as it is today

The idea that we are denying the young in Pakistan the space to be young is a major finding of the Pakistan National Human Development Report. But it is a thought that first hit me like a ton of bricks in December 2014, as I visited the New Muslim College in Charsadda — just days after the horrific terrorist attack at the Army Public School (APS) in Peshawar — to hold a focus group discussion with 15-18-year-olds on what young Pakistanis were thinking.

It struck me that the young men with me in the room were not much older than the students who had died at APS just a few days ago, or those who had done the horrific killing. The reality of the APS attack hung heavy in the room and I realised, as did they, that it is the young in Pakistan who have had to do much of the dying in the so-called ‘War on Terror.’ But there was also a palpably steely resolve in the room. Here is what I wrote about that encounter:

“Unlike every other APS conversation I had been hearing — on television, on social media, from politicians, in drawing rooms — theirs was devoid of sloganeering. There was no sign of despair. No hollow display of anger or anguish. No camouflaging of fear with bravado. Instead, there was resolve. Very endearing. Very becoming. Very mature. A very matter-of-fact recognition that this was the reality of the Pakistan they had inherited. A reality they now have to live with…”

It is then that I fully realised the perils of being young in Pakistan. “Extremists are out to indoctrinate the young. Terrorists are out to kill them. Educational institutions can neither guarantee quality education nor physical security. An emergent politics of anger uses the passions of the young as fuel for petty politicking. The result is that the space for the young to be young has shrunk — is endangered.”

My research has convinced me that the best gift that Pakistan can give to its young is to return to them the ability to be young. Indeed, it may be the best gift Pakistan can give itself — a future where this ability continues to be denied cannot be good for any Pakistani.

Being young is not just about being carefree, it is also about being able to explore. In the shrinking space to be able to do so, the young in Pakistan have already inherited most of the societal divides that define the country as a whole. That as many young Pakistanis consider being a Pakistani as their primary identity as consider their religion to be their primary identity, is probably reflective of society as a whole.

But what was the most disturbing aspect of our research was that more than 40 percent young men and 50 percent young women disapproved of having friendly relations with someone from another religion, or even another sect; nearly three out of every four young Pakistanis (men and women) responded that they would disapprove of someone from a different religion or sect preaching their religion.

The distrust that defines Pakistani society as a whole is equally prevalent amongst the young.  Just over 20 percent said they trusted politicians, only around 25 percent trust the police, just 40 percent had trust in the judiciary and less than 50 percent in the media. All of this was in 2016, and there is enough reason to believe that trust amongst the young has only eroded further since then.

Such a snapshot should be read not just as what the youth of today think, but what the Pakistan of tomorrow is likely to think. The challenges of social division, societal distrust and mutual intolerance are clearly great, but solutions are available. Silly as it may sound to some, given the enormity of the challenges, the very first — and possibly most meaningful, although not always easy — step should be resolute policy in allowing the young to be young.

Sports grounds are not a big investment, but they can be more meaningful than we might think. It is remarkable how parochial we have become, and simple steps to enhance mobility for the young, including the ability for travel exchange within the country to get to meet other Pakistanis who may not look like us but are equally Pakistanis, is another small but possibly impactful investment.

Safe and affordable mobility (along with reliable childcare and clean bathrooms) for young women, in fact, emerges as amongst the most effective means of significantly increasing women’s participation in the workforce.

Obvious as it should be by now, it is worth noting that, as we think about youth as a category for social analysis, now and into the future, the simple dichotomy of ‘young vs old’ is not only un-useful but can also be dangerous. In society, as in politics, some of the greatest and most alienating divisions that exist in Pakistan exist amongst the young themselves. The policy challenge is to find ways to reduce these divisions now before they sink deep roots and are passed on to the future, and to future generations.

The goal is not empty slogans of ‘integration’, but investing in practical means for the young in Pakistan to interact with other young people in Pakistan. Across divisions of gender, class, geography, religion and rural-urban-metropolitan, the bridges that need to be built are not just of concrete but of conversation.

Proposition 3: ‘Boom or bust?’ — it’s a choice

We began the 2017 Pakistan National Human Development Report with a story that is not from Pakistan. It remains valid and is worth repeating here:

“On December 17, 2010, a 26-year-old fruit and vegetable vendor in a small town in Tunisia set himself on fire, following a confrontation with a municipal official about where his cart was parked. While the specifics of what led to Mohamed Bouazizi’s death are unclear, what is indisputable is his fatal self-immolation catalysed protests that toppled Tunisia’s dictator and led to a string of uprisings in the region that came to be called the Arab Spring.

“The aim of mentioning this situation here is not to recount what happened in Tunis that day, or in the other countries of the Arab Spring subsequently. [Our concern is] with Pakistan’s youth. So, fast forward to Pakistan.

“Can you imagine a situation, anywhere in Pakistan, where a young person feels so frustrated by unemployment, or so disheartened, un-empowered and marginalised, that he takes a measure as extreme as Bouazizi did in Tunisia? One certainly hopes not. But hope alone is not enough. It is the responsibility of the state as well as society to enable an environment for our youth where such a fate is not even imaginable. Not even in our worst nightmares.”

Trying to predict whether Pakistan’s demographic youth momentum will end up being a ‘boom’ or a ‘bust’ is a fool’s errand. That Pakistan today has the largest number of young people it has ever had and that this number is set to grow over the next multiple decades, is a fact. How this fact will play out is not a matter of reading tea leaves, it is a matter of policy choice.

There is the inherent potential of a ‘boom’ in every youth bulge. A large number of new young entrants into the economy can become motors of consumption, generators of ideas and innovation and harbingers of new social energy.

There is also the equally inherent potential of a ‘bust’ in every youth bulge. A large number of new entrants into the economy need new employment, can feel suffocated by the lack of room to grow, and can burn with anger when existing systems they wish for are not enabled to change.

Certainly not as simple as it may sound, but the final path taken does depend on the choices made by policy, by society, and by the young themselves.

The writer is the founding dean of the Pardee School of Global Affairs at Boston University in the US and is a former vice chancellor of the Lahore University of Management Sciences (Lums).

He is currently the president of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) International This is a slightly modified version of an extract from the book Pakistan: Search for Stability, edited by Maleeha Lodhi and published in Pakistan by Oxford University Press.

It has been excerpted with permission from the author, editor and the publisher

Published in Dawn, EOS, May 5th, 2024