Studies on populism witnessed a manifold increase when Donald Trump unexpectedly won the 2016 American presidential election. Initially, most of the studies emerged in the US, and many still do.

But political scientists in various European countries also began to contribute to the discourse on populism when populists rose to power, or greatly expanded their electoral appeal, in multiple European countries. 

The rise of populism or ‘neo-populism’ has been a global phenomenon. Most contemporary political scientists agree that, although populism as we know it today began to rear its head during the mid-1990s, it truly started to become a global occurrence from the late 2000s.

To some scholars, it is still peaking. To others, it is declining, but the decline is slow. Most of this discourse is being shaped in the US and Europe. Therefore, many Asian scholars have critiqued their European and American counterparts for only exploring neo-populism in the context of its rise in the ‘global North.’ 

Asian scholars investigating neo-populism in their own backyards posit that, although neo-populism in Asian countries shares many traits with the neo-populism that emerged in the West, there are also some significant differences between the two. But before we explore these differences, a brief understanding of populism is important — especially when this understanding has been constantly evolving. 

While neo-populism has entrenched itself across America and Europe in recent times, the global South has had leaders championing ultra-nationalism, xenophobia and the politicisation of religion for decades

Populism is not an ideology per se, but a ‘style of politics’ which is almost entirely ‘performative’ and/or is ‘politics of spectacle’: showy and emotive. Or as the British lecturer of theatre J Dunne-Howrie puts it, “A politics emanating from the gut, not the head.” This style of politics can emerge from the right as well as the left, claiming to be representing a large ‘disadvantaged’ whole (‘the people’) battling an all-powerful ‘elite’ and a shadowy ‘deep state’.

In 2020, the European research project DEMOS identified four types of populism: right-wing populism, which promotes the interests of the ‘natives’ against migrants or ethnic minorities; left-wing populism, which is heavy on anti-capitalist rhetoric; illiberal populism which, like right-wing populism, is socially conservative but strives further to limit the reach of constitutionalism; and anti-establishment populism, which is highly suspicious of state institutions. Of course, all four have overlapping traits. 

These categories were the outcome of a study by DEMOS of 17 populist parties/movements active in Europe. But as some Asian scholars have pointed out, there are many similarities between the neo-populism that emerged in the West and one which swept across various Asian countries in the last decade. There are some stark differences between the two as well. 

However, there is consensus among most scholars that contemporary populism is almost overwhelmingly right-wing in nature. Another interesting thing to note is that most populists emerge from the same ‘elite’ groups that they attack. This may be a symptom of intra-class tensions in a society in which cracks have developed within economic elites.  

My own study of neo-populism continues to exhibit that, whereas in the West, neo-populism largely (but not exclusively) seems to be attracting the support of the working and rural classes, in Asia it has gained more traction among urban and peri-urban middle classes. This may be due to different attitudes towards neoliberal economics in the West and in Asia.

The post-1970s ‘neoliberal’ policies by Western governments — which reduced the economic role of the state — irritated the working classes and parts of middle-income groups. This irritation mutated into becoming anger against corporate elites. These elites greatly benefitted from neoliberal policies when established political parties in the West began to outsource many aspects of governance to them. 

Populists stepped in to navigate the resultant anger to their advantage, by bringing to the surface certain ‘politically incorrect’ notions that had been suppressed in the West between the end of World War II in 1945 and the end of the Cold War in 1991. What came to the surface was ultra-nationalism, xenophobia, racism, politicised religion, etc.

So, to counter ideas such as multiculturalism and globalisation, for example, populists in the West encourage nativism and localism and demand stricter anti-immigration policies. The surprising bit in this is that, unlike the conventional right-wing in the West, which had encouraged the reduction of the state’s role in economic matters, the neo-populist right-wing is actually looking to expand the state’s role. 

This is symptomatic of the belief that the sympathies of the working classes in the West have continued to shift from the left to the populist right. Trump was recently booed during a right-wing ‘libertarian’ rally because of this. Libertarians are radically opposed to any kind of state intervention.

On the other hand, the increasing middle classes in Asia gladly embraced neoliberalism, which provided them a sense of being freed from state regulations and, thus, accumulate wealth and status on their own terms. But it is not religious nationalism, xenophobia, cult of personality and a growing authoritarianism that is shaping Asian populism. 

According to the Chinese political scientist Shiru Wang, for four decades after World War II, these traits were not part of mainstream politics in most European countries and in the US. They only began to crawl back to the surface after the Cold War and, then, with more force during the 2010s. However, Wang then posits that these traits were deeply embedded in the mainstream politics of most Asian countries, especially in countries that emerged during the rapid decolonisation era.

Charismatic leaders built from cult of personality, championing ultra-nationalism, xenophobia and the politicisation of religion have been appearing in Asia and the global South for decades. Therefore, much of Asian politics has been inherently populist for decades now. And this brand of politics has appeared from the left as well as the right. This time, however, it has been intensifying these traits and, on some occasions, posing to fight the good fight against an obese state. 

So, in the West, populism is the weapon of the political/economic elite that are out to usurp political power of the ‘old’ faction of the same elite, by adopting and utilising the anger and ‘patriotism’ of the apparently anti-liberal natives. In Asia, middle class elites are intensifying ultra-nationalism and religious nationalism, already present in the mainstream, to bolster their economic influence with political power — a power that they are trying to snatch from the opposing, older factions of the same elites that they too are a part of.

The results can be devastating, because one has to be cut to size for the other to survive. The world has become too small to accommodate both.

Published in Dawn, EOS, June 2nd, 2024