THE alarm bells started ringing in 2020, as the security threat to Pakistan from the revival of the Afghanistan-based TTP increased rapidly. The threat came on the heels of the 2021 Doha Accord, leading to the US exit from Afghanistan.

Sadly, it was only in late 2021 that we saw a response to the terrorist threat in the form of negotiations with the TTP. This resulted in a short-lived ceasefire. Now, almost three years later, the government has announced a new “counterterrorism [CT] campaign through Operation Azm-i-Istehkam”. Most observers, however, see it as a euphemism for a new large-scale military operation in KP.

While nobody can disagree with the need for a national effort to combat terrorism in KP, opinions can differ on whether the military operation is the most effective way to deal with it. True, many would argue that it was through military operations that the TTP and its allies were defeated in Swat and KP and forced to flee to Afghanistan in 2014.

Others, however, would say that the cost of these operations was exorbitant in terms of the misery caused to the local population; many people may not want to pay that price again. There is, thus, a need to formulate a new, holistic response to the challenge. If a military operation is considered unavoidable, it must be one which is more responsive to the concerns of the local population and is fashioned in the light of new realities.

Much time has elapsed since the last operation, and the context has undergone significant changes. It is pertinent to point out that the announcement of the CT operation was followed by three unprecedented political developments. One, there was a huge public demonstration in Razmak, North Waziristan District, against the announced operation; last year, NWD faced the highest number of attacks by TTP, and the district is likely to be once more on the front-line of the proposed military operation. The people of NWD recall how thousands of their folks were killed, millions forced to leave their homes, whole towns razed to the ground, and their means of livelihood destroyed by the last military operation in 2014. This widespread resentment against the new operation will make it a nonstarter if the government opts to go ahead with it.

Secondly, the other major stakeholder in any federal CT operation in any province is the provincial government. In all previous military operations from 2004 onwards, the support of the provincial governments of KP was always there. This time, sadly, the provincial and federal governments are not on the best of terms. Without the complete support of the provincial government, any operation launched by the centre will deepen political polarisation, weaken the foundations of the federation, and likely fail.

A non-kinetic dimension is needed to dispel public misgivings about Azm-i-Istehkam.

Thirdly, it is not only the political party in power in KP but also all the other major political parties in the province that have opposed this operation. This political consensus in KP against the military operation there by the federal government is unprecedented. Minus the requisite political support, the military operation is more likely to widen public-military alienation and play into the terrorists’ hands.

There is another point which merits attention. As per recent reports, TTP is rapidly spreading its tentacles in KP and attempting to destroy the social fabric by forcibly imposing its brand of Sharia. Not only has it exponentially increased its number of terrorist attacks in 2024, the TTP has also set up its own courts in NWD to ‘resolve’ disputes and punish people. It has set up check-posts on main highways and kidnapped a TikToker in Bannu to influence social media. So, while the people are rightly concerned about the devastation caused by previous military operations, they should not lose sight of the previous atrocities perpetrated by TTP in Swat and elsewhere in KP. These are likely to be repeated if the public fails to realise the level of the prevailing terrorist threat.

It is in response to this threat to national security that the government announced a military operation. The question is, how will it ensure it succeeds in dismantling TTP, given the constraints of the unprecedented opposition from the public and KP’s entire political leadership.

It is generally agreed that TTP today is so well-armed, well-trained and well-entrenched in KP that it will be difficult for the under-resourced, ill-armed police to tackle it on its own and that only a military-police combine can defeat it. However, the people and KP government have serious reservations regarding the real intentions and tactics of the proposed military action. Thus the first step vital for the operation’s success is to engage with the political leadership of KP and bridge the trust deficit. Together, they should come up with details of the operation, which are acceptable to all.

Also, to dispel public misgivings against the military operation, it should have a non-kinetic dimension, focusing on CBMs, such as fulfilling commitments made at the time of the Fata merger and compensating all those affected by the previous military campaigns. This should be part of a bigger, well-thought-out, comprehensive plan to build up the resilience of the local people against the ideology of violent extremism being preached by TTP. The support of the government of KP is essential for the success of this endeavour, since the provincial civil departments will be responsible for the delivery of such measures.

Last, but not the least, the military operation should be treated as an ad hoc measure; the long-term plan should be to immediately start building up the capacity of the police, so that the force is able to hold its own and defeat TTP through kinetic measures. The military can then recede into the background, intervening only when asked by the civilian authorities.

To make Azm-i-Istehkam effective, the main stakeholders must rise above partisan interests and institutional hubris to develop a mutually acceptable CT framework. The need of the hour is a military operation with a difference.

The writer is a former police officer who was Nacta’s first national coordinator.

Published in Dawn, June 30th, 2024