IS it a ‘vision’, a loose programme, or an actual kinetic ‘operation’? A week on, we don’t precisely know. Operation Azm-i-Istehkam seems to be suffering from the same kind of uncertainty that one presumes it set out to fix. It is worrying that a major counterterrorism initiative announced amidst a dramatic surge in violent incidents seems so untethered from specifics. The government has prevaricated about its actual scope and intent and, facing stiff resistance from representatives of the battle-fatigued areas where it is presumed it will be executed, has quickly played down its ambitions. Unnamed security sources have spoken to local media to assure that there will be no displacement of civilian population under the operation, nor will it entail a large-scale military action. So what will it be then, exactly?

Pakistan’s ambassador in the US, Masood Khan, was recently seeking small arms and modern equipment from Washington for the drive. The envoy’s explanations at a Washington-based think-tank illustrated the ‘Azm-i-Istehkam’ for prospective foreign backers. According to Mr Khan, the initiative has three components: doctrinal, societal and operational. According to him, work on the first two components is already underway, and work on the third is about to be initiated. It is for this third component that Pakistan is seeking “strong security links, [and to] enhance intelligence cooperation, resume sales of advanced military platforms, and work on ‘the sustainment of US-origin defence equipment’”, according to a news report on his interaction. Meanwhile, the defence minister has also spoken about the possibility of pursuing terrorists in hideouts based in Afghanistan. Not only do these two developments seem to contradict assurances of the limited scope of kinetic operations, they also contradict what Defence Minister Khawaja Asif recently stated about Pakistan not seeking help from Washington for the initiative. Why is there such a glaring disconnect between what the government intends to do and what it is publicly stating? The government should answer. Some of the other details that have come to light seem sensible: checking smuggling and cross-border infiltration and strengthening the prosecution of terrorism-related crimes. However, the government needs to communicate clearly and share a consolidated programme with all stakeholders if it hopes to achieve success. Azm-i-Istehkam seems to be in flux at the moment, and any quest for durable stability should ideally start from a more permanent plan.

Published in Dawn, July 1st, 2024