TWENTY-FOUR years ago, just months into his first term as Russia’s second post-Soviet president, Vladimir Putin was pictured partying at a dacha in Sochi while his nation coped with the loss of a nuclear-powered submarine during naval exercises; all of its 118 personnel perished in the disaster. The vessel was called Kursk.
Back in 2000, the Russian media had few qualms about calling out official incompetence and presidential indifference. Fast forward to 2024, and none of the officially tolerated press or TV outlets can be expected to seriously fault the authorities for this month’s swift foray into Russian territory by Ukrainian troops. The barely resisted incursion occurred in the Kursk oblast.
The region’s name should also resonate with anyone familiar with the key events of World War II. The most formidable clash of tanks in history entailed a monumental loss of life — upwards of a million, by some accounts — but the Battle of Kursk is mainly remembered as a turning point when, following a hard-won triumph in the Battle of Stalingrad, the Soviet Red Army turned the tide against the Nazi invaders. Less than two years later, it was at the gates of Berlin.
More than 80 years later, both sides in the unnecessary conflict try to tar each other with the Nazi tag; both rely to some extent on far-right forces within their military structures. But whatever the follies and fallacies of Moscow and Kyiv, this is not World War II, and it’s crucial to all humanity that it does not turn into World War III.
The curse of Kursk haunts Putin.
That threat still cannot be discounted, although the flashpoint might be in a different part of the world, but it is not imminent. However, the consequences of the Ukrainian advance into Russian territory remain unclear, and the messaging from Kyiv about its motivation has been somewhat muddled. It serves as a temporary morale booster for Ukrainians, no doubt, as well as a slap in the face for Putin’s pretensions as Mr Security — someone who would keep Russians safe from all foes. He has failed several times in that respect over the years, but it is not clear whether the present embarrassment will suffice as a potential tipping point.
The Ukrainian president has said that the successful attack on Russian soil was intended as a negotiating tactic — presumably to persuade Putin that the border is vulnerable in both directions, so his insistence on retaining large chunks of Ukraine as part of any peace deal is untenable. However, Volodymyr Zelensky and his aides have also talked about creating a buffer zone, and expressed the hope that some of the Russian troops on the front line in eastern Ukraine might be withdrawn to Kursk, which was poorly defended by inexperienced young conscripts, hundreds of whom are now in Ukrainian custody, possibly intended to serve as bargaining chips in future PoW exchanges.
Might that work, or will Putin’s instinct be to exact revenge, for which Ukrainian civilians may pay the biggest price? Putin’s tendency is to prefer revanchism over compromise. Russia’s apparent inability thus far to meaningfully resist the Ukrainian military in Kursk — the first time in 80 years that foreign forces have advanced so far into its territory — should serve as an even bigger reminder than his one-time confidant Yevgeny Prigozhin’s revolt last year that Putin’s republic does not measure up to its projected illusions. There is good reason, no doubt, to resent the Nato encirclement of Russia, which has been proceeding for decades, but that hardly justifies the decision to invade Ukraine, let alone pretend that the coveted territory ought never to have been separated from the ‘motherland’.
Without delving into history, suffice it to say that Putin’s ill-considered gambit returned to bite him on the backside, whereas it remains to be seen whether Zelensky’s gamble will pay any dividends. The conflict needs to end, but neither Ukraine and its Western allies nor Russia are inclined to contemplate the kind of compromises that would facilitate such an outcome — echoes of Gaza, arguably.
US sources suggest that Kyiv’s Kursk initiative derailed talks in Qatar towards an agreement on not targeting energy facilities: chiefly power plants in Ukraine and oil refineries in Russia, but including nuclear facilities. That information adds to the absurdity of Zelensky’s apparent assumption that the Kursk advance would sufficiently rattle Putin into making concessions. The Russian president, evidently intending to deny all responsibility (as usual) if what comes next does not fit his narrative, flew off to Azerbaijan on a scheduled visit. Echoes of the submarine incident.
What might come next in this sordid conflict remains to be seen. But anyone who expects Putin to come to his senses in the face of territorial blackmail is living in a fool’s paradise.
Published in Dawn, August 21st, 2024
Dear visitor, the comments section is undergoing an overhaul and will return soon.