US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan’s recent visit to Beijing indicated an effort by both countries to de-escalate tensions ahead of the American presidential election in November.

Described as talks in their ‘strategic communication’ channel, discussions between Sullivan and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi ranged over all the issues that divide the two countries — Taiwan, trade, technology curbs, military postures in the South China Sea and, according to the US readout, China’s support for Russia’s ‘industrial base’. They also discussed the possibility of a call between Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping to follow up on understandings reached last year in their face-to-face meetings in San Francisco and, earlier, in Bali.

It may be surprising for these talks to have taken place when the Biden administration is a lame duck. But the fact that the Chinese took them seriously underlines their desire to stabilise the relationship before the White House gets a new occupant.

For the Chinese president to receive Sullivan was a strong signal by Beijing that it wants to calm the turbulent relationship before uncertainties set in of how the next US president might act. President Xi told Sullivan he hoped the US would see China’s development in a positive light and work with China to find a “right way” for the two major countries to “coexist”. Both sides, he reiterated, should decide whether they are “rivals or partners.”

Differences over contentious issues did not, of course, narrow — but the positive atmospherics of the interaction did help lower the temperature. Both sides agreed to implement mutual commitments on countering narcotics and AI safety and risk. Also agreed was the need for military leaders at the theatre command level to speak to each other to limit the risk of miscalculation.

These are welcome efforts to put relations on a stable track. But the key question for the future remains: how will the winning presidential candidate deal with Beijing?

America’s policy of containing Beijing is not expected to change. China will continue to be seen as a strategic challenge. From most accounts, Chinese officials seem apprehensive that, irrespective of who wins the election, Washington will adopt a combative approach. The Financial Times recently quoted a Chinese professor as saying both candidates are “two bowls of poison for Beijing”. The Chinese apprehensions are well founded, given the bipartisan political consensus in the US is to act tough with China. Moreover, America’s deep state regards China as an enemy, not just a competitor.

Neither Trump nor Harris will want a collision course with China even as they intensify competition.

But, beyond this, would Donald Trump and Kamala Harris differ in their management of America’s relationship with China?

Trump is largely a known quantity, but then he is also unpredictable and impulsive. This makes it difficult to predict his future conduct, especially as he is capable of suddenly changing course. There is even less certainty about the foreign policy a Harris administration would pursue. However, both see China as the major competitor and adversary, and neither is expected to soften their position if elected.

Trump is expected to continue his ‘America First’, unilateralist approach that characterised his previous administration. He has struck an aggressive tone during his campaign, saying he would raise tariffs on Chinese imports by 60 per cent. But he has also said he would seek a good relationship with Beijing. In an interview with Fox News last month, he said that while there is no greater critic of China than him, he respected China and President Xi.

Therefore, Trump will likely take a tough position on trade issues, just like in his first term. At the same time, though most of his team members are hawks on China, he can easily override their views. He is capable of being pragmatic, as his business instincts would urge him to be transactional and strike trade deals rather than seek to subdue a rival or impose sanctions. His admiration for ‘strongmen’ might also encourage pragmatism, especially as he often boasts about the “great relationship” he had with President Xi.

On Taiwan, Trump has never said America would intervene militarily if China ‘invaded’ Taiwan, as Biden once declared. Otherwise, too, Trump would be averse to any military conflict with China. He has been critical of Taiwan, saying it should pay the US for defending it. He has also assailed Taiwan for “not giving anything to the US” and instead taking away “100pc of the semiconductor industry”. While this is a mistaken view, Trump has never let facts stand between him and his assertions.

His stance on Ukraine could have a knock-on effect on ties with China. Often claiming he can end the war “in a day”, Trump is likely to push for talks to end a conflict he says, “should never have happened.”

He says he has a plan to end the war, which he will unveil if elected. “I’ll have a deal made, guaranteed,” he has claimed. Trump is also not interested in continuing military aid to Ukraine. If he makes good on his promise to end the war, this will remove a growing irritant in relations with China, which the Biden administration has accused of helping Russia’s military-industrial base.

Kamala Harris’s foreign policy pronouncements have been vague. Also, she has never been to China. But she is expected to continue the policy approach of the Biden administration, of which she was a part for four years. Biden took the rivalry with China to another level by raising tariffs on a wider range of Chinese imports and enhancing military aid to Taiwan. He also unleashed an intense tech war by curbs and sanctions on Chinese companies.

On containing China, Harris won’t be any different. In her speech to the Democratic Convention, she pledged to ensure “that America — not China — wins the competition for the 21st century”. She will likely seek to cement anti-China alliances in Asia, as Biden sought to do. Harris would also be less able to resist the US military’s view of China as an enemy.

Whatever the differences between Trump and Harris, neither would want unmanaged tensions with China to push the two countries towards a collision course or a rupture. That would have disastrous consequences not just for the US and China, but also the rest of the world.

The writer is a former ambassador to the US, UK and UN.

Published in Dawn, September 9th, 2024