THE assassination of long-standing Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah by Israel last week has delivered a serious blow to what was once the Middle East’s most formidable armed group, sparking uncertainty about its future, the Palestinian conflict and Iran’s influence in the region.

Hezbollah has, in recent weeks and months, lost a number of senior figures, including the iconic Nasrallah, who led the group since 1992 after succeeding Abbass Mousavi, who was also assassinated by Israel.

In addition, a significant number of Hezbollah cadres were wounded in unprecedented pager and walkie-talkie blasts on Sept 17 and 18.

The group was the first external entity to open an active support front for Palestinians challenging the Israeli occupation on Oct 8 last year — a day after Hamas launched Operation Al Aqsa Flood. It has so far lost over 1,750 fighters, with another 7,000 wounded in the year-long conflict.

Israel has intensified its strikes on Hezbollah installations in recent weeks, causing extensive damage to its infrastructure and disrupting supply lines. Lebanon is currently under virtual siege imposed by Israel, preventing the group from receiving supplies from abroad.

In this challenging environment, Hezbollah is also undergoing a leadership transition, not only at the top but also within its second-tier leadership.

The group is no stranger to the kind of difficult situation it is in now. A similar scenario occurred during its 2006 conflict with Israel, when air strikes destroyed its rocket arsenal and took out several elite fighters. Nevertheless, it managed to hold off a much stronger Israeli army, earning considerable respect both at home and across the Arab world.

The losses suffered by Hezbollah in the current conflict are significantly higher than those in 2006. But at the same time, the group is now better resourced and manned, with an estimated force of over 100,000 members.

Trita Parsi, the executive vice president of Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, agrees that despite devastating blows, Hezbollah “is not finished”.

However, he noted, recovering from these losses wouldn’t be easy either. “Not only has almost the entire echelon of senior commanders been killed, but perhaps more importantly, its communications system has been cracked, and several informants working for Israel remain in the organisation. This makes it very difficult for Hezbollah to regroup and bounce back,” he maintained.

Israel’s meticulous intelligence campaign against the Lebanese outfit leveraged advanced technologies, strategic partnerships, and operational vulnerabilities to penetrate the organisation’s once-impenetrable defences.

Israeli intelligence had extensively focused on the organisation for finding a way into its inner circle.

The biggest opportunity came with Hezbollah’s 2012 deployment to Syria, aimed at supporting President Bashar Al Assad, which inadvertently compromised its internal security.

Coordination with foreign spies exposed Hezbollah’s operational mechanisms to Israeli monitoring.

The Israelis monitored “the communication system, gathering human intelligence, electronic intelligence, open source intelligence, but above all spatial intelligence that involved satellite information,” according to military analyst Elijah Magnier.

This multi-layered approach enabled precise strikes on Hezbollah leadership and infrastructure, compromising its security and operational effectiveness.

Reports indicate that Israel’s air campaign has destroyed only 10 per cent of Hezbollah’s arsenal, which mostly comprised fresh imports, leaving the group with tens of thousands of fighters and a significant stockpile of rockets and missiles.

The future of Hezbollah is undoubtedly uncertain following these losses. However, the group’s de-centralised structure and entrenchment within Lebanese society make it difficult to dismantle easily.

“Support of Hezbollah would become more determined,” Magnier believes. Therefore, what appears as a tactical victory for Israel may not easily translate into a long-term strategic advantage.

Hashem Safieddine, who was the head of Hezbollah’s executive council at the time of Nasrallah’s death, is expected to take over as the next leader.

He will be well-prepared to assume command. Being Nasrallah’s maternal cousin and connected to Qassem Soleimani, the Iranian commander killed in a US drone strike, he is likely to be even more connected to Iran, Hezbollah’s primary backer.

Operationally, the group has shown few signs of weakness amid recent setbacks, as it has continued its rocket attacks on Israeli targets, with only a slight reduction in their frequency.

Published in Dawn, October 1st, 2024

Header image: A billboard bearing a picture of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah is displayed on a building in Tehran on Sept 30, 2024. — AFP