Studies show that incidents of civil unrest have been increasing across the world. Yet, there are also those who are of the view that the police are now more likely to contain and control unrest than ever before. The ‘success’ in this regard can be measured by the ability of the police to not only avoid causing fatal casualties among the protesters, but also within their own ranks. 

The urgency to study violent unrests and, more so, how they are (or should be) tackled by the police, intensified in the 1970s after the world witnessed a brutal series of riots in the mid- and late 1960s. A large number of protesters lost their lives in these riots. 

Till the 1960s, the most common tactic used by the police was to line up in front of the protesters and, at the slightest provocation, fire rounds of tear gas before charging and smashing into the protesters with batons. The idea was to create fear in the protesters and a sense of dread. This often led to multiple injuries and even deaths. These were ‘bad optics’ as well for an institution that wished to be seen as a legitimate force, out to prevent violence and chaos. 

Therefore, during and soon after the 1960s, police in most countries began to be viewed by the media and most people as a symbol of brutality. It began to rapidly lose whatever little sympathy was left for it, as images of cops giving protesters severe thrashings became common on TV and in newspapers. 

While police forces across the globe are now better equipped to manage and contain riots without causing casualties, they claim to have become more vulnerable themselves and are still largely perceived as ‘aggressors’ in such encounters

Over the next three decades, various new ‘crowd control’ tactics were developed. But this mostly took place in Europe and the US; old tactics to vanquish rioters and protesters continued to be applied in dictatorships in Asia, Africa and South America. 

Deaths and severe injuries during protests remained a common feature in these regions and so did the reputation of the police as a ‘brutal force.’ However, things began to somewhat change in these regions as well from the 1990s onwards. 

So, what were the new tactics?

One of the most prominent among these emerged in the US from a 1982 “Broken Window Theory.” It was called the ‘Broken Window Theory’ because if a broken window is ignored, it is bound to lead to the creation of much larger problems. The theory posited that major crimes and widespread violence can be prevented if minor offences are punished, instead of being ignored or only leniently addressed. 

This, the argument went, would help regulate society’s violent and criminal tendencies and aid the creation of a law-abiding environment. This theory also posited that, in law-abiding environments, protests too remain peaceful. The theory was first turned into practice by the New York police in 1990. It was applied to various degrees in some European countries as well. But it soon began to attract criticism for having racial and class biases. 

Secondly, its ‘achievements’ were said to be questionable, because they were based on outcomes whose sources were independent of the policies of the ‘Broken Window’ applications. Then there was the ‘faulty assumption’ that the intensity of crime and political unrest were related. 

But before the ‘Broken Window’ policies began to be seen as preemptive measures based on what turned out to be largely flawed hypotheses, there was the ‘negotiated management’ tactic. In this, the government encouraged protesters to negotiate with the police in setting certain rules of engagement and the routes the protesters were to take to avoid violence. But most protesters often break such agreements. This, in turn, sees the police return to applying tougher measures.

In the 2000s and 2010s, police forces formulated two more tactics in a bid to contain the more severe outcomes of riots. In the first, police troops face the protesters as layered formations, with left and right flanks, and a front and a centre. This way, the troops can keep an eye on the protesters from various angles and act from multiple sides. This tactic also actually allows strategic gaps, from which protesters who want to exit the protest can leave. 

Then there is what the faculty member of the US Army War College M Christopher calls ‘command and control’ — a tactic in which the police disperses pockets of people before they can come together to form a mob. The coming together is also foiled by creating physical barriers. 

All these tactics are used depending on the conditions. Images of riots, as seen in the media, seem chaotic. But the authorities often have a holistic view of the proceedings. Police are only armed with batons, tear gas and shields. Officers who are allowed to carry pistols are discouraged from using them. The idea is to avoid casualties and severe injuries. 

However, due to the new tactics, chances of cops getting injured or losing their lives have increased. The police often complain that, in a bid to avoid bad optics (in the media), authorities put the lives of the cops in greater danger.

During the 2021 mob attack on Capitol Hill in Washington DC, the Capitol Police sent out an urgent request to the military to deploy members of the National Guard. But the request was initially ignored because the director of the army staff “didn’t like the visual of the National Guard standing in a police line with the Capitol in the background.”

During the October 4 protests in Islamabad by the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI), the police used negotiated management and command and control tactics. But whatever little rules of engagement were agreed, they quickly broke down. 

Barriers were placed to stop people from marching towards Islamabad. These are often erected to isolate groups who might transform into mobs. These groups are then dispersed. This is why one only saw small groups of protesters sporadically managing to enter Islamabad. And yet, there was a causality — a cop. 

Whereas severe injuries and deaths among protesters have greatly reduced due to the aforementioned tactics, these have increased among cops. Yet, the police have not been able to shrug off the image of being the aggressor. 

Even one or two images of isolated incidents splashed in the media can undermine the position of the police as a legitimate force controlling ‘illegitimate’ action. This ‘damned if I do, damned if I don’t’ disposition can become a major source of despondency and frustration among cops.

Published in Dawn, EOS, October 20th, 2024