POLITICAL parties in Pakistan generally do not have a plan to engage the youth in constructive activities to capitalise on their potential. The exception is the PTI, which has mobilised a large segment of the youth to fuel an agitation movement in the country. Nevertheless, the party’s approach stems from its focus on its leader Imran Khan’s personality, rather than a deep connection between the youth and democratic values, rights, freedom, and hope.

In their comparison of PTI-led activism with the recent student movement in Bangladesh, which led to the ouster of Sheikh Hasina Wajed, political commentators overlooked several vital points. First, the student movement was centred on the pursuit of rights and freedoms, which Sheikh Ha­­sina’s government had curbed. The movement was not sudden but the result of a continuing dialogue and debate about the situation in Bangladesh, which primarily took place on university campuses, with Dhaka University as the main point. Social media platforms amplified the impact of these discussions, but they were essentially underpinned by robust intellectual discourse.

It was Gen Z — all too often stereotyped as self-centred — which actually came up with compelling arguments for change and successfully executed plans and strategies, drawing strength from marginalised segments. By contrast, PTI-led youth activism lacks the organisation and strong intellectual discourse of the student movement in Bangladesh. In fact, it is mainly jobless youth from KP that constitute the bulk of the party’s street power. Moreover, the PTI lacks strong organisational roots on campuses, which has limited its ability to foster sustained youth engagement.

A more fitting comparison for the student movement in Bangladesh might be drawn with the Jammu and Kashmir Joint Awami Action Com­mittee and the Awami Action Committee of Gilgit-Baltistan, which effectively mobilised the public against the government’s efforts to eliminate subsidies. Moreover, political and ideological parallels could be drawn with movements like the Haq Do Tehreek in Gwadar and the Baloch Yakjheti Committee, led by Mehrang Baloch, which have galvanised marginalised segments around the issue of rights and the missing persons.

Imran Khan’s political agenda does not address the structural challenges the youth face.

What unites the youth around Imran Khan is his consistent narrative and political rhetoric, coupled with his populist leadership style. For many, he represents a heroic figure, a symbol of resistance against the establishment, and a beacon of hope in a political landscape where mainstream parties have compromised mainly with the establishment. Most importantly, he serves as a symbol of change for the growing middle class of Pakistan, a demographic burdened by the demands of the country’s 59 per cent youth bulge.

However, the PTI is similar to other political parties in the country, many of which have transformed into political dynasties. Power and leadership within the PTI are increasingly concentrated around Imran Khan and his family, with crucial decisions made only with his consent. Despite widespread public support, the party needs a solid organisational structure and an effective secondary leadership capable of uniting its cadre when the top leadership is absent.

The PTI often displays overconfidence, as evident in its ‘solo flight’ approach when it holds protests. It prefers this to building consensus with rival political parties. Its agitation revolves around Imran Khan’s release from jail, instead of broader democratic principles. Even its stance on judicial independence has been selective as evidenced by its approach to the 26th Amendment to the Constitution.

While Pakistan does have potential for a vibrant student movement to evolve, there are three major constraints in the way. First, the PTI is channelling youth energy into populist ideas and cultish loyalty, which erodes the potential for open dialogue among the youth. Second, the establishment has taken control of university campuses, and has managed to restrict spaces meant for intellectual debate and activism. Religious activities — spearheaded by groups such as the Tableeghi Jamaat, the Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan, and even some banned ones — are given prominence. Unfortu­nately, this has also impacted faculty members, who have either come under these groups’ influe­nce or surrendered their independence to the es­­tablishment. Even a mid-level official of the establishment can effectively control a university, with the teaching staff and administrators unable to challenge his authority.

The powers that be along with other state insti­t­u­­­­­tions and political parties have undermined Pak­istani youth’s potential. Two key factors should be mentioned: their fear of a youth-led movement for change and their lack of vision regarding the constructive harnessing and channelling of the you­th’s potential. In brief, the power elites are fo­­c­used only on safeguarding their own interests. They send their children abroad for education or enrol them in one of the handful of exclusive elite institutions in the country, with little to no concern for the broader quality of education, the fut­ure of the youth, or the development of a knowledge-based economy. Their primary focus remains on controlling the youth rather than empowering them.

Those who call the shots in Pakistan follow a template similar to Sheikh Hasina’s in Bangladesh. In her case, she first subdued the media through severe censorship, then eliminated political opponents, brought the judiciary under her control, and forged alliances with the military. While their may some differences in sequence, the overall process here is strikingly similar, with the ruling parties reinforcing such practices.

But despite such parallels with Bangladesh, the power elites here do not perceive the emergence of a similar nationwide movement, given their tight grip on university campuses, the fragmentation of rights movements on ethnic and nationalist lines, and the limited potential for a unified uprising. The PTI, perhaps unintentionally, plays into the strategy of those who wield actual power by keeping the youth engaged in futile political activities and diverting their energy from constructive efforts. Even if Imran Khan achieves his aims, including his release, through youth support, it is unlikely to inspire any long-term optimism in the younger generation. His political agenda does not offer any real hope, nor does it address the structural challenges the youth face.

Additionally, the links between the extremists and the power wielders are still there, which ensures that the latter can rely on these religiously inspired elements for support in times of crisis, further consolidating their control.

The writer is a security analyst.

Published in Dawn, December 1st, 2024