AS I write this, Syrian rebels are in control of half of the ancient and strategically vital city of Aleppo. In a rapid three-day advance that saw government forces melt away, the rebels captured town after town before entering Aleppo. This is not only the biggest rebel advance in almost a decade, it is also the only time rebels have assaulted Aleppo since 2012, when they seized control of eastern Aleppo before being subjected to a brutal siege by Russian and Syrian forces in 2016, which ended in their retreat.
The offensive has upended the fragile balance established since the Russian and Iranian intervention — aided by a large deployment of pro-Iran forces like Hezbollah, various Iraqi militia groups and also the Al Fatemiyoun and Al Zeinabiyoun militias — helped Bashar al-Assad’s floundering Syrian Arab army (SAA) retain control over approximately 70 per cent of the country.
The rebels — an alphabet soup of groups with differing ideologies and composition — retained control of the rest of Syria and have enjoyed the support of a changing cast of regional actors, notably Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, which has carved out a ‘buffer zone’ in northern Syria, ostensibly as a defence against attacks by the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
The rebels have also received political and logistical support (along with not-so-covert military aid) from several Western powers, notably the US, which retains 900 soldiers in Syria, ostensibly to protest against a resurgence by the Daesh.
The rebel offensive has upended a fragile balance.
The current advance is being spearheaded by Hayat al-Tahrir Sham (HTS) along with smaller groups and seemingly a not insignificant number of foreign fighters, such as Uzbeks and Chechens. Reports also seem to indicate that the SDF is cooperating with Russia and Assad’s SAA, and while the fog of war is hard to penetrate, this would make sense given Turkey’s support for the Syrian rebels.
Interestingly, the fall of Aleppo has also been welcomed by Taliban militant Hafiz Gul Bahadur, whose group hosted several Arab fighters in the past, some of whom went on to join HTS or its predecessor groups.
HTS has an interesting history: its leader, Abu Mohammed al-Golani, was the commander of Al Qaeda’s Syria branch, and directed several bombing campaigns which targeted civilians as much as they did government forces. Since then, he has ‘moderated’ his stance enough to gain the tacit support (or at least end the opposition) of the US, which had designated HTS as a terrorist group. During Donald Trump’s first presidency, the US acknowledged that HTS was no longer on its active target list.
This offensive comes at a time when none of Assad’s allies — Iran, Russia or Hezbollah — have resources or troops that can be mobilised quickly to aid Assad’s forces, which have often proven themselves incapable of fighting.
And it is no coincidence that this offensive — while undoubtedly planned well in advance — was launched just a few days after the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire. Having lost a great part of its most senior leadership, and having suffered casualties and a serious depletion of their war material stocks, Hezbollah is in no position to aid Assad. Hezbollah also opened itself up for infiltration and intelligence gathering by Israel due to their involvement in Syria and may eschew another such involvement so soon, even if they had the resources to manage it.
The same largely goes for Russia, which is bogged down in Ukraine, where its best generals and troops must, of course, be deployed at the expense of the hitherto quiet Syrian front. Now, while some Russian air assets are indeed being deployed, it may well be too little, and certainly far too late, to slow the advance. Strategically, the prospect of losing a chunk of Syria poses a dilemma for Russia, which relies on the Syrian port of Tartus, which is effectively Russia’s only foothold in the Mediterranean, and allows the Russian navy to repair, refuel and resupply without having to resort to its Black Sea bases.
In effect, this advance opens up new fronts for Russia, Hezbollah and Iran. The obvious beneficiaries are Israel and the US.
Depleted by its war against Israel in support of Gaza, Hezbollah needs to keep its overland supply routes open in order to be prepared for the inevitable second round with Israel, and the advance directly endangers those routes.
Israel, meanwhile, is sitting pretty, having closed the Lebanese front and redoubled its destruction of Gaza. Tel Aviv has a long history of supporting anti-Assad forces and even evacuating Al Qaeda-linked forces to occupied Golan for medical treatment by Israeli army medics. In 2018, outgoing Israeli chief of staff admitted to having armed anti-Assad rebels after years of denials. The dismantling of the ‘axis of resistance’ remains the goal and this is just one more step towards that end.
The writer is a journalist.
Published in Dawn, December 2nd, 2024
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