NO one knows the exact number of madressahs in Pakistan — not the government, not the madressah leadership, and not independent agencies.

Each entity offers its estimates, claiming theirs to be the most accurate. The numbers are critical if we are to understand the seminaries’ scope, scale, quality, political economy, outreach, support base, and overall contributions. Regrettably, the state as well as the madressah leadership have created confusion where registration is concerned, causing the issue to overshadow the equally important debate on the national impact of these religious schools.

The registration issue has been exploited by the JUI to consolidate its control over these seminaries, strengthen the party’s political constituency, and resist state regulation.

The debate over madressah registration revolves around whether it should be conducted through the Directorate General of Religious Education (DGRE) or the Societies Registration (Amendment) Act, 2024. The growing conflict, which is linked to the rulers’ attempts to court the JUI chief to obtain his support for the 26th Amendment, has deepened rifts within the madressah leadership itself.

Maulana Fazlur Rehman has clear political motives: to retain control over the Deobandi madressahs, push for amendments to the Societies Act for madressah registration, and render the DGRE irrelevant. If successful, the madressahs already registered with the DGRE would be forced to re-register under the Societies Act. Additionally, the new madressah boards created after the DGRE’s creation in 2020 would lose their authority, effectively surrendering to the older, more traditional educational boards.

Two primary issues obstruct an accurate count of madressahs in the country.

Currently, four educational boards are aligned with the Deobandi, five with the Barelvi, two with the Shia, and two with the Ahle Hadith schools of thought, and one with the Jamaat-i-Islami. Maulana Fazl and the older madressah leadership aim to reclaim their influence over these boards. However, those already registered with the DGRE oppose this move. They argue that madressahs should be free to choose their registration system — whether under the DGRE or the Societies Act — without being forced to switch. However, the madressah leadership has a history of shifting its stance on the registration issue since the late 1990s — often based on a mix of genuine and assumed concerns.

Two major assumptions underpin their opposition. First, the madressah leadership fears that state-led registration will allow the government to interfere in their curriculum and financial affairs, thus weakening its control over these institutions. Second, it believes registration will undermine madressahs’ autonomy and open the door to foreign influence, enabling external forces to engineer the seminaries.

The latter assumption runs deep in the madressah mindset. Viewing the state through a colonial lens, the madressahs seek to preserve their religious and social code, in an echo of their struggles under the British. This perception has helped nurture militant groups such as the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan. The TTP, in particular, has constructed its political and ideological paradigm on the notion of resisting state control, which they see as a colonial legacy.

The state considers itself the custodian of nationalism, which it has linked with religion. However, the madressah leadership believes the state lacks the legitimacy to impose regulatory mechanisms. Interestingly, the DGRE was initially supported by the madressahs, which preferred it to registering under the Societies Act, which they believed would make them directly accountable to the state. Additionally, due to the security situation, the LEAs were collecting data on madressahs — which the madressah leadership criticised as unnecessary interference.

The state thought that creating more madressah educational boards would help lower sectarian divisions, but its strategy backfired, with more boards along sectarian lines deepening the divide.

The madressah leadership’s acceptance of the DGRE was primarily aimed at avoiding LEA interventions and not complying with the Societies Act requirements. Even if the new act proposed by the JUI is passed and implemented, the madressah leadership is likely to come up with new excuses to resist state-led regulation and maintain its autonomy.

With proper registration and an accurate count of madressahs, the state can assess their true potential and impact on the education sector. While madressahs are increasingly encroaching on the private education sector, their primary competitor remains the public education system. Federal and provincial governments often use madressahs as an excuse to reduce education budgets, claiming that they meet the needs of a significant segment of society. However, data does not support this perception — madressahs are estimated to cater to only nine to per cent of Pakistan’s educational needs, though their leadership claims they cater to double the statistic. Yet, such assertions need verifiable data. Traditional madressah boards claim 26,000 madressahs, while 10,000 are registered with the new boards and the DGRE, bringing the official count to around 36,000. However, other estimates put the number closer to 50,000. Even the chairman of the Council of Islamic Ideology supports this figure but notes that over 60pc of the madressahs only provide basic Quranic instruction and do not technically qualify as full-fledged madressahs.

Two primary issues obstruct an accurate count. First, large madressahs often have multiple branches, including separate campuses for boys and girls. Yet they are typically counted as a single institution, a practice reinforced by the recent amendment proposed by the JUI in the Societies Act, which states that madressahs with multiple branches will be treated as one entity. The DGRE follows the same approach. Also, unregistered madressahs are often found to operate under the endorsement of registered ones.

The second issue pertains to ‘ghost madressahs’ — institutions that exist only on paper, and whose names are often used to collect donations or maintain registration status even after they have been shut down. For example, when the principal of a small madressah cannot sustain operations or receives an offer to teach elsewhere, the madressah may close while its registration remains active.

The issue of funding further complicates the debate. While no one knows the exact volume of donations and charity that madressahs receive, their growth — particularly their increasing role in the private education sector — suggests they are attracting far more resources than their official scale would justify. Ultimately, the ambiguity surrounding their numbers and operations translates into greater power and influence for Pakistan’s religious elites.

The writer is a security analyst.

Published in Dawn, December 15th, 2024